Conclusion

No Solution ◽  
2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.C. Aveyard
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Political Context ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
British Policy ◽  
Northern Ireland Conflict ◽  
The Government ◽  
Lack Of Commitment

This book has attempted to critique a number of flawed perceptions of British policy during the Northern Ireland conflict. The Labour government’s handling of the UWC strike was not as disastrous as has been portrayed. From an analysis of the context of the strike and the challenges it proffered it becomes clear that the government was limited in what it could achieve. The strike did not merely succeed because of indecisiveness or a lack of commitment to Sunningdale. This is reinforced by the experience of the UUAC strike three years later. The depiction of the two stoppages as symbolic of Rees and Mason’s tenures as Secretary of State is inaccurate. In spite of a vastly different political context the UUAC strike was a close-run affair; after three years of planning difficulties remained....

scholarly journals The formation of the Ulster Home Guard

2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (158) ◽  
pp. 230-246
Author(s):  
William Butler
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Second World War ◽  
Police Force ◽  
British Government ◽  
Law And Order ◽  
World War ◽  
British Policy ◽  
The Government ◽  
Second World

AbstractThis article explores the problems encountered in the formation of the Ulster Home Guard, supposedly a direct equivalent to its well-known British counterpart, as part of the paramilitary Ulster Special Constabulary in Northern Ireland, during the Second World War. Predictably, the Ulster Home Guard became an almost exclusively Protestant organisation which led to many accusations of sectarianism from a variety of different national and international voices. This became a real concern for the British government, as well as the army, which understandably wished to avoid any such controversy. Though assumptions had previously been made about the numbers of Catholics in the force, this article explores just how few joined the organisation throughout the war. Additionally, the article investigates the rather awkward constitutional position in which the Ulster Home Guard was placed. Under the Government of Ireland Act, the Stormont administration had no authority on matters of home defence. It did, however, have the power to raise a police force as a way to maintain law and order. Still, the Ulster Home Guard, although formed as part of the Ulster Special Constabulary, was entrusted solely with home defence and this had wider implications for British policy towards Northern Ireland throughout the Second World War.

Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980

1981 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. V. Lowe
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Significant Shift ◽  
British Government ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
British Policy ◽  
The Government ◽  
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

The Protection of Trading Interests Act, passed by the United Kingdom Parliament on March 20, 1980, is one of the most remarkable pieces of legislation to emerge in recent years from that body. It effects a significant shift in British policy relating to the control of international restrictive practices, and is of considerable interest to international lawyers. The aim of the Government in introducing the measure was, in the words of the Secretary of State for Trade, “to reassert and reinforce the defences of the United Kingdom against attempts by other countries to enforce their economic and commercial policies unilaterally on us.” This aim is secured, in general terms, by a combination of three measures. Firstly, an extension of the power of the British Government to forbid compliance by British citizens and businesses with orders of foreign authorities, where those orders have extraterritorial effect and prejudice British trading interests. Secondly, a prohibition on the enforcement by United Kingdom courts of foreign judgments involving the award of multiple damages and of certain other judgments touching upon the control of restrictive practices. Thirdly, the establishment of a right for British citizens or businesses against whom foreign courts have awarded multiple damages to recover the noncompensatory element from the original plaintiff by an action in a United Kingdom court.

The collapse of power-sharing

No Solution ◽  
2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.C. Aveyard
Keyword(s):  
Great Britain ◽  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Political Context ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
The Political ◽  
Labour Government ◽  
Security Forces ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
Industrial Disputes

This chapter considers the initial three months of the Labour government, incorporating both the political and security situation. During this time the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees, and the Northern Ireland Office made changes to security policy. Many of these showed continuity with the previous administration but some reflected the differing attitude of the Labour frontbench while in opposition. Most prominent was the suggestion that the police should play a greater role in security efforts. In May the UWC strike led to the collapse of the power-sharing executive and this is considered in great detail. It is argued that previous accounts have placed insufficient emphasis on the political context and the parameters within which the security forces could operate. The practical difficulties involved in strike-breaking are large and the loyalist strike should be placed in the broader, British context of difficulties experienced in handling industrial disputes in Great Britain.

