Police primacy and the myth of Ulsterisation

This chapter shows how over the course of 1976 plans were prepared to adjust security policy in line with Rees’s desire for police primacy, leading to the professionalization of the RUC and a marked change in the responsibilities and actions of the security forces. By placing greater emphasis on police work and proceeding through the courts, as well as limiting the way in which the army operated, it was hoped that support for paramilitary groups would be undermined. In September 1976 Rees moved to the Home Office and Roy Mason took his place. Some authors have depicted this changing of the guard as heralding a more confident and aggressive security policy. While his rhetorical efforts were effective in securing confidence from unionists, his contribution to security policy was minimal.

‘Positive direct rule’: economic policy

This chapter looks at economic policy in Northern Ireland in the context of severe economic difficulties experienced by the UK as a whole. It shows how the Labour government sought to shield Northern Ireland from economic realities because of the conflict, increasing public expenditure and desperately seeking industrial investment. The level of desperation in this endeavour is illustrated through examples such as Harland & Wolff’s shipyards and the DeLorean Motor Company. The experience of the 1970s, and particularly under the Labour government, set the pattern for the following decades with a steadily increasing subvention from the rest of the United Kingdom and a growing dependence on the public sector, all at a time when the opposite trend took place in Great Britain.

Conclusion

This book has attempted to critique a number of flawed perceptions of British policy during the Northern Ireland conflict. The Labour government’s handling of the UWC strike was not as disastrous as has been portrayed. From an analysis of the context of the strike and the challenges it proffered it becomes clear that the government was limited in what it could achieve. The strike did not merely succeed because of indecisiveness or a lack of commitment to Sunningdale. This is reinforced by the experience of the UUAC strike three years later. The depiction of the two stoppages as symbolic of Rees and Mason’s tenures as Secretary of State is inaccurate. In spite of a vastly different political context the UUAC strike was a close-run affair; after three years of planning difficulties remained....

The evolution of the long war

After the ceasefire the Provisional IRA was in disarray and it struggled because of increased attrition by British security forces. In response, just as the Labour government adapted to the long haul ahead by formulating the policies of police primacy and criminalisation, republicans fashioned a ‘long war’ strategy which formed the basis of their armed struggle for the rest of the conflict. Sections of the Northern Ireland Office began to appreciate that the conflict would persist over a number of years because of the PIRA’s ability to adapt to the new conditions. Pressures from the British army to revert to a more aggressive stance persisted and there was growing evidence that senior officers were only paying lip service to the Labour government’s strategy. There were also a number of controversies over SAS operations, the growing protest in the prisons and interrogation techniques used by the RUC. Each of these illustrates the limitations on attempts to drive a wedge between the Provisional IRA and the nationalist community.

Political inertia

This chapter shows how the period that followed the end of the Convention was characterised by political inertia. It deals with the perception that under Roy Mason politics was pushed to one side in favour of a focus on the economy and security. This is extended to relations with the parties, including a congenial relationship with the Ulster Unionists and a steadily worsening one with the Social Democratic and Labour Party.

The collapse of power-sharing

This chapter considers the initial three months of the Labour government, incorporating both the political and security situation. During this time the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees, and the Northern Ireland Office made changes to security policy. Many of these showed continuity with the previous administration but some reflected the differing attitude of the Labour frontbench while in opposition. Most prominent was the suggestion that the police should play a greater role in security efforts. In May the UWC strike led to the collapse of the power-sharing executive and this is considered in great detail. It is argued that previous accounts have placed insufficient emphasis on the political context and the parameters within which the security forces could operate. The practical difficulties involved in strike-breaking are large and the loyalist strike should be placed in the broader, British context of difficulties experienced in handling industrial disputes in Great Britain.

After the ceasefire

In this chapter the Labour government’s focus turned to long-term plans for constitutional and security policy. The period up to March 1976 marked a phase in which the great uncertainties that had dominated since the collapse of Sunningdale were replaced with clearer plans for the future. Some Labour ministers sought to discuss radical changes to Northern Ireland’s relationship with Great Britain. Rees was dismissive and, after the Convention concluded, these debates ended with the affirmation of indefinite direct rule. Sectarian violence led Wilson to announce the deployment of the Special Air Service (SAS) to County Armagh but longer-term plans were also made more publicly clear. Rees’s commitment to what became known as criminalisation was announced with the ending of detention without trial, a declaration that special category status for prisoners would be phased out and an emphasis on operating through the court system.

Drift?

This chapter deals with the aftermath of the collapse of power-sharing and the Labour government’s attempts to produce an entirely new constitutional approach. To many at the time, British policy for the remainder of 1974 was frustratingly static, both on the political front and in dealing with paramilitary violence. Though the period might be characterised as one of drift, significant developments occurred behind closed doors. Plans were developed for an expected Provisional IRA ceasefire and the Gardiner commission produced its report, identifying many of the key changes that would follow and supporting Rees in his desire for a security policy which moved away from detention without trial and placed greater emphasis on the police. Rees also declared his plan for a constitutional convention in which politicians in Northern Ireland would be given the task of seeking an agreement without imposition from Dublin or London.

Background: British Labour and Northern Ireland, 1964–74

This chapter provides background and context for Labour’s policies on Northern Ireland when it returned to government in March 1974. It examines the general attitude to Northern Ireland at Westminster, the bipartisan support for internal reform at Stormont, dissent within the Labour party on bipartisanship, the escalation of the Northern Ireland conflict, the imposition of direct rule and the making of the Sunningdale Agreement. It concludes with a number of blows to Sunningdale prior to the February 1974 general election.

Fraying at the edges: the Provisional IRA ceasefire

This chapter considers Labour policy in Northern Ireland during the Provisional IRA ceasefire. In the dialogue facilitated by Brendan Duddy the British representatives made a number of statements to the effect that the government was willing to withdraw from Northern Ireland. The analysis presented here is that these remarks were made in order to drag the ceasefire out and that it did not amount to the bilateral arrangement they had hoped for. Rees is shown here to be firm on what was expected of the ceasefire. Publicly, he was placed in the difficult position of being unable to make clear, definitive statements without endangering the ceasefire. Privately, he insisted there could be no negotiation with republicans and that the benefit of the ceasefire was that it enabled the Labour government to remove detention without trial and pursue a new policy of criminalisation. In the autumn it became apparent to the Provisionals that they were being strung along and the ceasefire collapsed.