Nuclear Technology, Multipolarity, and International Stability

1966 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciro Elliott Zoppo
Keyword(s):  
International System ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The Other ◽  
Nuclear Technology ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Traditional Theory ◽  
System A ◽  
International Stability ◽  
The Stability

Traditional theory of international politics maintains that, other things being equal, a multipolar balance-of-power system. Arms-control theory, on the other hand, generally contends that an increase in independent nuclear powers is a direct threat to the stability of the international system. is more stable than a bipolar system. A bipolar nuclear deterrent relationship is believed to be inherently more stable than one in which equilibrium is maintained among several nuclear powers in independent or alliance relationships. Though the relatively greater stability of a bipolar system may be preferred, its stability is, nevertheless, contingent. Maintaining the stability of mutual nuclear deterrence while restraining aggression is the primary goal of arms control.

Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 859-870 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick J. McGowan ◽  
Robert M. Rood
Keyword(s):  
Power Systems ◽  
International System ◽  
Poisson Model ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Alliance Formation ◽  
Time Intervals ◽  
System A ◽  
Research Questions ◽  
International Systems ◽  
Verbal Model

This paper is a partial systematic test of Morton A. Kaplan's “theory” of alliance behavior in balance of power international systems first proposed in his well-known System and Process in International Politics (1957). Three hypotheses are inferred from Kaplan's writings predicting that in a stable balance of power system, (a) alliances will occur randomly with respect to time; (b) the time intervals between alliances will also be randomly distributed; and (c) a decline in systemic alliance formation rates precedes system changing events, such as general war. We check these hypotheses by applying probability theory, specifically a Poisson model, to the analysis of new data on fifty-five alliances among the five major European powers during the period 1814–1914. Because our research questions are so general, our findings should not be regarded as definitive; however, the data very strongly support our hypotheses. We conclude that Kaplan's verbal model of a balance of power international system has had its credibility enhanced as a result of this paper.

Long-term bandwagoning and short-term balancing: the lessons of coalition behaviour from 1792 to 1815

2001 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
DANIEL J. WHITENECK
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Time Perspective ◽  
International System ◽  
Napoleonic Wars ◽  
System A ◽  
System 2 ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Global War

Recent literature in International Relations has argued that the absence of ‘balancing’ behaviour by European states during the Napoleonic Wars from 1798 to 1815 calls into question current explanations for the presence or absence of such behaviour in international relations. This literature has argued that: (1) Napoleonic France presented a significant threat to the stability of the international system; (2) European states did not balance against this threat from 1798 to 1813, and subsequently balanced only after Napoleon's defeat in Russia in 1812; (3) members of the system possessed adequate power to balance successfully against this threat; and (4) since European states engaged in co-opting, rewarding, avoiding, or bandwagoning behaviour towards the French threats to the system, a new explanation for the absence of balancing behaviour is required. Each of these four points can be refuted by: taking a longer time perspective of the international system during the period in question, expanding state motives to include interests other than security, using a long cycle model of coalition leadership by a global leader, recognizing the constraints faced by European states in their choices of balancing or bandwagoning behaviour under threats from France, and taking into account the role of innovation and change in a period of global war.

Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability

1964 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 390-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl W. Deutsch ◽  
J. David Singer
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Power Systems ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Diplomatic History ◽  
Central Position ◽  
Classical Literature ◽  
International Stability ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Power Concept

In the classical literature of diplomatic history, the balance-of-power concept occupies a central position. Regardless of one's interpretation of the term or one's preference for or antipathy to it, the international relations scholar cannot escape dealing with it. The model is, of course, a multifaceted one, and it produces a fascinating array of corollaries; among these, the relationship between the number of actors and the stability of the system is one of the most widely accepted and persuasive. That is, as the system moves away from bipolarity toward multipolarity, the frequency and intensity of war should be expected to diminish.

scholarly journals Great Power Competition: Lessons from the Past, Implications for the Future

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Vuving
Keyword(s):  
International System ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
The Other ◽  
Great Power ◽  
The Past ◽  
Game Of Chicken ◽  
The Us ◽  
History Of ◽  
Asymmetric Game

Throughout the 52-century long history of great power competition, human dynamics, technology, and geography are the most consequential and most permanent factors that have shaped the interaction among the great powers. This essay mines the past for lessons about great power competition by examining the structural impact of these factors on the rise and fall of great powers, the balance of power among them, and the character of their relations. In order to aid its analysis, the essay introduces three concepts that have not been discussed in the literature: 1) The system-changers: actors that are not system-makers like the great powers but have the power to change the international system and disrupt the balance of power among the system-makers.2) The strategic structure of great power competition: a structure that emerges from the interaction of the players’ preferences and determines the best strategies for the players as well as the stable outcomes of their game. The essay argues that the Thucydides Trap does not exist in the US-China rivalry because the strategic structure of this rivalry is that of either a Game of Chicken or a Peace-lover’s Dilemma. Using game theory and geopolitics, the essay is able to make long-term predictions and strategy implications for the US-China rivalry.3) The peace-lover’s dilemma: an asymmetric game whose stable outcome is the dominance of the more aggressive player (who prefers its own supremacy to sharing power with the other) over the less aggressive player (who prefers sharing power with the other to its own supremacy), hence this is a dilemma for the game’s peace-loving player.

