ON COURSE: THE CALIFORNIA UNIFIED OIL SPILL CONTROL TRAINING PARTNERSHIP

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 513-515
Author(s):  
John H. Giesen ◽  
Jon D. MacArthur
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Management Approach ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
Response Training ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Ultimate Objective ◽  
Spill Control

ABSTRACT Faced with training and travel dollar constraints, California's Department of Fish and Game and the 11th U.S. Coast Guard District worked to form a multiorganizational partnership designed to leverage required resources to conduct a premier operational-level oil spill response training program in the state. The partnership included no less than six major organizations from both the public and private sectors, each playing critical roles in planning and conducting the training. Major hurdles overcome were curriculum development and operational support. Both of these challenges were resolved through a unified management approach in which the ultimate objective became success of the course. The lessons learned from the program provide guidance and rationale for future such efforts.

ICS CONTRIBUTES TO THE NORTH CAPE OIL SPILL RESPONSE1

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Management System ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Management Tool ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
The North ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.

scholarly journals Current and Proposed Efforts to Resolve HSPD-5 and NCP Authorities (NIC and PFO)

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
LCDR John LaMorte ◽  
LT Rebecca Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Gulf Of Mexico ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
National Guard ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Oil Well ◽  
Environmental Disasters ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Oil Rig ◽  
Exercise And Training

ABSTRACT During the evening of 20 April, 2010 U.S. Coast Guard District Eight Command Center watch standers received a report of an explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon (DWH), an oil rig working on the Macondo oil well approximately 42 miles Southeast of Venice, LA (OSC Report, 2011). The explosion on board the DWH and resulting fires eventually destroyed the oil rig and caused it to sink into the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven crewmembers lost their lives in the tragic events that unfolded that night, and one of the nation's largest environmental disasters would soon follow. Estimates of the oil discharged from the Macondo oil well were between 12,000 and 25,000 barrels per day, and the response involved approximately 47,000 oil spill response personnel, 6,870 vessels, approximately 4.12 million feet of boom, and 17,500 National Guard personnel, five states (OSC Report, 2011). The massive oil spill lasted 87 days and estimates suggest that more than 200 million gallons of oil was discharged into the Gulf of Mexico, which stands as the largest oil spill event in U.S. history. From these massive response operations came important lessons learned for SONS event planning, preparedness, and response, as it became apparent during DWH response operations that oil spill response governance and doctrine was not well understood across the whole-of-government. This issue was well documented in the National Incident Commander's report and several recommendations were identified to address this issue. This paper will explore the steps taken within the U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) SONS Exercise and Training Program to promote a better understanding of oil spill response governance and doctrine among Cabinet-level senior leadership and the interagency representatives that will ultimately be involved when the next SONS event happens.

Taking a Step Back. Exercises as Training Opportunities.

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1055-1058
Author(s):  
Joseph Gleason
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Opportunity To Learn ◽  
The United States ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Personnel Turnover ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Response Exercise

ABSTRACT Historically, many response exercises conducted by the United States Coast Guard and other oil spill response stakeholders have been conducted as functional or full-scale exercises. With the increased demands placed on many U.S. agencies as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11’ 2001, there is a greater need than ever to ensure that time spent in training and exercises produces positive and tangible results for the participants. In preparation for the joint US/Canadian response exercise, CANUSLANT 2002, the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards decided to take a step back and look at the lessons learned from previous exercises. Based on this review, the Joint Response Team (JRT) decided to focus CANUSLANT 2002 as a training opportunity and to work on the lessons learned that were repeatedly identified in earlier CANUSLANT exercises. Perhaps the most common exercise conducted in oil spill response is the functional “command post” exercise where exercise participants are assigned to ICS (Incident Command System) staff elements. Participants then respond to an exercise scenario and prescripted injects that are provided to drive participant actions. With personnel turnover, transfers, and increased operational demands, many exercise participants struggle through the crisis phase of an incident scenario and never have the opportunity to learn what it is they are supposed to be doing. When all is said and done, many exercise participants are often simply go home happy that the exercise is over and done with. The goal for CANUSLANT 2002 was to produce an exercise where the participants accomplished something tangible; that long pending issues would be discussed and perhaps even resolved. The Exercise Design Team hoped that the participants walked away from the exercise saying that it was time well spent and not simply thankful that the exercise was over. This paper outlines the factors that led to the success of the CANUSLANT 2002 cross border response exercise. This paper also highlights some of the fundamentals for varying your approach to exercises to achieve tangible results while providing personnel the skills and training required to respond in the event of a real disaster.

