scholarly journals Encountering whales: How encounter rates became the basis for managing whaling

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim D Smith

Declining rates of encountering whales, including both sighting and catching, were noted by whalers throughout the 19th century, and these declines became the first indication that whaling was adversely affecting whale abundance. The interpretation of declines in both sighting and catch rates proved to be a difficult scientific task. Satisfactory quantitative methods of interpreting changes in whale encounter rates were not developed until the second half of the 20th century. Rates of encountering whales played a key role in the International Whaling Commission (IWC) Scientific Committee from its beginning in the early 1950s, as well as in the US in implementing its Marine Mammal Protection Act beginning in the early 1970s. The development of methods of collecting and interpreting sighting and catch data was intimately interwoven with the development of themanagement of whaling and cetacean by-catches in fisheries throughout the world, but especially within the context of the Scientific Committees of the IWC and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO). Although overfishing of whales was initially identified through the use of sighting rate data, catch rate data provided the IWC’s Committee its first firm footing for management advice. However, it was sighting rate data that ultimately became the basis for the scientific advice on whaling and for management advice in other settings. This led to the development of large scale cetacean sighting programmes, such as the IWC’s International Decade of Cetacean Researchsurveys in Antarctic aboard Japanese ships, the North Atlantic Sighting Surveys (NASS) aboard Norwegian, Icelandic, Spanish, Greenlandic and Faroese vessels and aircraft (coordinated by NAMMCO through its Scientific Committee from 1995), and surveys under the US’s Marine Mammal Protection Act and the European Union’s Small Cetacean Abundance in the North Sea (SCANS) programme. Fishery independent cetacean sighting surveys have proven to be both central and essential to understanding and regulating of human impacts on cetaceans.

Oceans ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 311-325
Author(s):  
Stephen Jewson ◽  
Nicholas Lewis

In a recent paper, Kossin et al. showed that during the period from 1979 to 2017, there was a statistically significant increase in the ratio of category 3–5 to category 1–5 tropical storm fixes in the ADT-HURSAT satellite dataset of tropical cyclone observations. The sign of this increase is consistent with previously developed theory and modelling results for how tropical cyclones may change due to climate change. However, without further analysis, it is difficult to understand what the implications of this increase might be for present day tropical cyclone risk. It is also difficult to understand how tropical cyclone risk models might be adjusted to reflect this increase, since this ratio is not typically directly represented in such models. Our goal is therefore to understand the drivers for this increase in terms of changes in the numbers of fixes of different categories of storms in different basins, which are quantities that are more directly related to tropical cyclone risk and risk modelling. We use both heuristic and quantitative methods. We find that the increase in the ratio is mainly driven by a decrease in the denominator (the number of category 1–5 fixes) and to a small extent by a slight increase in the numerator (the number of category 3–5 fixes). The decrease in the denominator is mostly driven by a statistically significant reduction in the number of category 1 fixes outside the North Atlantic. The slight increase in the numerator is mostly driven by a statistically significant increase in the number of category 3–4 fixes in the North Atlantic. Based on these results, we discuss different ways in which the increase in the ratio could be represented in risk models.


1892 ◽  
Vol 34 (872supp) ◽  
pp. 13940-13941
Author(s):  
Richard Beynon

2019 ◽  
pp. 73-81
Author(s):  
Oleh Poshedin

The purpose of the article is to describe the changes NATO undergoing in response to the challenges of our time. Today NATO, as a key element of European and Euro-Atlantic security, is adapting to changes in the modern security environment by increasing its readiness and ability to respond to any threat. Adaptation measures include the components required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the security challenges it might face. Responsiveness NATO Response Force enhanced by developing force packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges and threats. As part of it, was established a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, a new Allied joint force that deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory. NATO emphasizes, that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. Cooperation with NATO already contributes to the implementation of national security and defense in state policy. At the same time, taking into account that all decision-making in NATO based on consensus, Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance quite vague perspective. In such circumstances, in Ukraine you often can hear the idea of announcement of a neutral status. It is worth reminding that non-aligned status did not save Ukraine from Russian aggression. Neutral status will not accomplish it either. All talks about neutrality and the impossibility of Ukraine joining NATO are nothing but manipulations, as well as recognition of the Ukrainian territory as Russian Federation area of influence (this country seeks to sabotage the Euro-Atlantic movement of Ukraine). Think about it, Moldova’s Neutrality is enshrined in the country’s Constitution since 1994. However, this did not help Moldova to restore its territorial integrity and to force Russia to withdraw its troops and armaments from Transnistria.


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