scholarly journals Little evidence that Eurasian jays protect their caches by responding to cues about a conspecific’s desire and visual perspective

eLife ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piero Amodio ◽  
Benjamin G Farrar ◽  
Christopher Krupenye ◽  
Ljerka Ostojić ◽  
Nicola S Clayton

Eurasian jays have been reported to protect their caches by responding to cues about either the visual perspective or current desire of an observing conspecific, similarly to other corvids. Here, we used established paradigms to test whether these birds can – like humans – integrate multiple cues about different mental states and perform an optimal response accordingly. Across five experiments, which also include replications of previous work, we found little evidence that our jays adjusted their caching behaviour in line with the visual perspective and current desire of another agent, neither by integrating these social cues nor by responding to only one type of cue independently. These results raise questions about the reliability of the previously reported effects and highlight several key issues affecting reliability in comparative cognition research.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piero Amodio ◽  
Benjamin G Farrar ◽  
Christopher Krupenye ◽  
Ljerka Ostojic ◽  
Nicola S Clayton

Corvids appear to be capable of adjusting their behaviour according to another's perspective, knowledge and desire. For example, Eurasian jays have been found to employ a variety of cache protection strategies to minimise cache loss by responding to cues about the visual perspective or current desire of an observing conspecific. However, it is not known whether these jays (or any other corvid) can integrate multiple cues about different mental states and perform the optimal response accordingly. Across five experiments, we found little evidence that our Eurasian jays responded to either the visual perspective or current desire of another agent. In Experiments 1 and 2 we investigated whether Eurasian jays can limit the risk of cache loss by responding simultaneously to cues about the desire and perspective of a potential conspecific pilferer. Building on established paradigms, we used opaque and clear barriers to manipulate the observer's visual access to cache locations, and specific satiety to manipulate the observer's desire towards different types of food. Across both experiments the jays' caching pattern provided no evidence that they could integrate information about the observer's desire and perspective. Moreover, the results were also inconsistent with the previously reported effects that jays protect their caches by responding to either the visual access or specific satiety of the observer independently. To gain further insight into these unexpected results, we conducted three more experiments. In Experiments 3 and 4, we attempted to replicate the previous finding that Eurasian jays prefer to cache behind an opaque barrier over a clear barrier when observed by a conspecific than when caching in private. In Experiment 5, we further investigated the previous finding that jays preferentially cache a type of food that had been eaten to satiety by a conspecific over a food that had not been eaten by the conspecific. Experiments 3, 4 and 5 found no significant effects in the direction of the previously reported effects, questioning their robustness. We conclude by discussing the implications of our study for the field of corvid cognition and highlight several key issues that affect the reliability of comparative cognition research.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdulaziz Abubshait ◽  
Patrick P. Weis ◽  
Eva Wiese

Social signals, such as changes in gaze direction, are essential cues to predict others’ mental states and behaviors (i.e., mentalizing). Studies show that humans can mentalize with non-human agents when they perceive a mind in them (i.e., mind perception). Robots that physically and/or behaviorally resemble humans likely trigger mind perception, which enhances the relevance of social cues and improves social-cognitive performance. The current ex-periments examine whether the effect of physical and behavioral influencers of mind perception on social-cognitive processing is modulated by the lifelikeness of a social interaction. Participants interacted with robots of varying degrees of physical (humanlike vs. robot-like) and behavioral (reliable vs. random) human-likeness while the lifelikeness of a social attention task was manipulated across five experiments. The first four experiments manipulated lifelikeness via the physical realism of the robot images (Study 1 and 2), the biological plausibility of the social signals (Study 3), and the plausibility of the social con-text (Study 4). They showed that humanlike behavior affected social attention whereas appearance affected mind perception ratings. However, when the lifelikeness of the interaction was increased by using videos of a human and a robot sending the social cues in a realistic environment (Study 5), social attention mechanisms were affected both by physical appearance and behavioral features, while mind perception ratings were mainly affected by physical appearance. This indicates that in order to understand the effect of physical and behavioral features on social cognition, paradigms should be used that adequately simulate the lifelikeness of social interactions.


