scholarly journals The Marine Salvage Industry: Proven in Preventing Oil Spills

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
pp. 684710
Author(s):  
Jim Elliott
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Recovery ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
New Policies ◽  
The U.S

Abstract The marine salvage industry plays a vital role in protecting the marine environment. Governments, industry and the public, worldwide, now place environmental protection as the driving objective, second only to the safety of life, during a marine casualty response operation. Recognizing over 20 years after the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that the effectiveness of mechanical on-water oil recovery remains at only about 10 to 25 percent while the international salvage industry annually prevents over a million tons of pollutants from reaching the world's oceans, ten years ago the United States began implementing a series of comprehensive salvage and marine firefighting regulations in an effort to improve the nation's environmental protection regime. These regulations specify desired response timeframes for emergency salvage services, contractual requirements, and criteria for evaluating the adequacy of a salvage and marine firefighting service provider. In addition to this effort to prevent surface oil spills, in 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard also recognized the salvage industries advancements in removing oil from sunken ships and recovering submerged pollutants, issuing Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) classification standards for companies that have the capabilities to effectively respond to non-floating oils. Ten years after the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulatory framework, this paper will review the implementation of the U.S. salvage and marine firefighting regulations and non-floating oil detection and recovery requirements; analyze the impacts and effectiveness of these new policies; and present several case studies and recommendations to further enhance salvage and oil spill response effectiveness.

Integrated Vessel Response Plan Format

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 635-638
Author(s):  
William C. Rogers ◽  
Jean R. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
West Coast ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Response Planning ◽  
Vessel Response ◽  
Response Plan ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Oil shipping companies operating on the West Coast of the United States are subject to international, federal, and state oil spill prevention and response planning regulations. Many companies wrote separate plans for each jurisdiction with the result that tank vessels carried several different plans on board and parent companies faced an administrative burden in keeping plans current. In June 1996, oil shipping company representatives proposed that the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force work with them to develop a format incorporating West Coast states' and U.S. Coast Guard contingency planning requirements. A workgroup comprised of representatives of the Task Force, industry, and the U.S. Coast Guard, working cooperatively, eventually proposed a voluntary integrated plan format based on the key elements of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Response Plan. This format allowed correlation with state planning requirements as well as with the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by international regulations. The U.S. Coast Guard, the Canadian Ministry of Transport, and all West Coast states have subsequently documented their agreement to accept vessel plans in this format, to coordinate review as needed, and to allow references to public documents such as Area Plans.

Oil Spill Risks from Nontank Vessels1

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-266
Author(s):  
Jean R. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
West Coast ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fuel Oil ◽  
Emergency Plan ◽  
Heavy Fuel Oil ◽  
Design Elements ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT An issue of increasing concern worldwide is that of oil spills from nontank vessels that carry large quantities of petroleum product as fuel or lubricants. The New Carissa incident in Oregon in 1999 is only one of several that have impacted the U.S. West Coast in the last few years. Others include the M/V Kuroshima, which grounded in Dutch Harbor, Alaska in 1997, and the M/V Kure, which spilled oil in Humbolt Bay also in 1997. The Tenyo Maru was cut in half in a collision and sank with the loss of one life and a spill of at least 100,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil and diesel in Washington State in 1991. Additional examples of both spills and threats of spills are sited, both in the United States and worldwide. This paper examines a number of actions that have been taken in response to this threat. One such model is the Canadian requirement that vessel owner/operators demonstrate a formal agreement with an approved response contractor, and list that contractor in their Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP). A more comprehensive approach would be to establish approved “umbrella” contingency plans for major port areas, supported by contracts with oil spill removal organizations (OSROs). This preferred model has been adopted by the U.S. West Coast states, and affords the opportunity for the contracted responders to drill with emergency response officials, thus improving the likelihood of an efficient, coordinated spill response. This paper also proposes spill prevention design elements for nontank vessels.

