Creating an Incident Command System Credentialing Program for Oil Spill Response

2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (1) ◽  
pp. abs405
Author(s):  
Elin Storey ◽  
Linda Pilkey-Jarvis
1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 267-272
Author(s):  
Robert G. Rolan ◽  
Keith H. Cameron

ABSTRACT While developing its new crisis management plan in 1989, BP America (BPA) modified the incident command system (ICS) for use as the organizational structure of its oil spill response team. This was done to be compatible with the post-Exxon Valdez organization of the Alyeska response team and for certain advantages it would provide for responses in other locations and in other types of crisis situations. The ICS was originally developed for fighting wildfires in California and has since been widely adopted by other fire and emergency services in the U. S. While retaining most of the ICS structure, ?PA developed modifications necessary to fit the unique requirements of oil spill response. The modified ICS was used during a full scale test of ?PA's draft crisis management plan in December 1989, and thus was familiar to ?PA's top executives and other participating response team members. When the American Trader spill occurred in February 1990, BPA's management used the modified ICS organization even though the crisis management plan had not been finalized or widely distributed within the company. Details of the organizational structure evolved as the spill response progressed, in part due to the changing requirements of the response over time and in part because of previously unrecognized issues. This paper describes that evolution and the resulting final structure. Essential differences between the original ICS and BPA's oil spill version of it are highlighted. Despite the unrecognized issues and the unfamiliarity of some team members with the ICS, the organization worked well and can be credited with a share of the success of the American Trader response.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 973-977
Author(s):  
Jonathan D. Sarubbi ◽  
Brian Lynch ◽  
Tim Y. Deal

ABSTRACT The National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) was created in response to the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill disaster and is focused on strengthening a port community's preparedness to respond to oil spills. In planning for its PREP exercise in 2003, the oil spill response community within the Delaware River Port Complex saw an excellent opportunity to leverage the PREP exercise program to create an exercise that combined a major oil spill response with law enforcement operations that included: implementing security measures for protection of maritime infrastructure, crime scene investigation and intelligence collection. The PREP exercise scenario involved a catastrophic oil spill that was the result of a terrorist incident. The overarching objective of the exercise was to use the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage concurrent operations involving law enforcement response (Crisis Management) and response operations aimed at protecting public health and safety (Consequence Management). To integrate the two distinct disciplines of law enforcement operations and oil spill response, the exercise objectives included: (1) testing an ICS organizational model to manage spill response and maritime security with the FBI's Joint Operations Center (JOC), which is responsible for investigation and intelligence activities; (2) developing Incident Action Plans that integrate both oil spill and maritime security operations; and, (3) using the common processes inherent in ICS, to coordinate the efforts of 25 responding agencies to create a cohesive response. In the case of the Philadelphia exercise, the convergence of crisis and consequence management required unprecedented cooperation by all responding agencies. Focusing on the Incident Command System was absolutely critical for multi-agency operations. This paper discusses the 2003 Philadelphia PREP exercise and the valuable lessons learned in conducting concurrent operations under a single management system.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 300125
Author(s):  
Richard Packard ◽  
Mike Popovich ◽  
John Stengel

As a result of the Buzzards Bay oil spill in 2003, and subsequent passage of the Oil Spill Act of 2004, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, through its Department of Environmental Protection's (MassDEP) Oil Spill Program, has developed a comprehensive, 3-tiered program to protect coastal resources. The program includes three elements: 1) the development of 160 Geographic Response Plans (GRP) to protect environmentally sensitive areas, 2) the acquisition and distribution of 83 oil spill response equipment trailers to coastal communities and, 3) the development of a training and exercise program to better prepare local first responders, including fire departments, police departments, harbormasters and other town officials, to respond to oil spills that threaten environmentally sensitive areas in their communities. This training and exercise program has increased first responders competency and skills as they relate to oil spill response resulting in a higher degree of readiness and preparedness amongst first responders throughout coastal Massachusetts. The program follows standard Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation protocols with clearly defined goals and objectives. Each exercise includes personnel from multiple municipalities working together to achieve the common goal of protecting coastal resources. The objectives of each exercise include, 1) foster inter-agency planning and coordination by providing the opportunity for local responders to work with each other and with Federal and State responders. 2) deploy a GRP protective booming tactic during a simulated incident, 3) promote resource coordination among local responders by coordinating use of assets from participating towns and agencies, 4) improve local oil spill preparedness by deploying equipment from pre-positioned trailers, providing participants hands-on experience in the field, and 5) evaluate the effectiveness of the booming tactic and identify any modifications necessary. Participants utilize the Incident Command System (ICS), operating within a Unified Command structure, testing their ability to effectively communicate goals, objectives and tactics.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 863-866
Author(s):  
Michael de Bettencourt ◽  
John Tarpley ◽  
Kathleen Ward

