Exploring Higher-Order Conceptual Learning in an Arthropod with a Large Multisensory Processing Center

Comparative cognition aims to understand the evolutionary history and current function of cognitive abilities in a variety of species with diverse natural histories. One characteristic often attributed to higher cognitive abilities is higher-order conceptual learning, such as the ability to learn concepts independent of stimuli—e.g., ‘same’ or ‘different’. Conceptual learning has been documented in honeybees and a number of vertebrates. Amblypygids, nocturnal enigmatic arachnids, are good candidates for higher-order learning because they are excellent associational learners, exceptional navigators, and they have large, highly folded mushroom bodies, which are brain regions known to be involved in learning and memory in insects. In Experiment 1, we investigate if the amblypygid Phrynus marginimaculatus can learn the concept of same with a delayed odor matching task. In Experiment 2, we test if Paraphrynus laevifrons can learn same/different with delayed tactile matching and nonmatching tasks before testing if they can transfer this learning to a novel cross-modal odor stimulus. Our data provide no evidence of conceptual learning in amblypygids, but more solid conclusions will require the use of alternative experimental designs to ensure our negative results are not simply a consequence of the designs we employed.

The denotation and the connotation as a logic method in legal technique

The article discusses the specifics of legal techniques in the formulation of legal definition. A comparative analysis of approaches to understanding the definition procedure in jurisprudence, philosophy, logic, mathematics and philology is carried out. The relevance of the topic under study lies in the absence in modern legal tech-nology of generally accepted approaches to understanding the methodological speci-ficity of the implementation of the definition procedure. The purpose of this article is to determine the methodological foundations of differentiation of axiomatic and con-textual definitions, the implementation of the critical analysis of the classifications of types of definitions in the modern scientific literature. The basis of the concept of definition proposed by the authors is the analytical study of the logicallinguistic operation of determination on the example of the defi-nition of «corruption» from the Federal Law of December 25, 2008 No. 273-FZ. There is a lack of legal recognition of corruption as a bribe, and criticism of the narrow definition. Corruption is defined as a criminal act of a social and legal nature, which is constrained by the nature of official crimes in conflict with the interests of society and the State, the essence of which is an obvious mercenary motive in personal en-richment (material and non-material) through the use of his official position (authori-ty) for mercenary purposes. The study is based on the methodological tools of systemic, structural-functional and comparative cognition methods.

Can associative learning be the general process for intelligent behavior in non-human animals?

The general process- and adaptive specialization hypotheses represent two contrasting explanations for understanding intelligence in non-human animals. The general process hypothesis proposes that associative learning underlies all learning, whereas the adaptive specialization hypothesis suggests additional distinct learning processes required for intelligent behavior. Here, we use a selection of experimental paradigms commonly used in comparative cognition to explore these hypotheses. We tested if a novel computational model of associative learning --- A-learning --- could solve the problems presented in these tests. Results show that this formulation of associative learning suffices as a mechanism for general animal intelligence, without the need for adaptive specialization, as long as adequate motor- and perceptual systems are there to support learning. In one of the tests, however, the addition of a short-term trace memory was required for A-learning to solve that particular task. We further provide a case study showcasing the flexibility, and lack thereof, of associative learning, when looking into potential learning of self-control and the development of behavior sequences. From these simulations we conclude that the challenges do not so much involve the complexity of a learning mechanism, but instead lie in the development of motor- and perceptual systems, and internal factors that motivate agents to explore environments with some precision, characteristics of animals that have been fine-tuned by evolution for million of years.

Current Understanding of the “Insight” Phenomenon Across Disciplines

Despite countless anecdotes and the historical significance of insight as a problem solving mechanism, its nature has long remained elusive. The conscious experience of insight is notoriously difficult to trace in non-verbal animals. Although studying insight has presented a significant challenge even to neurobiology and psychology, human neuroimaging studies have cleared the theoretical landscape, as they have begun to reveal the underlying mechanisms. The study of insight in non-human animals has, in contrast, remained limited to innovative adjustments to experimental designs within the classical approach of judging cognitive processes in animals, based on task performance. This leaves no apparent possibility of ending debates from different interpretations emerging from conflicting schools of thought. We believe that comparative cognition has thus much to gain by embracing advances from neuroscience and human cognitive psychology. We will review literature on insight (mainly human) and discuss the consequences of these findings to comparative cognition.

