Causal Theories of Action

1999 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Theories Of Action ◽  
Causal Theories

Reasons and Action Explanation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Wald ◽  
Sergio Tenenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Action Explanation ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
Causal Theories

The problem of deviant causation has been a serious obstacle for causal theories of action. We suggest that attending to the problem of deviant causation reveals two related problems for causal theories. First, it threatens the reductive ambitions of causal theories of intentional action. Second, it suggests that such a theory fails to account for how the agent herself is guided by her reasons. Focusing on the second of these, we argue that the problem of guidance turns out to be related to a number of other issues in the literature on action explanation, and that it is much more general: it threatens not only causal theories but any theory of action. Finally, we suggest that a certain version of the view that acting has a constitutive or formal aim can overcome this problem.

Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 7

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
New Orleans ◽  
Cutting Edge ◽  
Interdisciplinary Work ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Brain Sciences ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
Causal Theories ◽  
Observational Knowledge

This is the seventh volume of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (OSAR), and the fifth drawn from papers presented at the New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR, November 14–16, 2019). The OSAR series is devoted to publishing cutting edge, interdisciplinary work on the wide array of topics falling under the general rubric of ‘agency and responsibility.’ In this volume, roughly half of the chapters focus on agency, and half focus on responsibility. In the former camp, there are essays about the non-observational knowledge we have about our current intentional actions, constitutivism, answerability, organizational agency, socially embedded agency, and a brain sciences critique of causal theories of action. In the latter camp, there are essays about praise, guilt, blame, sanction, forgiveness, and disclaimers.

scholarly journals Representing first-order causal theories by logic programs

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAOLO FERRARIS ◽  
JOOHYUNG LEE ◽  
YULIYA LIERLER ◽  
VLADIMIR LIFSCHITZ ◽  
FANGKAI YANG
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Logic Programming ◽  
Logic Programs ◽  
Action Languages ◽  
First Order ◽  
National Conference ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
Causal Theories ◽  
Causal Logic ◽  
The Way

AbstractNonmonotonic causal logic, introduced by McCain and Turner (McCain, N. and Turner, H. 1997. Causal theories of action and change. In Proceedings of National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Stanford, CA, 460–465) became the basis for the semantics of several expressive action languages. McCain's embedding of definite propositional causal theories into logic programming paved the way to the use of answer set solvers for answering queries about actions described in such languages. In this paper we extend this embedding to nondefinite theories and to the first-order causal logic.

Causal Theories of Action

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 831-854 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Costa
Keyword(s):  
Intentional State ◽  
Causal Connection ◽  
Intentional States ◽  
Bodily Movement ◽  
Composite Event ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
The Right ◽  
Causal Theories ◽  
Bodily Movements

Causal theories of action are attempts to develop an account of actions in terms of events (typically bodily movements and their effects) which have the right kind of causal ancestry. The causal ancestry must be traced back to some kind of intentional state (or combination of intentional states) in the agent, such intentional state (or states) must have the right kind of content, and it must cause the bodily movement (or other effect) in the ‘right’ way. Causal accounts differ on the nature of the intentional state, the nature of the content it must have, and the specification of the ‘right’ kind of causal connection to bodily movements or other effects. Causal accounts also differ on the identification of the action itself. Some acounts say that the action is the bodily movement, provided that it was caused in the right way and had the right kind of effects. Others identify the action with the triggering intentional state (called a volition or trying), provided that it has the right kind of effects. Yet others identify the action with the composite event of the intentional state's causing the appropriate effects. Finally there are those which fail to identify the action with any of these events or combinations of them.

scholarly journals Intentional Action

2021 ◽  
pp. 57-91
Author(s):  
Joshua Shepherd
Keyword(s):  
Side Effect ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Gettier Cases ◽  
Technical Problems ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
Causal Theories

The project of analyzing intentional action has been out of favor for some time. In part this is due to exhaustion over details—accounts are usually subject to very technical problems or elaborate counterexamples. This chapter builds build on the earlier accounts of control and non-deviance to offer a new account of intentional action. This account builds on Mele and Moser’s influential work, and goes beyond it in some ways. After offering the account, this chapter considers a range of ancillary issues and problem cases. It discusses, for example, side-effect cases, senseless movements, the role of belief and knowledge in intentional action, and action theoretic versions of systematic Gettier cases. Finally, it turns to issues of reductionism that motivate some rejections of causal theories of action. The upshot is that anti-causalists have a new account to contend with, and one that has answers to the problems often thought to be damning for causalism.

Action

2020 ◽  
pp. 83-111
Author(s):  
Michael Della Rocca
Keyword(s):  
Regress Argument ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
Causal Theories ◽  
In Virtue Of

Chapter 4 argues that, as in the case of substance, prominent accounts of action rightly insist on—but fail to meet—the explanatory demand with regard to action: what is it in virtue of which an action is an action? This failure is observed both in the case of causal theories of action (represented by Davidson and his followers) and in the case of rival non-causal theories (represented by Anscombe and her followers). This chapter then appeals to a Bradleyan regress argument to show that—as in the case of substance—such a failure is inevitable as long as one assumes that one is dealing with differentiated or relational action. The only remedy is to make a Parmenidean Ascent with regard to action: there are no actions, not even one action, there is simply action, analogous to actus purus in Aquinas’ sense.

Causal theories of action

1975 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 201-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Behan Mccullagh
Keyword(s):  
Theories Of Action ◽  
Causal Theories

Designing multi-actor implementation: A mechanism-based approach

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Busetti ◽  
Bruno Dente
Keyword(s):  
Design Strategy ◽  
Design Approach ◽  
Design Features ◽  
Focusing Events ◽  
Design Procedures ◽  
Implementation Processes ◽  
Causal Mechanisms ◽  
Policy Fields ◽  
Causal Theories ◽  
Analytical Tools

The article offers analytical tools for designing multi-actor implementation processes. It does so by proposing a design approach centred on causal mechanisms. Such design strategy requires designers to focus primarily on causal theories explaining why implementers commit overtime to implementing policies. The central proposal is that design procedures should be reversed, i.e. start by reasoning on the causal mechanisms explaining implementers’ behaviour and then go looking for design features. Several advantages of this approach related to designing, reforming, or transferring successful practices are discussed throughout the article. Finally, the article provides six extended examples of such mechanisms in different policy fields: actor’s certification, blame avoidance, earning brownie points, repeated interactions, focusing events and attribution of opportunity or threat.

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