“We have to tell us what to do.”

2021 ◽  
pp. 160-177
Author(s):  
Jessica DuLong

This chapter discusses how, instead of establishing a top-down command and control structure, the Coast Guard — from the top brass down to the on-scene rank and file — allowed for the organic, needs-driven, decentralized response that played an enormous role in the ultimate success of the waterborne evacuation. This approach, in turn, allowed mariners to take direct action, applying their workaday skills to singular circumstances, without being stifled by red tape. No one had foreseen the sudden need for evacuating a huge swath of Manhattan Island. Yet as terrorized people continued to flee to the waterfront, more and more boats turned up to rescue them. As greater numbers of vessels and evacuees amassed along the shoreline, streamlining operations became the biggest challenge. The only solution was to get organized, and that organization was implemented in large part by Lieutenant Michael Day and the pilots operating aboard the New York, which continued its barrier patrol. Their efforts were made easier by the relationships that both the Coast Guard and the Sandy Hook Pilots had with the New York harbor community.

Author(s):  
Jessica Symons

This chapter argues for an ‘emergent city’ urban policy, inspired by organisers of civic parade in Manchester which involved over 1,800 participants from 90 community groups. The analysis compares the top-down, command-and-control process of cultural strategy development in the city with the nurturing emergent approach of the organisers commissioned by the council to produce a civic parade. Drawing on parade making as a cultural trope, the chapter describes how the parade makers held back, allowing the parade shape to develop rather than over-directing it. It suggests that city decision makers can learn from this restrained approach.


2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 403-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Vitale

With the increase in large contentious demonstrations in the last decade has come a variety of new efforts to explain the tactics used by police. Based on an analysis of how the New York Police Department (NYPD) handled six demonstrations at the 2004 Republican National Convention (RNC), this article argues that the more repressive Miami model of policing has not become the universal norm in policing large protests. Each of the six protests was dealt with in a unique way, though a general pattern emerged in which the police used either the "soft hat" command and control model or the "hard hat" Miami model. This suggests that local police forces make decisions about how to police demonstrations independent of influence by federal officials or national trends. It also emphasizes the importance of local political context in investigating the motivations of police action at protests.


Leonardo ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 345-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Townsend

The adoption of mobile devices as the computers of the 21st century marks a shift away from the fixed terminals that dominated the first 50 years of computing. Associated with this shift will be a new emphasis on context-aware computing. This article examines design approaches to context-aware computing and argues that the evolution of this technology will be characterized by an interplay between top-down systems for command and control and bottom-up systems for collective action. This process will lead to the emergence of “contested-aware cities,” in which power struggles are waged in public spaces with the assistance of context-aware systems.


1971 ◽  
Vol 1971 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-108
Author(s):  
Donald J. Leonard

ABSTRACT At the API-FWPCA joint conference on prevention and control of oil spills held in New York in 1969, it was reported that two-thirds of the oil spill incidents each year occurred in port and harbor areas and were generated during routine petroleum transfer operations. Based on our investigations, the spills are generally the result of personnel errors and only rarely due to equipment failure. This paper describes the concept, development and initial trials of a number of devices made for Shell and used to prevent spills due to tank overfilling during tank vessel loading. The instruments are inserted into the tanks through tank-top ullage holes. They sound an alarm when product reaches a level where a spill is imminent, alerting crewmen and allowing them to take corrective action. Complete instrument specifications are given as they were presented to companies working with Shell on the device development. The evaluation, shipping company and U.S. Coast Guard involvement and support, field testing of prototypes and factors affecting Shell's device choice are described. Apparent favorable initial device reception by the users, ship crewmen and dock personnel (bearing largely on instrument effectiveness) is described. A second phase effort is described which will accumulate these alarms and provide an automatic link to shore facilities to shut down pumps or close valves upon receipt of an overfill alarm.


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