scholarly journals WHERE CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT MEET1 (MANAGING CONCURRENT OPERATIONS)

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 973-977
Author(s):  
Jonathan D. Sarubbi ◽  
Brian Lynch ◽  
Tim Y. Deal
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Exercise Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Maritime Security ◽  
Delaware River ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Consequence Management

ABSTRACT The National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) was created in response to the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill disaster and is focused on strengthening a port community's preparedness to respond to oil spills. In planning for its PREP exercise in 2003, the oil spill response community within the Delaware River Port Complex saw an excellent opportunity to leverage the PREP exercise program to create an exercise that combined a major oil spill response with law enforcement operations that included: implementing security measures for protection of maritime infrastructure, crime scene investigation and intelligence collection. The PREP exercise scenario involved a catastrophic oil spill that was the result of a terrorist incident. The overarching objective of the exercise was to use the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage concurrent operations involving law enforcement response (Crisis Management) and response operations aimed at protecting public health and safety (Consequence Management). To integrate the two distinct disciplines of law enforcement operations and oil spill response, the exercise objectives included: (1) testing an ICS organizational model to manage spill response and maritime security with the FBI's Joint Operations Center (JOC), which is responsible for investigation and intelligence activities; (2) developing Incident Action Plans that integrate both oil spill and maritime security operations; and, (3) using the common processes inherent in ICS, to coordinate the efforts of 25 responding agencies to create a cohesive response. In the case of the Philadelphia exercise, the convergence of crisis and consequence management required unprecedented cooperation by all responding agencies. Focusing on the Incident Command System was absolutely critical for multi-agency operations. This paper discusses the 2003 Philadelphia PREP exercise and the valuable lessons learned in conducting concurrent operations under a single management system.

ICS CONTRIBUTES TO THE NORTH CAPE OIL SPILL RESPONSE1

1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Management System ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Management Tool ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
The North ◽  
Oil Spill Response

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.

Adaptation of the Incident Command System to Oil Spill Response During the American Trader Spill

1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 267-272
Author(s):  
Robert G. Rolan ◽  
Keith H. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Structure ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Management Plan ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Crisis Management Plan

ABSTRACT While developing its new crisis management plan in 1989, BP America (BPA) modified the incident command system (ICS) for use as the organizational structure of its oil spill response team. This was done to be compatible with the post-Exxon Valdez organization of the Alyeska response team and for certain advantages it would provide for responses in other locations and in other types of crisis situations. The ICS was originally developed for fighting wildfires in California and has since been widely adopted by other fire and emergency services in the U. S. While retaining most of the ICS structure, ?PA developed modifications necessary to fit the unique requirements of oil spill response. The modified ICS was used during a full scale test of ?PA's draft crisis management plan in December 1989, and thus was familiar to ?PA's top executives and other participating response team members. When the American Trader spill occurred in February 1990, BPA's management used the modified ICS organization even though the crisis management plan had not been finalized or widely distributed within the company. Details of the organizational structure evolved as the spill response progressed, in part due to the changing requirements of the response over time and in part because of previously unrecognized issues. This paper describes that evolution and the resulting final structure. Essential differences between the original ICS and BPA's oil spill version of it are highlighted. Despite the unrecognized issues and the unfamiliarity of some team members with the ICS, the organization worked well and can be credited with a share of the success of the American Trader response.

Massachusetts First Responder Exercises: Preparing Local Communities for Oil Spill Response

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 300125
Author(s):  
Richard Packard ◽  
Mike Popovich ◽  
John Stengel
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Homeland Security ◽  
Exercise Program ◽  
First Responders ◽  
Coastal Resources ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Sensitive Areas ◽  
Environmentally Sensitive Areas ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Environmentally Sensitive

As a result of the Buzzards Bay oil spill in 2003, and subsequent passage of the Oil Spill Act of 2004, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, through its Department of Environmental Protection's (MassDEP) Oil Spill Program, has developed a comprehensive, 3-tiered program to protect coastal resources. The program includes three elements: 1) the development of 160 Geographic Response Plans (GRP) to protect environmentally sensitive areas, 2) the acquisition and distribution of 83 oil spill response equipment trailers to coastal communities and, 3) the development of a training and exercise program to better prepare local first responders, including fire departments, police departments, harbormasters and other town officials, to respond to oil spills that threaten environmentally sensitive areas in their communities. This training and exercise program has increased first responders competency and skills as they relate to oil spill response resulting in a higher degree of readiness and preparedness amongst first responders throughout coastal Massachusetts. The program follows standard Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation protocols with clearly defined goals and objectives. Each exercise includes personnel from multiple municipalities working together to achieve the common goal of protecting coastal resources. The objectives of each exercise include, 1) foster inter-agency planning and coordination by providing the opportunity for local responders to work with each other and with Federal and State responders. 2) deploy a GRP protective booming tactic during a simulated incident, 3) promote resource coordination among local responders by coordinating use of assets from participating towns and agencies, 4) improve local oil spill preparedness by deploying equipment from pre-positioned trailers, providing participants hands-on experience in the field, and 5) evaluate the effectiveness of the booming tactic and identify any modifications necessary. Participants utilize the Incident Command System (ICS), operating within a Unified Command structure, testing their ability to effectively communicate goals, objectives and tactics.