ABSTRACT The Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Team (SCAT) process has done a tremendous amount to standardize the language of shoreline impact and cleanup needs over the past 8 years. The SCAT process has been standardized regionally, and this process now generates a tremendous amount of information in a very short period of time. However, the SCAT-generated information can be extremely complicated and dense. In the urgency of the oil spill crisis, the information is often filtered and distilled down to a point where it is so generalized that it is nearly useless. This inability to manage critical information often wastes valuable resources and time. To better manage the information and decision making associated with shoreline cleanup, the SCAT process must be fully integrated into the Incident Command System (ICS). The information generated by the SCAT must not only be thorough, the spill management team and the supervisors in the field must easily understand it. This paper discusses the problems and opportunities associated with integrating the SCAT process and the ICS planning process.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 431-446

ABSTRACT In a situation where oil is spilled on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) the operator is responsible for the oil spill response. To do this in a robust and efficient way Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies (NOFO) handles the oil spill response on behalf of all member companies. Handling an oil spill response situation in all its forms from offshore incident to beach restoration involves many different resources, skills and people. Introducing Incident Command System (ICS) as the command system for this task even increases the amount of training we need to do. How can NOFO achieve the optimal training of our common and shared response resources in a time where focus is on an effective and robust response? Having an overview of the different response needs and response plans NOFO coordinates activity, training and exercises in an efficient way. This is done with the aid of NOFO’s operative plan. The plan describes every resource with a performance requirement and puts it in to a response context. This gives NOFO a foundation to build a response that is structured and cost efficient for our members. Furthermore, this enables NOFO to tailor our training and exercises from the individual responder/resource to the complex large-scale field exercise which involves typically 250–350 people from numerous different operating companies, municipalities, governmental and private responders. This paper will describe how we plan, train and exercise on the NCS in order to be prepared for response in an efficient and robust way.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2098-2111
Author(s):  
Kelly Lynn Schnapp ◽  
Joseph Leonard ◽  
Michael Drieu ◽  
Bryan Rogers

ABSTRACT This paper seeks to better prepare the oil spill response community for incorporating well control into a response organization, based on conditional considerations rather than long and firmly held assumptions. Techniques used to control a well, after a blowout, are more closely related to technical well drilling and control activities rather than to operations intended to address oil in the environment. When oil is released from a well in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), response organizers need to consider various factors influencing the organization that may exist at the time. These include a working knowledge of well control by response leadership; strength of responder relationships; and response complexity (to include authority, stakeholder and public expectations). This is particularly true when incorporating the well control support function in the oil spill response operational planning processes, usually facilitated by the Incident Command System (ICS). Within the last three years, complex well control operations were uniquely incorporated into response organizations during two Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUEs) and during the DEEPWATER HORIZON incident. Three options will be presented. Considerations for incorporating well control into a response organization will be presented using the case studies noted previously and by comparing similar lessons learned from the salvage industry in the late 1990's. Options presented help demonstrate that response organization flexibility is key to a successful response. This paper seeks to illuminate options surrounding placement of well control within an incident command structure based upon unique incident situational realities.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1055-1058
Author(s):  
Joseph Gleason

