Developing an International Oil Spill Policy Strategy for the U.S.

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 913-917
Author(s):  
Michael Adams

ABSTRACT As called for under the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990 (OPRC), “Parties to the OPRC convention are required to establish measures for dealing with pollution incidents, either nationally or in co-operation with other countries.” As a signatory to OPRC the U.S. Government (USG) has pledged to assist other countries in the development of their own oil spill response capabilities and while USG has many agreements that meet the guidelines of assisting other countries, there is no formal engagement strategy for developing further agreements, no agency championing this effort, and there are many still requiring assistance. However, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is uniquely positioned to perform the role of drafting an engagement strategy and working with the global community to assist those countries that have yet to develop an adequate oil spill response system of their own due to the lack of resources, expertise or both. There are many hurdles to enabling USCG to assume the OPRC assistance banner that have been previously addressed (Adams, IOSC 2001), which this paper will not seek to readdress. However, if USG does decide to move forward with an integrated policy there remains the need to develop an adequate engagement strategy. This strategy is necessary to ensure the limited resources available for foreign assistance are expended in the most cost effective, ethical and responsible manner possible. There are three alternative strategies I will analyze in an effort to determine the best suited for implementation of this policy. These three strategies are based primarily on 1) environmental need, 2) geographical proximity, and 3) political/economic interests. The goal of this strategy is to effectively implement the oil spill assistance policy alluded to previously in support of the U.S.'s pledge under OPRC. This paper will analyze the success of each strategy making a recommendation on which one USG should pursue.

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1051-1054 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Adams

ABSTRACT The United States has several international oil pollution response agreements for which the U.S. Coast Guard serves as lead agency for implementation. However, the United States does not have an integrated plan for implementing these agreements, the criteria to use in determining what level of cooperation is needed, or a strategy for prioritizing which countries with which to engage to forge new agreements. This paper outlines a strategy for international engagement that allows the United States to participate in response-related expertise exchange to ensure appropriate capabilities are available for spills that threaten U.S. interests. Obstacles to developing and implementing the strategy and ways to overcome them also are identified.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-192
Author(s):  
Stacey L. Crecy ◽  
Melissa E. Perera ◽  
Elizabeth J. Petras ◽  
John A. Tarpley

ABSTRACT #2017-373 Federal agencies involved in oil spill response in the U.S. are required to comply with several environmental compliance laws. Where a Federal agency is operating in a way that may affect endangered species in the area, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the agency to “consult” with the two Federal agencies responsible for protecting those species and habitats – the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, nonprofit organizations filed several lawsuits against the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (the “Action Agencies”) for failure to comply with the ESA during oil spill contingency planning. In one case, a settlement required the Action Agencies to consult with the NMFS and USFWS (together, called the “Services”) on the plan to use oil spill dispersants in California waters. Perhaps responding to these developments, several Regional Response Teams across the country initiated or made plans to review the status of their ESA Section 7 consultations. These efforts have varied in cost, scope, composition of agency representatives involved, and success in completing a consultation for a variety of reasons. There have been numerous challenges for USCG and EPA in meeting the ESA Section 7 consultation requirements for oil spill planning. First, the most recent framework for cooperation between the Action Agencies and the Services regarding consulting on oil spill planning and response activities is contained in an Interagency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in 2001. Although the agreement is still valid, some parts have been identified as outdated or in need of clarification. Secondly, there are no direct funding mechanisms or dedicated personnel assigned to the Action Agencies to work on pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations. Third, recommendations and consultation outcomes can vary between Service agencies as well as internally within each Service agency due to a high level of regional autonomy. In 2015, the National Response Team (NRT) formed a new, interagency subcommittee to improve the Federal Action Agencies’ ability to comply with environmental laws such as the ESA with respect to oil spill response and pre-spill planning. A workgroup of the NRT Subcommittee was formed to specifically address pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultation processes. The workgroup includes regional and national representatives from the Action Agencies and the Services. In addition to strengthening relationships and understanding among the participating agencies, the workgroup has identified gaps in the 2001 MOA and is in the process of developing tools and templates on how to conduct pre-spill ESA Section 7 consultations to help fill some of the existing gaps. The workgroup ultimately hopes to facilitate the development of updated, complete, efficient, and consistent ESA Section 7 consultations across the nation.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2146-2158
Author(s):  
Allen R. Thuring