Incorporating Well Control Support Functions into a Broader Oil Spill Response Organization

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2098-2111
Author(s):  
Kelly Lynn Schnapp ◽  
Joseph Leonard ◽  
Michael Drieu ◽  
Bryan Rogers
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Outer Continental Shelf ◽  
Support Functions ◽  
Well Drilling ◽  
Well Control ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Response Organization ◽  
And Control

ABSTRACT This paper seeks to better prepare the oil spill response community for incorporating well control into a response organization, based on conditional considerations rather than long and firmly held assumptions. Techniques used to control a well, after a blowout, are more closely related to technical well drilling and control activities rather than to operations intended to address oil in the environment. When oil is released from a well in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), response organizers need to consider various factors influencing the organization that may exist at the time. These include a working knowledge of well control by response leadership; strength of responder relationships; and response complexity (to include authority, stakeholder and public expectations). This is particularly true when incorporating the well control support function in the oil spill response operational planning processes, usually facilitated by the Incident Command System (ICS). Within the last three years, complex well control operations were uniquely incorporated into response organizations during two Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUEs) and during the DEEPWATER HORIZON incident. Three options will be presented. Considerations for incorporating well control into a response organization will be presented using the case studies noted previously and by comparing similar lessons learned from the salvage industry in the late 1990's. Options presented help demonstrate that response organization flexibility is key to a successful response. This paper seeks to illuminate options surrounding placement of well control within an incident command structure based upon unique incident situational realities.

Taking a Step Back. Exercises as Training Opportunities.

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1055-1058
Author(s):  
Joseph Gleason
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Opportunity To Learn ◽  
The United States ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Response Team ◽  
Personnel Turnover ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Response Exercise

ABSTRACT Historically, many response exercises conducted by the United States Coast Guard and other oil spill response stakeholders have been conducted as functional or full-scale exercises. With the increased demands placed on many U.S. agencies as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11’ 2001, there is a greater need than ever to ensure that time spent in training and exercises produces positive and tangible results for the participants. In preparation for the joint US/Canadian response exercise, CANUSLANT 2002, the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards decided to take a step back and look at the lessons learned from previous exercises. Based on this review, the Joint Response Team (JRT) decided to focus CANUSLANT 2002 as a training opportunity and to work on the lessons learned that were repeatedly identified in earlier CANUSLANT exercises. Perhaps the most common exercise conducted in oil spill response is the functional “command post” exercise where exercise participants are assigned to ICS (Incident Command System) staff elements. Participants then respond to an exercise scenario and prescripted injects that are provided to drive participant actions. With personnel turnover, transfers, and increased operational demands, many exercise participants struggle through the crisis phase of an incident scenario and never have the opportunity to learn what it is they are supposed to be doing. When all is said and done, many exercise participants are often simply go home happy that the exercise is over and done with. The goal for CANUSLANT 2002 was to produce an exercise where the participants accomplished something tangible; that long pending issues would be discussed and perhaps even resolved. The Exercise Design Team hoped that the participants walked away from the exercise saying that it was time well spent and not simply thankful that the exercise was over. This paper outlines the factors that led to the success of the CANUSLANT 2002 cross border response exercise. This paper also highlights some of the fundamentals for varying your approach to exercises to achieve tangible results while providing personnel the skills and training required to respond in the event of a real disaster.

Santa Monica Bay Prep 94: MAJOR SPILL EXERCISE PLANNING/EXECUTION1

1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 1031-1032
Author(s):  
Kara M. Satra
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Exercise Program ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
The People ◽  
Santa Monica Bay ◽  
Santa Monica ◽  
Response Exercise ◽  
Responsible Party

ABSTRACT The largest simulated response conducted under the most realistic conditions since the grounding of the Exxon Valdez has been captured on video. It shows the production and execution of the Preparedness for Response Exercise Program oil spill exercise held in September 1994 in Santa Monica Bay. The exercise involved over 500 people from more than 60 organizations. Chevron played the role of responsible party in this simulation of a spill of about 10,000 barrels of crude oil. The video focuses on the incident command system and the people for whom prevention and preparedness is a daily business.

Insights from Meta-Analysis of Recent Exercises

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 1388-1399
Author(s):  
Wade A. Narin van Court ◽  
Mark B. Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Exercise Program ◽  
The United States ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Exercise Programs ◽  
Additional Time ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Upper Level

