Damage Assessment and Restoration Following the JULIE N Oil Spill: A Case Study

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 409-412
Author(s):  
Gary S. Mauseth ◽  
Frank G. Csulak

ABSTRACT On September 27, 1996, the T/V JULIE N inbound with a cargo of 8.8 million gallons of #2 fuel oil struck the Million Dollar Bridge, spanning Portland Harbor between Portland and South Portland, Maine. The incident resulted in a spill of approximately 180,000 gallons of oil, which spread throughout a large area of Portland Harbor. The marine and coastal resources of Portland Harbor and the Fore River, including water resources, shellfish, wetlands, sediments, and birds were exposed and/or injured by the oil. The spill also had an adverse impact on several different public use services. The natural resource trustee agencies (including the State of Maine, NOAA, and the Department of the Interior) and Amity Products Carriers, Inc. (Responsible Party, RP) conducted a cooperative natural resource damage assessment to assess and restore natural resources exposed and/or injured by the spill. The trustees and RP operated under an initial verbal agreement to cooperate until a written agreement was executed over a year after the incident. The cooperative process and lessons learned are described in the paper. Particularly positive components included cooperative data collection and active collaboration on study design and endpoints. The trustees expended $782,860 in assessment costs. The RP expended an additional $169,101 in cooperative laboratory and field investigations, as well as $364,720 in consultant costs. The total assessment costs were $1,316,681. The trustees and the RP were then able to successfully negotiate a $1 million dollar settlement for the purpose of planning, implementing, and overseeing selected restoration projects. These projects included reducing the discharge of PAH's into the Fore River, wetland and bird habitat restoration, and construction of a recreational trail along the Fore River. The RP sought compensation from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund under the limitation of liability provisions of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Compensation included expenses beyond statutory liability for response, NRDA assessment, and damages to natural resources among others.

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 727-731
Author(s):  
Randall B. Luthi ◽  
Linda B. Burlington ◽  
Eli Reinharz ◽  
Sharon K. Shutler

ABSTRACT The Damage Assessment Regulations Team (DART), under the Office of General Counsel of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), has centered its efforts on developing natural resource damage assessment regulations for oil pollution in navigable waters. These procedures will likely lower the costs associated with damage assessments, encourage joint cooperative assessments and simplify most assessments. The DART team of NOAA is developing new regulations for the assessment of damages due to injuries related to oil spills under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. These regulations will involve coordination, restoration, and economic valuation. Various methods are currently being developed to assess damages for injuries to natural resources. The proposed means include: compensation tables for spills under 50,000 gallons, Type A model, expedited damage assessment (EDA) procedures, and comprehensive procedures. They are being developed to provide trustees with a choice for assessing natural resource damages for each oil spill.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 661-665
Author(s):  
Deborah P. French McCay ◽  
Carol-Ann Manen ◽  
Mark Gibson ◽  
John Catena

ABSTRACT The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) seeks to make the environment and public whole for injury to or loss of natural resources and services as a result of a discharge of oil. This means that restoration projects implemented as part of a natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) must be of a sufficient scale to produce resources and services of the same type and quality and of comparable value to those that were lost. Services, for an NRDA, include both the ecological and human uses of the resources. Also, the loss must be quantified from the time of impact until the resource returns to baseline conditions—the level in the absence of the impact. This paper details a series of methods that may be used for scaling NRDA restoration projects and describes how these methods were used in the restoring the injuries incurred as a result of the North Cape oil spill.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1143-1146
Author(s):  
Don A. Kane ◽  
Francis J. Gonynor

ABSTRACT A primary goal of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) is to make the environment and public whole for injuries to natural resources that result from the discharge of oil. OPA 90 authorizes state and federal natural resource agencies to serve as trustees for natural resources and provides them with the responsibility, through a natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) process, to ensure that injured natural resources are restored. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) promulgated damage assessment regulations, and in an attempt to correct deficiencies and meet OPA 90 mandates, developed a framework intended to promote expeditious restoration. To lessen the common litigious nature of the NRDA process, the regulations encourage active participation by a responsible party in a cooperative assessment of damages. Natural resource trustee agencies also have authority to enforce criminal aspects of other statutes for impacts resulting from an oil spill. However, when agencies initiate a criminal investigation under these statutes for an oil spill, the goals mandated in OPA 90 and set forth in the NOAA regulations can be substantially undermined. There are potential solutions that could, at least partially, resolve this dilemma for the responsible party to a point where participation in the NRDA process would not unduly prejudice its position in a criminal investigation. Such solutions might include written agreements as to communications and transactional use of immunity agreements, stay of proceedings, and protective orders, which singly, or in combination, could prove invaluable in preserving a progressive NRDA process, fully inclusive of the responsible party.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 851-854
Author(s):  
Frank Csulak ◽  
Douglas Helton ◽  
Carol-Ann Manen ◽  
Norman Meade ◽  
Marguerite Matera