THE OILING OF ICS

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Hunter
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Role Of Government ◽  
The Public ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Industry Standard ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Crisis Managers

ABSTRACT The incident command system (ICS) works for oil spills. It should be the industry standard and some will argue that it already is. But there are a number of temptations to fiddle with it. Fueling these inclinations is the fundamental difference between oil spills and natural disasters: Oil spills make the perpetrator fix the problem—under heavy oversight. Add to this difference the public outcry that attends oil spills and the dual role of government as both helper and prosecutor. From these conditions emerge adaptations of ICS which both weaken and strengthen it. The benefits of ICS are diminished by deputy incident commanders who block unified commanders from access to section chiefs, over-zealous crisis managers who displace command post decisions or its information office, separate press offices with party line slants, government law enforcement activity mixed into spill response, nonstandard operations terminology and structure involving “containment and cleanup” or “salvage,” and the commingling of public and private response funds. ICS's application to oil spill response is strengthened by the use of trained unified commanders, deputy incident commanders who operate as staff rather than line, crisis managers who support on-scene objectives, joint information centers, and heavy involvement of skilled, prepared environmental assessment teams in the planning section who generate priorities, strategies, and (operationally coordinated) tactics. Technically, not all these points constitute alterations of ICS, but most do and the others come close. This mixed bag of strengthening and weakening tweaks to oil spill ICS provides an opportunity to take a new look at this faithful friend to the crisis responder.

MSRC Responders: Construction and Operation of Sixteen Oil Spill Response Vessels

1995 ◽  
Vol 32 (03) ◽  
pp. 164-178
Author(s):  
William H. Cowardin ◽  
George W Dowell ◽  
Richard C. Rodi
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Pollution ◽  
Time Frame ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Small Craft ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Technical Issues ◽  
Short Time

The Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC) was established to provide catastrophic spill response capabilities to its client companies as required by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). The MSRC fleet consists of 16 oil spill response vessels (OSRVs), 16 boom support boats, 17 oil barges, and numerous small craft totaling 273 vessels, 185 of which are U.S. Coast Guard certificated. This paper provides an overview of these vessels, their capabilities, and their roles in oil spill response. Particular emphasis is placed on the design, acquisition, and operation of the 200 ft oceangoing OSRVs and the technical issues which had to be resolved in the extremely short time frame mandated by the OPA 90. The authors also discuss some of the problems encountered in assembling this fleet and the lessons learned.

SWEDISH COAST GUARD RESPONSE TRAINING PROGRAM

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 547-549
Author(s):  
Dan Thorell ◽  
Thomas Fago
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Support System ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Basic Training ◽  
Response Training ◽  
The People ◽  
Training Response ◽  
Weak Points ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Great Pressure

ABSTRACT The efficiency of an oil spill response operation depends very much on the response commander's knowledge, experience, and possibilities of analyzing and reviewing the situation. Decisions must be made quickly and under great pressure. All officers in the Swedish Coast Guard (CG) have the same basic training in response preparedness. During service they will utilize their knowledge on board in real operations and in exercises (local, regional, national, and international). Through different senior courses, some of them will be authorized to be on-scene commanders and finally response commanders. The possibilities for training response commanders under “real” conditions are limited. Weak points in the organization, decision procedures, command centers, and such are usually found during actual operations, however. The Swedish Coast Guard has decided on a strategy to train the response commander and his staff in their normal workplaces, with their normal tools, and with the people they are used to working with. To accomplish this, the Coast Guard has developed a portable computerized exercise support system providing the command with necessary data and images to run an exercise.