Author(s):  
Christopher McCarroll

This chapter sets out some key issues related to a philosophical analysis of point of view in memory. It does so by looking at examples of psychological, philosophical, and literary accounts of the phenomenon, as well as examples of the author’s own observer perspective memories. The chapter provides an overview of some of the empirical evidence related to visual perspective in memory. Despite these consistent empirical findings, however, a number of doubts and misconceptions about remembering from-the-outside still linger, especially concerning the status of observer perspectives in memory. This chapter outlines some of the skepticism to the possibility of remembering from-the-outside and points to a possible diagnosis of why such skepticism arises. This chapter points to a way of thinking about memory—to be developed through the course of the book—which eases the worries about remembering from-the-outside.


2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 1020-1029 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark R Gardner ◽  
Zainabb Hull ◽  
Donna Taylor ◽  
Caroline J Edmonds

Experiments revealing ‘spontaneous’ visual perspective-taking are conventionally interpreted as demonstrating that adults have the capacity to track simple mental states in a fast and efficient manner (‘implicit mentalising’). A rival account suggests that these experiments can be explained by the general purpose mechanisms responsible for reflexive attentional orienting. Here, we report two experiments designed to distinguish between these competing accounts. In Experiment 1, we assessed whether reflexive attention orienting was sufficient to yield findings interpreted as spontaneous perspective-taking in the ‘avatar task’ when the protocol was adapted so that participants were unaware that they were taking part in a perspective-taking experiment. Results revealed no evidence for perspective-taking. In Experiment 2, we employed a Posner paradigm to investigate the attentional orienting properties of the avatar stimuli. This revealed cue-validity effects only for longer stimulus onset asynchronies, which indicates a voluntary rather than reflexive shift in spatial attention. Taken together, these findings suggest that attentional orienting does indeed contribute to performance in the Samson et al. avatar task. However, attention orienting appears to be voluntary rather than reflexive, indicating that the perspective-taking phenomenon measured may be less spontaneous than first reported.


2003 ◽  
Vol 358 (1435) ◽  
pp. 1189-1196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josep Call

Abstraction is a central idea in many areas of physical comparative cognition such as categorization, numerical competence or problem solving. This idea, however, has rarely been applied to comparative social cognition. In this paper, I propose that the notion of abstraction can be applied to the social arena and become an important tool to investigate the social cognition and behaviour processes in animals. To make this point, I present recent evidence showing that chimpanzees know about what others can see and about what others intend. These data do not fit either low-level mechanisms based on stimulus-response associations or high-level explanations based on metarepresentational mechanisms such as false belief attribution. Instead, I argue that social abstraction, in particular the development of concepts such as seeing in others, is key to explaining the behaviour of our closest relative in a variety of situations.


2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 332-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara J. Shettleworth

AbstractThe title of the target article suggests an agenda for research on cognitive evolution that is doubly flawed. It implies that we can learn directly about animals' mental states, and its focus on human uniqueness impels a search for an existence proof rather than for understanding what components of given cognitive processes are shared among species and why.


2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pia Dietze ◽  
Eric D. Knowles

“Theory of Mind” (ToM; people’s ability to infer and use information about others’ mental states) varies across cultures. In four studies ( N = 881), including two preregistered replications, we show that social class predicts performance on ToM tasks. In Studies 1A and 1B, we provide new evidence for a relationship between social class and emotion perception: Higher-class individuals performed more poorly than their lower-class counterparts on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, which has participants infer the emotional states of targets from images of their eyes. In Studies 2A and 2B, we provide the first evidence that social class predicts visual perspective taking: Higher-class individuals made more errors than lower-class individuals in the Director Task, which requires participants to assume the visual perspective of another person. Potential mechanisms linking social class to performance in different ToM domains, as well as implications for deficiency-centered perspectives on low social class, are discussed.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pia Dietze ◽  
Eric Knowles

“Theory of Mind” (ToM; people’s ability to infer and use information about others’ mental states) varies across cultures. In four studies (N = 881), including two preregistered replications, we show that social class predicts performance on ToM tasks. In Studies 1A and 1B, we provide new evidence for a relationship between social class and emotion perception: Higher-class individuals performed more poorly than their lower-class counterparts on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, which has participants infer the emotional states of targets from images of their eyes. In Studies 2A and 2B, we provide the first evidence that social class predicts visual perspective-taking: Higher-class individuals made more errors than lower-class individuals in the Director Task, which requires participants to assume the visual perspective of another person. Potential mechanisms linking social class to performance in different ToM domains, as well as implications for deficiency-centered perspectives on low social class, are discussed.


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