The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power

1986 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 546-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Harrison Wagner
Keyword(s):  
Stable Distribution ◽  
International System ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
System Stability ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Controversial Issues ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
The Stability ◽  
International Systems

The theory of games is used to investigate several controversial issues in the literature on the balance of power. A simple model of an international system is presented as an n-person noncooperative game in extensive form, and the stability of both constant-sum and nonconstant-sum systems is examined. It is shown not only that constant-sum systems with any number of actors from two through five can be stable, but also that stability is actually promoted by conflict of interest. Contrary to much of the literature, however, there is a well-defined sense in which the most stable system is one with three actors. In each type of system, there is at least one distribution of power that leads not only to system stability but also to peace. Some of these peaceful distributions are more stable than others, and these more stable distributions are shown to be characterized by inequality rather than by equality of power. It is possible to distinguish between a bipolar and a multipolar type of stable distribution, the properties of each of which resemble, to some degree, assertions made about them in the literature. Finally, contrary to much of the recent literature on international cooperation, an increase in the ability of states to make binding agreements may actually diminish the stability of international systems.

Uniformity of Magnification from Different Electron Microscopes

1967 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 32-33
Author(s):  
Godfrey C. Hoskins ◽  
V. Williams ◽  
V. Allison
Keyword(s):  
Diffraction Grating ◽  
The Other ◽  
Carbon Replica ◽  
Electron Microscopes ◽  
The Stability

The method demonstrated is an adaptation of a proven procedure for accurately determining the magnification of light photomicrographs. Because of the stability of modern electrical lenses, the method is shown to be directly applicable for providing precise reproducibility of magnification in various models of electron microscopes.A readily recognizable area of a carbon replica of a crossed-line diffraction grating is used as a standard. The same area of the standard was photographed in Phillips EM 200, Hitachi HU-11B2, and RCA EMU 3F electron microscopes at taps representative of the range of magnification of each. Negatives from one microscope were selected as guides and printed at convenient magnifications; then negatives from each of the other microscopes were projected to register with these prints. By deferring measurement to the print rather than comparing negatives, correspondence of magnification of the specimen in the three microscopes could be brought to within 2%.

Analysis (Hans Morgenthau) to the concept of power and applied to the units of the international system

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 138
Author(s):  
Saif Nasrat Tawfiq Al - Haramazi
Keyword(s):  
Applied Sciences ◽  
International System ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Sciences ◽  
Basic Requirement ◽  
The Core ◽  
Hans Morgenthau

The theoretical curriculum in all disciplines is a basic requirement that nourishes the minds of the intellectual and cognitive recipients in the various scientific and cognitive stages. This is the framework that distinguishes the academic understanding of the anarchic, which is one of the most important and important keys in thinking and success in that jurisdiction or field, , Because it is unreasonable and logical to get into the core of any subject without searching and searching for its intellectual and historical bases to find out the reasons and reasons that surrounded this idea which was later recognized as an important contribution to the field of human sciences. Applied Sciences and other from the other side.

NPLs — The Solution Recipe for Albania

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 48
Author(s):  
Elona Shehu ◽  
Elona Meka
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Gdp Growth ◽  
System A ◽  
Analysis Technique ◽  
Recent Financial Crisis ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Asset Quality ◽  
Macroeconomic Determinants

The quality of the loan portfolio in Albanian banking system is facing many obstacles during the last decade. In this paper we look at possible determinants of assets quality. During the recent financial crisis commercial banks were confronted with deteriorating asset quality that threatened not only the banking industry, but also the stability of the entire financial system. This study aims to examine the correlation between non-performing loans and the macroeconomic determinants in Albania during the last decade. NPLs are considered to be of a high importance as they represent the high risk exposure of banking system. A solid bank with healthy assets increases the market efficiency. Our approach is based on a panel data regression analysis technique from 2005-2015. Within this methodology this study finds robust evidence on the existing relationship between lending interest rate, real GDP growth and NPLs. We expect to find a negative relationship between lending interest rate and asset quality. Further we assume an inverse relationship between GDP growth and non-performing loans, suggesting that NPLs decrease if the economy is growing. Furthermore this study proposes a solution platform, which looks deeper into the possibility of creating a secondary active market for troubled loans, restructuring the banking system or implementing the Podgorica model. This research paper opens a new lieu of discussion in terms of academic debates and decision-making policies.

Experimentalism as a Tool of Economic Innovation in Germany

2001 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wade Jacoby ◽  
Martin Behrens
Keyword(s):  
Industrial Relations ◽  
Information Gathering ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Partner ◽  
Social Actor ◽  
Comparative Political Economy ◽  
System A ◽  
German Model ◽  
Economic Innovation

Our purpose in this article is to analyze changes in the German wagebargaining system, a system that has attracted enormous attentionfrom scholars of comparative political economy and comparativeindustrial relations. We argue that the wage bargaining portion ofthe German model is neither frozen in place, headed for deregulation,nor merely “muddling through.” Rather, we see the institutionalcapacities of the key actors—especially the unions and employerassociations—making possible a process we term “experimentalism.”In briefest form, experimentalism allows organizations that combinedecentralized information-gathering abilities with centralized decision-making capacity to probe for new possibilities, which, oncefound, can be quickly diffused throughout the organization. We willshow that the capacity for such experimentalism varies across actorsand sectors. And, to make things even tougher, neither major Germansocial actor can sustain innovation in the longer term withoutbringing along the other “social partner.”

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