LESSONS LEARNED: THE METHODOLOGY OF CONDUCTING OIL SPILL RESPONSE TRAINING

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 1015-1016
Author(s):  
Bernard Bennett
Keyword(s):  
Emergency Response ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Emergency Services ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Training Needs ◽  
Careful Consideration ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Response Training ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
And Training

ABSTRACT Achieving and maintaining preparedness for oil spill response is similar to other emergency services in that constant training is required to achieve success. Careful consideration of what training is required must be conducted through systematic task and training needs analysis. Only then can the methods and suppliers of such training be selected. Once initiated, the training must be maintained, reinforced, and updated through exercises or other schemes. This paper looks at some lessons learned from conducting oil spill training and concludes that emergency response training for oil spills can be financially justifiable.

Managing Preparedness in the New Millennium: Applying a Measurement Strategy

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 349-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Weber ◽  
Larry Hewett ◽  
William Whitson ◽  
David Stalfort ◽  
Robert Loesch ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Assessment System ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Government Response ◽  
Corporate Executives ◽  
The World ◽  
Future Improvement ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT One of the most vexing questions in the world of oil spill preparedness is “Are we ready?” There is no question that countless energy and resources have been invested in improving oil spill response. The problem arises in trying to determine to what level these efforts have succeeded or where to focus future improvement efforts to fill any gaps. Understanding the true gaps in preparedness has become ever more critical. Many government response organizations have faced declining budgets in recent years. Corporate executives are likely to face difficulty justifying large expenditures on preparedness with fewer and fewer large spills. Anecdotal evidence is not enough to support requests for current perceived readiness woes, including additional personnel and equipment. Nor does this evidence provide insight to future preparedness shortfalls. So how do we support decision makers struggling to make wise choices with a limited pool of resources? How do we ensure that public and private response resources complement each other? These questions suggest the need for a commonly accepted preparedness management system. The authors describe a preparedness assessment system under development by the U.S. Coast Guard that is patterned after Malcolm Baldridge's quality improvement principles and will enable decision makers to better manage preparedness.

The public value of building large oil spill response vessels in Korea

Marine Policy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 88 ◽  
pp. 242-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Se-Jun Jin ◽  
Seul-Ye Lim ◽  
Seung-Hoon Yoo
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Public Value ◽  
The Public ◽  
Oil Spill Response

scholarly journals RESOURCE SUPPLY AN ACCESSIBILITY OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES

YMER Digital ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (12) ◽  
pp. 446-455
Author(s):  
Eshetu Mathewos Juta ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Public Transportation ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Assessment System ◽  
Behavioral Changes ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
Urban Mass Transit ◽  
Transportation Accessibility ◽  
Private Actors ◽  
Transportation Facilities

The term “urban mass transit” generally refers to scheduled intra-city service on a fixed route in shared vehicles. Public transportation is an important contributing factor to urban sustainability. Effective transportation networks that incorporate public transit livable by easing commute and transportation needs and increasing accessibility. To assess public transportation accessibility in metropolitan networks, two indices are used: the supply level of urban public transportation facilities resource and the public transportation-private automobile traveling time ratio. As the research in the Wolaita sodo town region and the assessment system, an evaluation technique for urban public transportation facility resource supply is developed based on accessibility. Accessibility is a representative indicator for evaluating the supply of bus system. Traditional studies have evaluated the accessibility from different aspects. Considering the interaction among land use, bus timetable arrangement and individual factors, a more holistic accessibility measurement is proposed to combine static and dynamic characteristics from multisource traffic data. The objective is to highlight the main lessons learned and identify knowledge gaps to guide the design and evaluation of future transport investments. Moreover, studies looking at ways to improve the operational efficiency of systems and those seeking to promote behavioral changes in transport users offer great potential to generate learning that is useful for the public and private actors involved.

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