scholarly journals Primjena načela fiskalne neutralnosti u presudama suda pravde Evropske unije / Application of Fiscal Neutrality Principle in the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

Author(s):  
Dinka Antić

Neutrality of value added tax (VAT) is not only a theoretical issue and unattainable myth but also a need for all modern economies. Higher degree of neutrality brings to a reduction of distortions on micro, macro and global economic system caused by selective taxation, with positive consequences on capital allocation efficiency at the national, regional and global level. The European Union, as a supranational integration, has mobilised all available legal mechanisms for elimination of harmful practice and policies that jeopardise VAT neutrality in the Member States and at the EU level as well. The EU is aiming at increasing the efficiency of the VAT system and coherence with the global VAT system promoted by OECD. By activities on reforming the EU legal framework in the field of VAT taxation taxpayers in the EU are brought to the level playing field at the EU Single Market and the world market as well. Legal framework at the EU level has been updated directly by amendments to the Council Directive 2006/112/EC and other related Council directives, and indirectly, via comprehensive case law of the Court of Justice of the EU. The practice of the Court and mandatory implementation of its case law indirectly contribute to uniformity of application of the VAT rules, its efficiency and neutrality in relation to position of taxpayers at the EU level. The Court decisions have become a powerful mechanism of supranational intervention in the EU VAT system aiming at achieving a higher degree of harmonisation of VAT system at the EU level. Due to the attitude of the Court that a principle of VAT neutrality has a supremacy over national VAT legislation and rules, the decisions have produced systematic implications for national tax systems as well.

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marion Del Sol ◽  
Marco Rocca

The European Union appears to be promoting at the same time both cross-national mobility of workers and an increased role for occupational pensions. There is, however, a potential tension between these two objectives because workers risk losing (some of) their pension rights under an occupational scheme as a consequence of their mobility. After long negotiations, the EU has addressed this issue through a minimum standards Directive. Shortly before the adoption of this Directive, the Court of Justice also delivered an important decision in the same field, in the case of Casteels v British Airways. By analysing the resulting legal framework for safeguarding pension rights under occupational schemes in the context of workers’ mobility, we argue that the application of the case law developed by the Court of Justice in the field of free movement of workers has the potential to offer superior protection compared to the Directive. We also highlight the fact that the present legal framework seems to afford a much fuller protection to the intra-company cross-national mobility of workers employed by multinational companies, while also seemingly favouring mobility for highly specialised workers.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inga Daukšienė ◽  
Arvydas Budnikas

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the purpose of the action for failure to act under article 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The statements are derived from the analysis of scientific literature, relevant legislation, practice of the European Union Court of Justice (CJEU) and the European Union General Court (EUGC). Useful information has also been obtained from the opinions of general advocates of the CJEU. The article of TFEU 265, which governs the action for failure to act, is very abstract. For this reason, a whole procedure under the article 265 TFEU was developed by the EU courts. The original purpose of the action for failure to act was to constitute whether European Union (EU) institution properly fulfilled its obligations under the EU legislation. However, in the course of case-law, a mere EU institution’s express refusal to fulfill its duties became sufficient to constitute that the EU institution acted and therefore action for failure to act became devoid of purpose. This article analyzes whether the action for failure to act has lost its purpose and become an ineffective legal remedy in the system of judicial review in the EU. Additionally, the action for failure to act is compared to similar national actions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Amalie Frese

Abstract Income inequality is at an all-time high in the Europe Union (EU). Implications from the economic crisis which broke out in 2008, and in particularly the austerity measures introduced by Governments in Eurozone countries receiving bailout programmes, created further inequalities, for example between men and women. This paper starts from the hypothesis that whereas other institutions in the EU have played a direct role in tackling the economic crisis, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) may have played a more indirect role, which nonetheless can have an overlooked value in particular for setting direction for legal norms of equality and anti-discrimination in Europe. The paper therefore addresses a legal-empirical question: To what extent does the anti-discrimination case law of the CJEU reflect the increased inequalities in Europe following the economic crisis? Based on a dataset of all anti-discrimination cases of the CJEU, I conduct a quantitative analysis of changes in the case law from before to after the economic crisis. I find that there is only weak evidence, which suggests that the case law of the CJEU reflects the increased inequalities following the economic crisis.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 472-486
Author(s):  
Elizaveta Samoilova