ABSTRACT This paper examines the oil pollution response fund created by Section 311(k) of the 1972 CWA and then modified, culminating with the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) established by OPA. Could the CWA have been successful absent the provision for a federal fund? This Fund is now four decades old. Has it passed the “test of time”? Did it meet the goals set at its birth? Is it still relevant? Should it continue? CWA Section 311 and later OPA created a range of response tools to deal with oil and hazmat spills on the waters of the US. They established a public/private solution to spill response. Key components:An expectation that the spiller was responsible and liable to clean up the spill;The National Contingency Plan and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator/FOSC;Establishing expertise on “special teams”: the CG's National Strike Force and EPA's Emergency Response Team;An up-front trust fund available only to the FOSC that pays for removals if the responsible party (RP) does not step forward. The fund exists to:Pre-empt the RP from using delay as a response option, despite the law.Give the FOSC money to quickly hire private response companies, if the RP does not act or if the spill's origin is a mystery. Equally important, the CWA and OPA did NOT designate a government agency to “clean up” oil spills. Rather, the law envisioned private companies performing that role, paid for by the spillers/RP or the 311(k)/OSLTF Fund, under the oversight of the USCG or the EPA. It tasked the USCG with managing this Fund. The Fund achieved its results. The US has a robust private oil spill removal sector that responsible parties hire when needed. If an RP does not act, the CG and EPA FOSCs use the Fund to mobilize those same companies to remove oil spills on US waters. The US economy has grown, as has the number of oil spills reported. Cases each year requiring Fund use have not increased proportionally. Responsible parties continue to clean up their spills, as the CWA envisioned. The Fund retains its ability to respond simultaneously to major spills, even during Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon. In forty two years, the Fund has always been available for an FOSC directed removal. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.


1985 ◽  
Vol 1985 (1) ◽  
pp. 623-625
Author(s):  
Leon J. Kazmierczak ◽  
Thomas A. Crawford

ABSTRACT Sun Transport, the Marine division of Sun Refining and Marketing Company, a subsidiary of Sun Company, Inc., has conducted a series of drills to assess the effectiveness of its Oil Spill Response Plan. The latest drill, third in the series, was conducted in September 1982. Papers presented at the 1979, 1981, and 1983 Oil Spill Conference describe the plan, its rationale, and the previous two drills. This paper reviews the training progression of the previous exercises and reports on the findings and experiences of this latest exercise. As in previous drills, the planning committee and a few others were the only people in Sun Company with any prior knowledge of the drill. This simulation was the most extensive. It involved simultaneous and separate call-out scenarios, full-scale use of contractor cleanup crew and equipment, chartering aircraft, and participation by representatives of the Clean Caribbean Cooperative, the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP), and the U.S. Coast Guard. The realism provided by this exercise allowed each participant to experience firsthand the problems on-scene at a major cleanup operation and to come away with confidence in managing them.


1994 ◽  
Vol 31 (03) ◽  
pp. 175-182
Author(s):  
Hans Hofmann ◽  
George Kapsilis ◽  
Eric Smith ◽  
Robert Wasalaski

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has mandated that by the year 2015 all oil tankers operating in waters subject to jurisdiction of the United States must have double hulls. This paper examines the Act and the status of regulatory initiatives it has generated. Guidance for new hull construction and retrofit of existing vessels is outlined, and both IMO (International Maritime Organization) and U.S. Coast Guard requirements are discussed. Finally, the structural changes necessary to convert the U.S. Navy's T-AO Class oil tankers to meet the requirements of the Act are specified and illustrated.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017027
Author(s):  
Tim Gunter

Among the variety of oil spill response countermeasures, including mechanical, chemical, in-situ burning and bioremediation, deployment of chemical dispersants has been successfully utilized in numerous oil spills. This paper will review the history of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) C-130 Air Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) capability, deployment in remote areas, and associated challenges. ADDS consists of a large tank with dispersant(e.g., 51,000 pounds), owned and operated by an industry partner, used aboard USCG C-130 aircraft designed to be ADDS capable as specified in various agreements for marine environmental protection missions. ADDS is a highly complex tool to utilize, requiring extensive training by air crews and industry equipment technicians to safely and properly deploy during an oil spill response. In 2011, the Commandant of the USCG, Admiral Papp reaffirmed the USCG's C-130 ADDS capability during a hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries and the Coast Guard. The use of ADDS in remote areas creates unique challenges, such as logistical coordination between the USCG and spill response industry partners and maintaining proficiency with personnel. It is critical for federal, state, and local agencies, industry, and academia to understand the history and challenges of ADDS to ensure the successful utilization of this response tool in an actual oil spill incident.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1093-1095
Author(s):  
Bernie Bennett ◽  
Yvette Osikilo

ABSTRACT The International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) Oil Spill Working Group (OSWG) is celebrating its 20th anniversary. Its mission has been, through education, training and awareness initiatives, to enhance the state of preparedness and response to marine oil spill incidents in priority coastal locations around the world. Its programme is carried out in close cooperation with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and operates within the context of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC), 1990. The OSWG is made up of oil spill managers and specialists from IPIECA member companies and associations, supported by invited representatives from other organisations in the oil spill response community. It aims to ensure that the full range of industry interests is adequately reflected in its work programme. Coordination between these industry-based organisations and the IMO remains an essential ingredient in the success of the OSWG programme This paper reviews the main activities and achievements of the IPIECA OSWG over the last 20 years and attempt to illustrate and measure the impact of its work on global oil spill preparedness. We then hypothesize as to how the work of the IPIECA OSWG might develop over the next 20 years, which could serve as future strategic/planning guidance.


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