ABSTRACT Oil terminals maintain and assess their oil spill response readiness by conducting drills and exercises in general accordance with the Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) guidelines; however, they often do not realize the full benefits of the time and effort they invest in their exercise programs. Specifically, the way many terminals conduct and evaluate their drill and exercise programs does not provide an in-depth understanding of the capabilities and competencies of their personnel and their response contractors. URS Corporation (URS) recently performed a meta-analysis of tabletop exercises (TTX), equipment deployment exercises (EDX), and unannounced spill equipment deployment drills (UDD) that we facilitated at terminals around the United States. The meta-analysis was performed as a combined review of the after action reports from the various exercises to identify common lessons learned and areas for improvement. Specifically, the objective of the meta-analysis was to develop recommendations, based on an in-depth understanding of the identified common lessons learned and insights from our exercise facilitators, to enhance or improve terminals' oil spill response performance when implemented in the design of future drills and exercises. Based on our study, URS identified and developed recommendations to address the following areas for improvement: training/exercises did not build on previous efforts; TTX were “walk through” or discussion type of exercises and not conducted in “real time”; UDD were conducted in similar ways each time and did not “stress the system”; exercises and drills did not involve upper level (e.g., regional or corporate) personnel who may have significant roles in the response; terminal personnel did not have relationships with staff of industries, contractors, and/or agencies in their area; terminal personnel were not familiar with the Geographic Response Plans or Area Contingency Plans for their area; and exercise programs and post-exercise reviews and critiques did not effectively assess all 15 response plan components. By implementing the recommendations from our meta-analysis, terminals can expect to obtain significantly greater benefits in terms of competence and confidence to respond to oil spills for a modest investment in additional time, cost, and effort.

THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS FOR RESPONSE EXERCISE PROGRAM (PREP) A PAPER TIGER OR DYNAMIC PROCESS?

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 969-972
Keyword(s):  
Exercise Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Hazardous Substance ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Continuous Growth ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Self Evaluation ◽  
National Preparedness ◽  
Response Exercise

ABSTRACT The National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program has been in effect for over a decade. There is no doubt that it has been a principal factor in moving the response community from the concept of developing incident management from scratch, to unified performance through organized teams. However, in the past couple of years the PREP approach has reached a certain level and stalled. When one goes to exercise design meetings throughout the country and commonly hear, “we are not ready to deal with this issue,” one must wonder why plans cannot or will not be fully tested after a decade of experience. Is the program working to the degree that is necessary and achievable? For continuous growth of the response community's level of competency in the Incident Command System and oil/hazardous substance response operations, a dynamic exercise program must exist. It is pertinent to ask?Has the National PREP Program reached status quo, and if so are we willing to change in order to improve?What is gained by testing the initial 24-hour period of the response over and over?Do core components of a plan tested during smaller exercises satisfy the effort that would be required for the Worst Case Discharge event?What works best, self-evaluation or independent evaluation?Is agency verification of exercises being done?Are unresolved issues and lessons learned documented, studied, and resolved before the next training or spill?Are lessons learned shared between companies for incorporation into plans?Do either the national or state modified PREP programs promote increased capability of oil spill removal organizations and spill management teams at local, regional, and national levels?Is the true availability of response resources tested through PREP? This paper will compare and contrast the National PREP program conducted by Federal Agencies, to the State of Washington's modified PREP program. The authors will answer these questions and provide recommendations for changes to PREP that will create a more dynamic and meaningful training program.

The Refugio Oil Spill Response: Case Study and Lessons’ Learned/Best Practices for the Future

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-123
Author(s):  
Yvonne Najah Addassi ◽  
Julie Yamamoto ◽  
Thomas M. Cullen
Keyword(s):  
Best Practices ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Santa Barbara ◽  
California Department ◽  
Oil Spill Response ◽  
Santa Barbara County ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT The Refugio Oil Spill occurred on May 19, 2015, due to the failure of an underground pipeline, owned and operated by a subsidiary of Plains All-American Pipeline near Highway 101 in Santa Barbara County. The Responsible Party initially estimated the amount of crude oil released at about 104,000 gallons, with 21,000 gallons reaching the ocean. A Unified Command (UC) was established consisting of Incident Commanders from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW) Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), Santa Barbara County, and Plains Pipeline with additional participation by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and California State Parks. Within hours, the CDFW closed fisheries and the following day Governor Brown declared a state of emergency for Santa Barbara County. The released oil caused heavy oiling of both on and offshore areas at Refugio State Beach and impacted other areas of Santa Barbara and Ventura. A number of factors created unique challenges for the management of this response. In addition to direct natural resource impacts, the closure of beaches and fisheries occurred days before the Memorial Day weekend resulting in losses for local businesses and lost opportunities for the public. The Santa Barbara community, with its history with oil spills and environmental activism, was extremely concerned and interested in involvement, including the use of volunteers on beaches. Also this area of the coast has significant tribal and archeologic resources that required sensitive handling and coordination. Finally, this area of California’s coast is a known natural seep area which created the need to distinguish spilled from ‘naturally occurring’ oil. Most emergency responses, including oil spills, follow a similar pattern of command establishment, response and cleanup phases, followed by non-response phase monitoring, cleanup and restoration. This paper will analyze the Refugio oil spill response in three primary focus areas: 1) identify the ways in which this spill response was unique and required innovative and novel solutions; 2) identify the ways in which this response benefited from the ‘lessons’ learned from both the Deepwater Horizon and Cosco Busan oil spills; and 3) provide a summary of OSPR’s response evaluation report for Refugio, with specific focus on how the lessons learned and best practices will inform future planning efforts within California.

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