The Arthur Crawford Scandal

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Metelits
Keyword(s):  
Retirement Age ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Government Service ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Modus Operandi ◽  
High Court ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
The Press ◽  
The Government ◽  
To Receive

The Arthur Crawford Scandal explores how nineteenth century Bombay tried a British official for corruption. The presidency government persuaded Indians, government officials, to testify against the very person who controlled their career by offering immunity from legal action and career punishment. A criminal conviction of Crawford’s henchman established the modus operandi of a bribery network. Subsequent efforts to intimidate Indian witnesses led to litigation at the high court level, resulting in a political pressure campaign in London based on biased press reports from India. These reports evoked questions in the House of Commons; questions became demands that Indians witnesses against Crawford be fired from government service. The secretary of state for India and the Bombay government negotiated about the fate of the Indian witnesses. At first, the secretary of state accepted the Bombay government’s proposals. But the press campaign against the Indian witnesses eventually led him to order the Government of India, in consultation with the Government of Bombay, to pass a law ordering those officials who paid Crawford willingly, to be fired. Those whom the Bombay government determined to be extorted were not to be fired. Both groups retained immunity from further actions at law. Thus, Bombay won a victory that almost saved its original guarantee of immunity: those who were fired were to receive their salary (along with periodic step increases) until they reached retirement age, at which time they would receive a pension. However, this ‘solution’ did little to overcome the stigma and suffering of the fired officials.

British Policy Toward Egyptian Labour Activism, 1882–1936

1988 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary Lockman
Keyword(s):  
Suez Canal ◽  
Upper Egypt ◽  
British Policy ◽  
The Government ◽  
Port Said

In May 1896 Lord Cromer, the British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt and that country's de facto ruler, received a “very numerously signed petition” from the coalheavers of Port Said. These workers, most of them migrants from Upper Egypt, were employed through labor contractors by several English and other foreign-owned companies to carry coal onto ships transiting the Suez Canal. The coalheavers complained of ill-treatment by the contractors (shuyuūkh), who “buy and sell us like slaves”, stealing part of their wages and forcing them to buy all they needed at stores owned by the contractors. Cromer acknowledged receipt of the petition in a letter to the coaling companies, commenting that the workers “seem to have some real grievances, notably in connection with the truck system”. Suggesting that the employers seek to avoid a strike, he expressed the opinion that the government “should deal with a strike at Port Said on the same lines as a strike in England, that is to say, that they should preserve order and not interfere to any serious extent between employers and labourers.”

The Limits to Coercive Consociationalism in Northern Ireland

1989 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 562-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan O'Leary
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Irish History ◽  
Northern Ireland Conflict

The merits of consociation as a means of solving the Northern Ireland conflict are presented through contrasting it with other ways of stabilizing highly divided political systems. Why voluntary consociation has been unsuccessful in Northern Ireland and unfortunately is likely to remain so is explained. The signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) must be understood against the background of the failure of previous consociational experiments. The AIA partly represented a shift in British strategy from voluntary to coercive consociationalism. The prospects for this coercive consociational strategy and variants on it are evaluated. Irish history is something Irishmen should never remember, and Englishmen should never forget.

The exit option: mediation and the termination of negotiations in the Northern Ireland conflict

2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niall O´ Dochartaigh ◽  
Isak Svensson
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Third Party ◽  
British Government ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Irish Republican Army ◽  
Northern Ireland Conflict ◽  
Exit Option ◽  
Information Advantage ◽  
The Uk

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the mediation exit option, which is one of the most important tactics available to any third party mediator.Design/methodology/approachThe paper analyzes a crucial intermediary channel between the Irish Republican Army (hereafter IRA) and the British Government utilizing unique material from the private papers of the intermediary, Brendan Duddy, including diaries that cover periods of intensive communication, extensive interviews with the intermediary and with participants in this communication on both the British Government and Irish Republican sides as well as recently released official papers from the UK National Archives relating to this communication.FindingsThe study reveals how the intermediary channel was used in order to get information, how the third party and the primary parties traded in asymmetries of information, and how the intermediary utilized the information advantage to increase the credibility of his threats of termination.Research limitations/implicationsThe study outlines an avenue for further research on the termination dynamics of mediation.Practical implicationsUnderstanding the conditions for successfully using the exit‐option is vital for policy‐makers, in particular for peace diplomacy efforts in other contexts than the Northern Ireland one.Originality/valueThe paper challenges previous explanations for why threats by mediators to call off further mediation attempts are successful and argues that a mediator can use the parties' informational dependency on him in order to increase his leverage and push the parties towards settlement.

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