ABSTRACT Historically, many response exercises conducted by the United States Coast Guard and other oil spill response stakeholders have been conducted as functional or full-scale exercises. With the increased demands placed on many U.S. agencies as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11’ 2001, there is a greater need than ever to ensure that time spent in training and exercises produces positive and tangible results for the participants. In preparation for the joint US/Canadian response exercise, CANUSLANT 2002, the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards decided to take a step back and look at the lessons learned from previous exercises. Based on this review, the Joint Response Team (JRT) decided to focus CANUSLANT 2002 as a training opportunity and to work on the lessons learned that were repeatedly identified in earlier CANUSLANT exercises. Perhaps the most common exercise conducted in oil spill response is the functional “command post” exercise where exercise participants are assigned to ICS (Incident Command System) staff elements. Participants then respond to an exercise scenario and prescripted injects that are provided to drive participant actions. With personnel turnover, transfers, and increased operational demands, many exercise participants struggle through the crisis phase of an incident scenario and never have the opportunity to learn what it is they are supposed to be doing. When all is said and done, many exercise participants are often simply go home happy that the exercise is over and done with. The goal for CANUSLANT 2002 was to produce an exercise where the participants accomplished something tangible; that long pending issues would be discussed and perhaps even resolved. The Exercise Design Team hoped that the participants walked away from the exercise saying that it was time well spent and not simply thankful that the exercise was over. This paper outlines the factors that led to the success of the CANUSLANT 2002 cross border response exercise. This paper also highlights some of the fundamentals for varying your approach to exercises to achieve tangible results while providing personnel the skills and training required to respond in the event of a real disaster.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 987-990
Author(s):  
Kristy Plourde ◽  
Jean R. Cameron ◽  
Vickie Huyck

ABSTRACT The original oil spill Field Operations Guide (FOG) was a product of the Standard Oil Spill Response Management System (STORMS) Task Force comprised of representatives of the U. S. Coast Guard, California Department of Fish and Game Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), other states, the petroleum industry, oil spill response organizations, and local government. The STORMS Task Force produced this first version of the “oilized” Incident Command System (ICS) FOG and Incident Action Plan (IAP) forms in 1994 and made subsequent revisions in 1995 and 1996. With 2 more years of ICS experience and facilitated by the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, a new group of representatives from federal and state governments, the petroleum industry, and oil spill response professionals met to review and update the 1996 FOG and IAP forms in October 1998. The overall goal was to remain consistent with the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) yet reflect the experience gained using ICS at actual oil spills and drills. The group met quarterly over an 18-month period, working collaboratively to reach a consensus on numerous changes. Some of the changes included adding an Environmental Unit to the Planning Section, revising the planning cycle diagram for the oil spill IAP process, and revising the IAP forms as appropriate to reflect the way oil spills are managed. All significant revisions/improvements will be highlighted in this paper and poster.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2726-2742
Author(s):  
Ståle Jensen

ABSTRACT How can we continuously develop and improve large scale emergency preparedness, such as oil spill response, in times of low oil prices, budget cuts and downsizing? NOFO (Norwegian Clean Seas Association For Operating Companies) has found its path, through modernization and cooperation. When there are spills of crude oil from the petroleum industry at the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) NOFO will perform the oil spill response (OSR) on behalf of the owner of the spill, in practical terms becoming the company’s OSR branch during the incident. NOFO was founded in 1978, as a response to the large blowout at the Bravo field the previous year. Focus on offshore OSR technology and combat strategies has been the main motivation during our almost 40 year’s existence. The last decade has included a significant improvement in our competence and training on near-shore and beach OSR, simultaneously maintaining the unique offshore segment. As part of improving NOFO capacity within large scale, and / or long duration spill situations (e.g. Macondo), NOFO have embraced and implemented ICS (Incident Command System), thus improving our capabilities and capacities through the whole range from offshore to shoreline OSR. Through 2015 and 2016 ICS training and ICS adaptions of previous organizational systems has been prioritized, and new ones have been developed. NOFO personnel have participated in numerous training sessions and exercises with our member companies (operators on the Norwegian continental shelf) nationally and internationally. Through strategic choices of planning and collaboration both internally in NOFO and between NOFO and the Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA), Global Response Network (GRN), other oil spill Response Organizations (OSROs) and cooperating partners, the number of exercises has increased, the value and output of exercises is improved, and thus the capacity and capability of NOFOs whole range OSR in improved. At the same time, on behalf of our members, NOFO have consumed less money year after year. NOFO is developing and improving our proven OSR capacity and competence, from offshore to shoreline, through increased efficiency, high focus on exercise training, and cooperation with other OSR agencies.


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