ABSTRACT On January 19, 1996, the tank borge North Cape and the tug Scandia grounded on Moonstone Beach in southern Rhode Island, spilling 828,000 gallons of no. 2 heating oil into Block Island Sound. Just 2 weeks prior to the grounding, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) had published the final natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) rule for the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The North Cape oil spill became the first opportunity to implement the new NRDA rules. One of the key provisions of the NRDA rule is the requirement that trustees must invite the responsible parties (RP) to participate in a cooperative assessment of damages. If the trustees and the RP can agree to perform the initial phases of an assessment cooperatively, the chances of achieving a fair settlement and avoiding protracted litigation are expected to be enhanced. The cooperative approach should also reduce overall transaction costs, facilitate settlement, and result in a more rapid implementation of restoration projects. This paper presents an overview of the cooperative natural resource damage assessment process being undertaken by the trustees and the RPs following the North Cape oil spill and highlights some of the lessons learned in conducting a cooperative assessment.


1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 377-383
Author(s):  
Richard W. Dunford ◽  
Sara P. Hudson ◽  
William H. Desvousges

ABSTRACT The new Oil Pollution Act of 1990 defines natural resource damages from oil spills as the sum of the cost to restore foregone natural resource services, the diminution of value of natural resource services prior to restoration, and damage assessment costs. Natural resource damages are usually determined once removal activities (containment, protection, and cleanup) are completed. Nevertheless, removal activities affect the magnitude of all three natural resource damage components. Consequently, to minimize the total cost of oil spills, decisions on removal activities should consider the linkages between removal activities and natural resource damages. Successful containment results in minimal natural resource damages, because oil generally does far less damage to natural resources in open water than on shore. If oil cannot be contained, the potential natural resource damages from oil coming ashore in certain areas can help determine priorities for protection activities. In particular, oil may harm natural resource services much more in some areas than in others. Furthermore, some natural resource services are more costly to restore and assess than others. Finally, some cleanup activities do more harm than good to natural resource services. If the effects of cleanup activities on natural resource damages are ignored, “excessive” cleanup activities are likely.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 333-338
Author(s):  
Douglas Helton ◽  
Donna Lawson ◽  
Martin McHugh

ABSTRACT On June 24, 1989, the Uruguayan merchant marine tanker Presidente Rivera, loaded with 19 million gallons of No. 6 fuel oil, ran aground in the Delaware River near Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania, spilling between 200,000 and 300,000 gallons of oil. Currents spread the oil over approximately 29 miles of shoreline in New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania, reaching upstream as far as Little Tinicum Island, a wildlife refuge near Philadelphia, and downstream as far as Reedy Island, south of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal. Natural resources under the trusteeship of New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, the U.S. Department of the Interior, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (U.S. Department of Commerce) were affected by the spill, including shoreline parks, fisheries, marshes, birds, and wildlife. Additionally, portions of the river were closed to vessel traffic and nearby creeks were boomed off, preventing access to marinas and boat ramps. After three years of damage assessment, pretrial discovery, and negotiations, the trustees reached a settlement on natural resource damages with the responsible party. This paper discusses the strategy used by the trustees in developing a natural resource damage claim and highlights some of the lessons learned during the assessment and settlement process.


1987 ◽  
Vol 1987 (1) ◽  
pp. 533-540
Author(s):  
Gary L. Ott

ABSTRACT Federal guidelines that outline a process for natural resource damage assessment have recently been published. The guidelines provide two types of assessment procedures that are referred to as Type A assessments and Type B assessments. The Type A procedures are for simplified assessments and use a computer model to measure in monetary terms compensation for injury to marine and coastal natural resources through the use of average values and approximations. The proposed Type A computer model was used to analyze a major oil spill that occurred in Island Park, New York, where the federal on-scene coordinator had attempted to evaluate the magnitude and severity of the spill. In this one instance, both field observations and the proposed Type A computer model characterized this major oil spill as having a limited impact on the environment. Oil and chemical spills are generally characterized only by the size of the release. Conceivably, the proposed Type A model could be used as a tool for characterizing a spill by its potential to injure natural resources. The ability to focus on the environmental impacts of a spill may help analyze response actions that reduce natural resource damages.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1153-1155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Lehto