Abstract With all eyes on the recent global COVID-19 pandemic, another pandemic has been growing in the shadows: violence against women. The Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention creates a legal framework in order to protect women against all forms of violence. Its ratification process, however, has faced considerable challenges, particularly in the Central and Eastern European Member States. This article discusses the basic elements of the Istanbul Convention, reflects on the ratification process in the EU and its Member States, and sets out the main legal issues raised in the European Parliament’s request for an opinion (A-1/19 of 22 November 2019) to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Special focus is put on the choice of the correct EU legal basis and the practices of ‘splitting’ and ‘common accord’. This article argues that the European Parliament’s request for an opinion provides the perfect opportunity for the Court of Justice of the European Union to further clarify the law and the practice of concluding mixed agreements by the EU and its Member States.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 425-453
Author(s):  
Philip Strik

AbstractWhile investor–State arbitration is to a large extent detached from the EU legal order, EU law has recently started to be invoked in investor-State arbitration proceedings. In the context of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, the Commission has expressed the view that investor-State arbitration gives rise to a number of ‘arbitration risks’ for the EU legal order. Not only can it solicit investors to engage in forum-shopping, but it can also result in questions of EU law not being litigated in Member State or Union courts. This chapter explores the extent to which the compatibility of investor–State arbitration with the EU legal order is in issue. It examines the main features of investor-State arbitration as concerns its interplay with the EU legal order, as well as the Court of Justice’s case law on issues of compatibility between systems of international dispute settlement and the EU legal order. The chapter highlights that the way in which investor–State arbitral tribunals handle issues of EU law, as well as the involvement of interested parties, may foster the synergy between investor–State arbitration and the EU legal order.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


Author(s):  
Rita De Sousa Costa

[PT]No presente texto, apresentamos as grandes linhas de aplicação do direito europeu da protecção de dados conforme gizadas pela jurisprudência do TJUE, com o objectivo de demonstrar como e em que medida este Tribunal modelou – e continua a modelar – o quadro jurídico em vigor, na certeza de que aquela jurisprudência impõe um conjunto de desafios determinantes para a realização material do direito europeu da protecção de dados pessoais. [ESP]Este texto presenta las líneas generales de la aplicación de la legislación europea de protección de datos tal como se establece en la jurisprudencia del TJUE, con el objetivo de demostrar cómo y en qué medida este Tribunal ha configurado -y sigue configurando- el marco jurídico vigente, con la certeza de que la dicha jurisprudencia plantea una serie de retos cruciales para la aplicación material del derecho europeo de la protección de datos personales. [ENG]This text outlines the implementation of the European data protection law as laid down in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, with the aim of demonstrating how and to what extent the Court has shaped – and continues to shape – the current legal framework. The case-law analysed points out a plethora of challenges which are key to the implementation of the European personal data protection law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-103
Author(s):  
Zsolt Kokoly

Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as procedures taking place before the Commission aiming to clarify certain aspects regarding freedom of services – in this case, the principle of free transmission and retransmission of audiovisual media services – have always been regarded as particularly important in offering guidance in interpreting and applying European legal norms. The adoption in December 2018 of the revised text of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (Directive 2018/1808) marks the transition to a new, amended legal framework. It also enables the critical review of the last case decided in front of the Court of Justice of the European Union, still instrumented according to the provisions of Directive 2010/13/EU: Case C‑622/17 (Baltic Media Alliance v. Lietuvos radijo ir televizijos komisija). While the main focus of the present paper lies with Case C‑622/17, for a cogent understanding of the extended judicial and legal context of the case, we will briefly examine the four procedures successfully submitted to the Commission (by Lithuania and Latvia between 2015 and 2018), based on Art. 3 of the AVMSD (restriction based on public policy reasons, in this case incitement to hatred), and the only procedure based on Art. 4 (the “anti-circumvention procedure”) submitted in the lifespan of Directive 2010/13/EU by the Kingdom of Sweden (2017).


2021 ◽  
pp. 57-100
Author(s):  
Jan Wouters ◽  
Frank Hoffmeister ◽  
Geert De Baere ◽  
Thomas Ramopoulos

This chapter provides an overview of the treaty-making procedures in the European Union. It explains the historical evolution of primary law in the field and gives examples for each step under Article 218 TFEU (negotiation, signature, provisional application, and conclusion). Excerpts of European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law illustrate how these provisions are interpreted and applied in practice. The chapter also discusses the principles covering suspension and termination of EU agreements, and the ever more important system that allows the EU to contribute to the adoption of international secondary law under Article 218, paragraph 9 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). A final section describes EU practice for adopting non-legally binding instruments and reproduces the new guidance of December 2017 issued by the Council and the Commission in this respect after the ECJ’s judgment in the case relating to the EU–Swiss Memorandum of Understanding.


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