JOINT MEXICO-UNITED STATES OIL SPILL RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS TRAINING ACTIVITIES

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 711-714
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker-Hall ◽  
Timothy P. Holmes ◽  
Norma A. Hernandez Ramirez
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Hazardous Substances ◽  
Joint Training ◽  
Response Team ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Exercise and evaluation of the Pacific Annex of the Joint Contingency Plan Between the United Mexican States and the United States of America Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons or Other Hazardous Substances (MEXUSPLAN) uncovered a significant need for joint training between spill responders, planners, decision-makers and stakeholders on both sides of our border. Sponsored by U.S. Coast Guard District 11 (USCG Dll) and the Second Mexican Naval Zone (ZN2), a series of training sessions were held for Mexican officials from the Northern Baja California region and Mexico City in early 2003. The first of these well-attended sessions was held in two locations: San Diego, CA and Ensenada, Mexico in February 2003. The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Hazmat facilitated the first session, the Joint Mexico-United States Oil Spill Science Forum. It provided a scientific view of oil spills. The following joint session facilitated by USCG Dll and held in Ensenada was a tabletop exercise designed in preparation for the signing of the MEXUSPAC Annex. Through the use of a spill drill scenario, this session included instruction and dialogue about the roles and responsibilities of both U.S. and Mexican spill responders. Both sessions included presentations from several agencies of the Regional Response Team IX/Joint Response Team: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Dept. of the Interior and California's Office of Spill Prevention and Response. Industry partners also contributed topics of discussion, further complementing the U.S. response landscape. Mexican response agencies, including PEMEX, SAGARPA, SEMARNAT and PROFEPA, provided valuable input ensuring dialogue helping to identify additional joint response gaps. Upon the most significant gaps brought to light was the need for additional information regarding dispersant use by Mexican agencies, particularly in light of the approaching international SONS Exercise in April 2004. To this end, USCG Dll and NOAA HAZMAT developed and presented a modified Ecological Risk Assessment for their Mexican counterparts. Hosted by ZN2 in October 2003, this highly successful workshop brought together many key decision makers, planners and stakeholders from both sides of the border to discuss tradeoffs inherent in the use of existing spill response tools, including dispersants. Joint training and discussion sessions such as these are key to ensuring any measure of success in a joint spill response. Several additional training and discussion topics designed for the Mexican-U.S. joint response forum have been identified with many in the planning phase. Acknowledging the similarities as well as differences in response systems of our two nations' is essential to the success of these joint collaborations. Such continued efforts will help bridge existing gaps.

scholarly journals UNITED STATES COAST GUARD ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY “THEN” AND “NOW”

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 459-461
Author(s):  
Leonard Rich
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Emergency Response ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Recovery ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT The intent of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90) is to ensure the U.S. Government is prepared to protect the environment from a catastrophic spill of the magnitude and complexity of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill. The OPA90 legislation resulted in an overall restructuring and enhancement of the National Strike Force (NSF), and establishment of District Response Groups who are staffed and equipped with mechanical spill recovery assets and are prepared to take prompt actions to mitigate a worst case discharge scenario. During the early 1990s, over $31 million dollars worth of oil spill response equipment was acquired and placed at 23 locations throughout the United States. Since then, an additional $10 million dollars of environmental emergency response equipment has been added to the USCG'S inventory, and are now located at 16 additional sites. This paper will elaborate on the evolution of the USCG'S environmental emergency response capabilities. In terms of preparedness, it will explain how, where and why the Coast Guard has adjusted its resources and capabilities since the OPA90 legislation. The expanded mission requirements include; redistributing and adjusting the locations of the Vessel of Opportunity Skimming Systems, expanding functional use of the pre-positioned equipment for dewatering during shipboard fires, designing and implementing an offload pumping system for viscous oil at each NSF Strike Team, revisiting the condition and continued use of OPA90 procured first response “band-aid’ equipment, modifying the basic response equipment systems for fast current spill response, and the implementation of the Spilled Oil Recovery System. These actions reflect policy and mission adjustments influenced by an ever changing environment. The Coast Guard has re-organized from the bottom up to meet increased port security measures, and the capability to respond to all-hazard incidents. We must continue to maintain a high state of readiness in the oil spill response environment and accept the need to incorporate change to the equipment and the way we conduct our support to the American public.

THE STATES/BC OIL SPILL TASK FORCEAN—INTERNATIONAL MODEL FOR FORMULATING AND INFLUENCING PUBLIC POLICY

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-265
Author(s):  
Jon Neel ◽  
John Bones ◽  
Elizabeth Dimmick ◽  
Lynn J. Tomich Kent ◽  
Roger Dunstan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
British Columbia ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Task Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
International Response ◽  
Regional Coordination