ABSTRACT During oil spill incidents, NRDA and response activities may co-occur. This paper discusses those occurrences, focusing on ephemeral data collection and emergency restoration. Current laws provide some guidance for how these activities may be coordinated. The Field Operations Guide (FOG) and the National Contingency Plan (NCP) state that it is the responsibility of the Incident Commander (IC) to notify natural resource trustees of the incident and to coordinate NRDA representative's activities through the Liaison Officer. The FOG and NCP also state that it is the responsibility of the trustees to conduct their NRDA preassessment activities without hindering the response. The overlap between NRDA and response may be further complicated because many trustees may work within the environmental unit or the wildlife recovery unit for the response and also have the responsibility to work on NRDA. They may work in the Incident Command System advising the IC on response issues while also trying to initiate a damage assessment. Data collection during a response is critical for managing the incident as well as performing a thorough damage assessment. Although the types of data collected to aid the response may be similar to those used in damage assessment, often the scale and level of detail may be quite different. Even with these differences, synergies in ephemeral data collection may exist. Emergency restoration activities do sometimes occur before the response has concluded. The Oil Pollution Act regulations state that emergency restoration may occur if the action is needed to avoid the loss of natural resources, or to prevent any continuing danger to natural resources. If the trustees determine that emergency restoration is needed, they are required to consult with the IC prior to taking any such action. As an example, this paper will discuss emergency restoration actions undertaken during the Whatcom creek, WA gasoline spill to reduce the impact to migrating salmon.


1973 ◽  
Vol 1973 (1) ◽  
pp. 569-577
Author(s):  
Robert Kaiser ◽  
Donald Jones ◽  
Howard Lamp'l

ABSTRACT This paper presents the “Agnes Story” disaster as related to the largest inland oil spill experienced in the history of the U.S. and actions taken by EPA in coping with the problem. Contrasted to the massive oceanic spill of the TORREY CANYON, other major ship oil pollution disasters, the Santa Barbara and Gulf of Mexico offshore platform oil spills, the oil pollution resulting from the flooding produced by Tropical Storm Agnes required unprecedented actions by many governmental agencies. The inland rivers of the Middle Atlantic area experienced spills of petroleum products ranging from over 3,000,000 gallons of No. 2 fuel oil, gasoline and kerosene from storage tanks in Big Flats / Elmira, N.Y. (just north of the Pennsylvania border) to 6,000,000–8,000,000 gallons of black, highly metallic waste oil and sludge from an oil reclamation plant on the Schuylkill River. The aftermath of this gigantic inland oil spill was oil and gasoline soaked fields, oil coated trees, farm houses, homes, factories, an airport, and hundreds of stranded oil puddles, ponds and lagoons as the rivers receded to normal levels. The record setting flood stage along several miles of both the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Rivers and their tributaries was recorded vividly ashore on trees and buildings as if by a black grease pencil, drawing attention to the most widespread property damage suffered from the most devastating storm in recorded U.S. history. Cleanup of the spilled oil in the midst of other rescue and restorative actions by Federal, State and Municipal agencies was fraught with emergency response problems including: identification of major impact points, availability of resources for response actions, coordination of response actions, activation of cleanup contractors, meeting administrative requirements, and the structure for making command decisions. Along with these requirements were technical decisions to be made concerning methods of physical removal procedures, containment systems, chemical treating agents and, very importantly, protecting and restoring the environment. Major spill effects and significant cleanup operations, problems encountered, and lessons learned are presented so that future responses can be better and more efficiently dealt with in an inland oil spill disaster comparable to the “Agnes Oil Spill”.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-201
Author(s):  
Stephen Lehmann ◽  
Felix Lopez ◽  
Frank Csulak

ABSTRACT The U.S. Roosevelt Roads Naval Station (RRNS) lies near the municipality of Ceiba on the southeastern coast of Puerto Rico. On October 20, 1999, RRNS personnel reported a spill of JP5 fuel oil, which was officially determined to be 112,000 gallons. The oil spilled from a day-tank into a 50-acre basin mangrove forest and then into the northern Ensenada Harbor. Initial spill response activities by the U.S. Navy Construction Battalion (Seabees), including construction and placement of both underflow and culvert dams, were carried out in the face of an approaching hurncane. This damming effort resulted in both positive and negative consequences for the survival of the mangrove forest. In addition to the cleanup activities, the federal trustees—including the U.S. Navy (USN), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)—initiated a natural resource damage assessment (NRDA). The primary objectives of the damage assessment were to identify potential natural resources at risk, determine the horizontal extent of contamination within the basin mangrove, and document exposure and/or injuries to natural resources resulting from the spill. This paper examines the overall effectiveness of the spill response operations, discusses the difficulties in conducting cleanup activities in a basin mangrove environment, and describes coordination efforts between cleanup activities and natural resource response activities.


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