Little evidence that Eurasian jays protect their caches by responding to cues about a conspecific’s desire and visual perspective

Eurasian jays have been reported to protect their caches by responding to cues about either the visual perspective or current desire of an observing conspecific, similarly to other corvids. Here, we used established paradigms to test whether these birds can – like humans – integrate multiple cues about different mental states and perform an optimal response accordingly. Across five experiments, which also include replications of previous work, we found little evidence that our jays adjusted their caching behaviour in line with the visual perspective and current desire of another agent, neither by integrating these social cues nor by responding to only one type of cue independently. These results raise questions about the reliability of the previously reported effects and highlight several key issues affecting reliability in comparative cognition research.

Intra-specific differences in cognition: bumblebee queens learn better than workers

Species’ cognitive traits are shaped by their ecology, and even within a species, cognition can reflect the behavioural requirements of individuals with different roles. Social insects have a number of discrete roles (castes) within a colony and thus offer a useful system to determine how ecological requirements shape cognition. Bumblebee queens are a critical point in the lifecycle of their colony, since its future success is reliant on a single individual's ability to learn about floral stimuli while finding a suitable nest site; thus, one might expect particularly adept learning capabilities at this stage. I compared wild Bombus vosnesenskii queens and workers on their ability to learn a colour association and found that queens performed better than workers. In addition, queens of another species, B. insularis, a cuckoo species with a different lifecycle but similar requirements at this stage, performed equally well as the non-parasitic queens. To control for differences in foraging experience, I then repeated this comparison with laboratory-based B. impatiens and found that unmated queens performed better than workers. These results add to the body of work on how ecology shapes cognition and opens the door to further research in comparative cognition using wild bees.

Comparative cognition in three understudied ungulate species: European bison, forest buffalos and giraffes

Background Comparative cognition has historically focused on a few taxa such as primates, birds or rodents. However, a broader perspective is essential to understand how different selective pressures affect cognition in different taxa, as more recently shown in several studies. Here we present the same battery of cognitive tasks to two understudied ungulate species with different socio-ecological characteristics, European bison (Bison bonasus) and forest buffalos (Syncerus caffer nanus), and we compare their performance to previous findings in giraffes (Giraffa camelopardalis). We presented subjects with an Object permanence task, Memory tasks with 30 and 60 s delays, two inference tasks based on acoustic cues (i.e. Acoustic inference tasks) and a control task to check for the use of olfactory cues (i.e. Olfactory task). Results Overall, giraffes outperformed bison and buffalos, and bison outperformed buffalos (that performed at chance level). All species performed better in the Object permanence task than in the Memory tasks and one of the Acoustic inference tasks (which they likely solved by relying on stimulus enhancement). Giraffes performed better than buffalos in the Shake full Acoustic inference task, but worse than bison and buffalos in the Shake empty Acoustic inference task. Conclusions In sum, our results are in line with the hypothesis that specific socio-ecological characteristics played a crucial role in the evolution of cognition, and that higher fission-fusion levels and larger dietary breadth are linked to higher cognitive skills. This study shows that ungulates may be an excellent model to test evolutionary hypotheses on the emergence of cognition.

Doing Reliable Research in Comparative Psychology: Challenges and Proposals for Improvement

Unlike some other areas of psychology that have experienced a ‘reproducibility crisis’, the ex-tent to which research findings in comparative psychology are reliable is only just beginning to come under the spotlight. I outline what is known about where we as a field stand in terms of the reliability of our findings, and highlight some characteristic features of our research that give may cause for concern, focusing primarily on experimental comparative cognition. I then dis-cuss ways that we as individual researchers and a wider community can take steps to improve our current practices (and in some cases already are), as well as highlighting the crucial role insti-tutions and gatekeepers have to play in effecting change. By tackling potential issues head on, the field of comparative psychology can have more confidence that our research findings and the resultant claims we make about animal behaviour and cognition are reliable.