Leveraging Secrets: Displaced Archives, Information Asymmetries, and Ba‘thist Chronophagy in Iraq

2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 158-177
Author(s):  
Michael Degerald
2004 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret A. Abernethy ◽  
Jan Bouwens ◽  
Laurence van Lent

We investigate two determinants of two choices in the control system of divisionalized firms, namely decentralization and use of performance measures. The two determinants are those identified in the literature as important to control system design: (1) information asymmetries between corporate and divisional managers and (2) division interdependencies. We treat decentralization and performance measurement choices as endogenous variables and examine the interrelation among these choices using a simultaneous equation model. Using data from 78 divisions, our results indicate that decentralization is positively related to the level of information asymmetries and negatively to intrafirm interdependencies, while the use of performance measures is affected by the level of interdependencies among divisions within the firm, but not by information asymmetries. We find some evidence that decentralization choice and use of performance measures are complementary.


Author(s):  
Solomon Y. Deku ◽  
Alper Kara ◽  
Nodirbek Karimov

AbstractWe assess the value of frequent issuers to investors in securitization markets by examining the initial yield spread of 6132 European mortgage-backed securities (MBS), covering a 20-year period between 1999 and 2018. We find that frequent issuers have certification value, and it increases as the credit cycle approaches its peak, as lending standards loosen, and information asymmetries in securitization markets increase. Investors value frequent issuers more favourably on riskier, difficult to evaluate MBS. We find that after the great financial crisis (GFC), investors began to attribute more value to frequent issuers, regardless of MBS credit quality. We also find that in the pre-crisis period, investors required higher yields to compensate for perceived rating shopping, which is not observed after the GFC. Finally, we show that investors expect higher yields on deals closed by subsidiaries of foreign banks.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 ◽  
pp. 101405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoya Ding ◽  
Omrane Guedhami ◽  
Yang Ni ◽  
Jeffrey A. Pittman

2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robyn McLaughlin ◽  
Assem Safieddine

PurposeThis paper seeks to examine the potential for regulation to reduce information asymmetries between firm insiders and outside investors.Design/methodology/approachExtensive prior research has established that there are substantial effects of information asymmetry in seasoned equity offers (SEOs). The paper tests for a mitigating effect of regulation on such information asymmetries by examining differences in long‐run operating performance, changes in that performance, and announcement‐period stock returns between unregulated industrial firms and regulated utilities that issue seasoned equity. The authors also segment the samples by firm size, since smaller firms are likely to have greater asymmetries.FindingsConsistent with regulated utility firms having lower levels of information asymmetry, they have superior changes in abnormal operating performance than industrial firms pre‐ to post‐issue and their announcement period returns are significantly less negative. These findings are most pronounced for the smallest firms, firms likely to have the greatest information asymmetries and where regulation could have its greatest effect.Research limitations/implicationsThe paper does not examine costs of regulation. Thus, future research could seek to measure the cost/benefit trade‐off of regulation in reducing information asymmetry. Also, future research could examine cross‐sectional differences between different industries and regulated utilities.Practical implicationsRegulation reduces information asymmetry. Thus, regulation or mandated disclosure may be appropriate in industries/markets where information asymmetry is severe.Originality/valueThis paper is the first to compare the operating performance of regulated and unregulated SEO firms.


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