ABSTRACT The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was established in 1989 to enhance spill coordination among the West Coast states and British Columbia, and to address a number of issues that became apparent during the Nestucca barge and Exxon Valdez oil spills. Task Force members are the directors of the oil spill prevention and response agencies in Alaska, British Columbia, California, Oregon, and Washington. The Task Force has become a national model for facilitating cooperation and building consensus between coastal states and provinces and their federal governments. In October of 1990, the task force issued a report containing a comprehensive set of recommendations addressing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response. The group had achieved remarkable consensus, and many of the report's recommendations have been included in recent legislation enacted by the member states. The success of the task force's approach to regional coordination has also reduced the need for a proposed Pacific Oceans Resources Interstate Compact, which has been proposed to expand the states' role in areas of regulation that are otherwise federally preempted. The task force has become an effective mechanism for developing vigorous, productive relationships between government agencies, industry, and the public in both the United States and Canada. It has created important linkages between state/provincial and federal regulatory activities; for example, by providing input to Coast Guard and EPA rulemaking that implemented the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It also assisted in assuring a well-coordinated international response to the July 1991 Tenyo Maru oil spill outside the Strait of Juan De Fuca between Washington and British Columbia. The task force is continuing to advance its goals of promoting public policy on oil spill prevention; cooperative management of major spills by government and industry; protection of the states/provincial rights and their natural and economic resources; and inter-governmental consistency in regulations adopted for oil spill prevention, contingency planning, and resource damage assessment.

International Offers of Assistance Guidelines – Developing an IMO Tool to "Internationalize" Oil Spill Readiness and Response

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 328-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heather A. Parker ◽  
Scott R. Knutson ◽  
Andy Nicoll ◽  
Tim Wadsworth
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Guideline Development ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Global Perspective ◽  
National Response ◽  
Response Capacity ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT During the Macondo 252 incident in 2010, it became apparent that the lack of clear guidance to effectively manage the flood of response assistance offered and required from other nations and organizations. To help address these concerns, the U.S. Coast Guard hosted an international ad hoc workgroup after the 2011 International Oil Spill Conference to discuss challenges and issues associated with sharing equipment, technology and expertise among nations and organizations to support a national response authority faced with a significant oil spill exceeding the domestic response capacity. Ideas and recommendations were captured and the need for the development of a comprehensive set of guidelines for International Offers of Assistance (IOA) was formed. The U.S. Coast Guard recognized the importance of establishing these guidelines with a broad, global perspective and proposed the concept to the International Maritime Organization's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). In July 2011, MEPC approved the proposal submitted by the United States, and added this item to the work program of the Technical Working Group of the IMO Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances (OPRC-HNS TG). The OPRC-HNS TG began this work during its 13th session in March 2012, and continues to conduct the bulk of guideline development during intersessional periods via an International Correspondence Group, comprised of a range of national response authorities, spill contractors and industry representatives from around the world. These international guidelines will be available for use by nations as a tool to assist in managing a multitude of requests for and offers of assistance from other countries, regional coordinating bodies, or other entities. This paper summarizes work already completed and still in progress on the development of the IMO International Offers of Assistance Guidelines for oil spills. The ultimate goal for these Guidelines, once completed within the OPRC-HNS TG and approved by MEPC, will be adoption and utilization by IMO Member States, particularly those that are party to OPRC Convention and to the OPRC-HNS Protocol which require States to establish procedures for international cooperation during pollution incidents.

The Oil Spill Response Fund – Four Decades of Success

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2146-2158
Author(s):  
Allen R. Thuring
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Trust Fund ◽  
Us Economy ◽  
The Us ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT This paper examines the oil pollution response fund created by Section 311(k) of the 1972 CWA and then modified, culminating with the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) established by OPA. Could the CWA have been successful absent the provision for a federal fund? This Fund is now four decades old. Has it passed the “test of time”? Did it meet the goals set at its birth? Is it still relevant? Should it continue? CWA Section 311 and later OPA created a range of response tools to deal with oil and hazmat spills on the waters of the US. They established a public/private solution to spill response. Key components:An expectation that the spiller was responsible and liable to clean up the spill;The National Contingency Plan and the Federal On-Scene Coordinator/FOSC;Establishing expertise on “special teams”: the CG's National Strike Force and EPA's Emergency Response Team;An up-front trust fund available only to the FOSC that pays for removals if the responsible party (RP) does not step forward. The fund exists to:Pre-empt the RP from using delay as a response option, despite the law.Give the FOSC money to quickly hire private response companies, if the RP does not act or if the spill's origin is a mystery. Equally important, the CWA and OPA did NOT designate a government agency to “clean up” oil spills. Rather, the law envisioned private companies performing that role, paid for by the spillers/RP or the 311(k)/OSLTF Fund, under the oversight of the USCG or the EPA. It tasked the USCG with managing this Fund. The Fund achieved its results. The US has a robust private oil spill removal sector that responsible parties hire when needed. If an RP does not act, the CG and EPA FOSCs use the Fund to mobilize those same companies to remove oil spills on US waters. The US economy has grown, as has the number of oil spills reported. Cases each year requiring Fund use have not increased proportionally. Responsible parties continue to clean up their spills, as the CWA envisioned. The Fund retains its ability to respond simultaneously to major spills, even during Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon. In forty two years, the Fund has always been available for an FOSC directed removal. The opinions stated in this paper are the author's alone, and do not reflect the official policies of the United States Coast Guard.

