Filtering and the International System: A Question of Commitment

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2008 ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 859-870 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick J. McGowan ◽  
Robert M. Rood

This paper is a partial systematic test of Morton A. Kaplan's “theory” of alliance behavior in balance of power international systems first proposed in his well-known System and Process in International Politics (1957). Three hypotheses are inferred from Kaplan's writings predicting that in a stable balance of power system, (a) alliances will occur randomly with respect to time; (b) the time intervals between alliances will also be randomly distributed; and (c) a decline in systemic alliance formation rates precedes system changing events, such as general war. We check these hypotheses by applying probability theory, specifically a Poisson model, to the analysis of new data on fifty-five alliances among the five major European powers during the period 1814–1914. Because our research questions are so general, our findings should not be regarded as definitive; however, the data very strongly support our hypotheses. We conclude that Kaplan's verbal model of a balance of power international system has had its credibility enhanced as a result of this paper.


1973 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Martin Moore

The fundamental reality of Latin America during the 1970s will be the efforts of governments to reduce their countries' dependence on the developed world and thereby increase their autonomy within the international system. A salient aspect of this effort is and will be a redefinition of the role multinational corporations play in Latin American societies. Foreign investment will continue to play an important part in the economic life of the region, but the acceptable characteristics and behaviors of multinational corporations will differ substantially from those which were prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s.The rationale for a restructuring of the relationship of Latin American economies with the system of international trade and investment is found in the writings of “dependence theorists” such as Theotonio Dos Santos (1970) and Osvaldo Sunkel (1972). In a sense, their approach can be seen as a development of the Prebisch thesis of the 1950s, which held that Latin American economies were being systematically diverted from attaining their true potential through the workings of the international trade mechanism.


1966 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciro Elliott Zoppo

Traditional theory of international politics maintains that, other things being equal, a multipolar balance-of-power system. Arms-control theory, on the other hand, generally contends that an increase in independent nuclear powers is a direct threat to the stability of the international system. is more stable than a bipolar system. A bipolar nuclear deterrent relationship is believed to be inherently more stable than one in which equilibrium is maintained among several nuclear powers in independent or alliance relationships. Though the relatively greater stability of a bipolar system may be preferred, its stability is, nevertheless, contingent. Maintaining the stability of mutual nuclear deterrence while restraining aggression is the primary goal of arms control.


1982 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-160
Author(s):  
P.S. Jayaramu

In any analysis of the role that the Super Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—would play in the international system in the 1980s and beyond, one has to be careful of the fact that the projections that can be made cannot bear the stamp of definitiveness and are therefore debateable. Consciousness of this limitation notwithstanding, this paper attempts such an analysis. It is the belief of this writer that any projection of the Super Powers' role in the future has its roots in an understanding of the role they played in the past and are playing at present.


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