U.S. NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED INTERNATIONAL OIL SPILL RESPONSE POLICY1

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1051-1054 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Adams
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Lead Agency ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
International Engagement ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The United States has several international oil pollution response agreements for which the U.S. Coast Guard serves as lead agency for implementation. However, the United States does not have an integrated plan for implementing these agreements, the criteria to use in determining what level of cooperation is needed, or a strategy for prioritizing which countries with which to engage to forge new agreements. This paper outlines a strategy for international engagement that allows the United States to participate in response-related expertise exchange to ensure appropriate capabilities are available for spills that threaten U.S. interests. Obstacles to developing and implementing the strategy and ways to overcome them also are identified.

Developing an International Oil Spill Policy Strategy for the U.S.

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 913-917
Author(s):  
Michael Adams
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Cost Effective ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Foreign Assistance ◽  
International Convention ◽  
Integrated Policy ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT As called for under the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990 (OPRC), “Parties to the OPRC convention are required to establish measures for dealing with pollution incidents, either nationally or in co-operation with other countries.” As a signatory to OPRC the U.S. Government (USG) has pledged to assist other countries in the development of their own oil spill response capabilities and while USG has many agreements that meet the guidelines of assisting other countries, there is no formal engagement strategy for developing further agreements, no agency championing this effort, and there are many still requiring assistance. However, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is uniquely positioned to perform the role of drafting an engagement strategy and working with the global community to assist those countries that have yet to develop an adequate oil spill response system of their own due to the lack of resources, expertise or both. There are many hurdles to enabling USCG to assume the OPRC assistance banner that have been previously addressed (Adams, IOSC 2001), which this paper will not seek to readdress. However, if USG does decide to move forward with an integrated policy there remains the need to develop an adequate engagement strategy. This strategy is necessary to ensure the limited resources available for foreign assistance are expended in the most cost effective, ethical and responsible manner possible. There are three alternative strategies I will analyze in an effort to determine the best suited for implementation of this policy. These three strategies are based primarily on 1) environmental need, 2) geographical proximity, and 3) political/economic interests. The goal of this strategy is to effectively implement the oil spill assistance policy alluded to previously in support of the U.S.'s pledge under OPRC. This paper will analyze the success of each strategy making a recommendation on which one USG should pursue.

SECURITY POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR INLAND FACILITIES AND PIPELINES

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 229-232
Author(s):  
Gary Yoshioka ◽  
Ellinor Coder
Keyword(s):  
Security Policy ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Terrorist Attack ◽  
Large Fraction ◽  
The United States ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Department Of Energy ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Although facilities in the United States have not been subject to major oil spills caused by intentional acts, around the world acts of war and terrorism account for a large fraction of reported major oil spills. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires response plans that address a “worst case discharge;” however, the implementing regulatory agencies did not foresee the possibility of deliberate attacks that could involve multiple storage tanks or several pipeline response zones. In addition, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 highlighted the problems with the current U.S. federal response and contingency plans. The U.S. Coast Guard published a rule that requires operators of marine-transportation-related oil facilities to implement a variety of security measures. Inland facilities and pipelines are generally exempt from the security regulations; nevertheless, those facilities and pipelines can take steps to increase their own security preparedness by emulating the Coast Guard provisions. Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-7, issued on December 17, 2003, identified critical infrastructure sectors and sector-specific agencies to facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sectors. The U.S. Department of Energy is responsible for coordinating the protection of critical infrastructures in the Energy Sector, which includes the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil. In this paper, we discuss recent trends in Federal requirements and current provisions for oil industry security planning. We highlight types of major oil facilities that need to consider the possibility of a terrorist attack, as well as recommendations by industry groups. We conclude with suggested areas for industry planning improvement.

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