Optimizing the value of near misses in wildlife response preparedness: The Kulluk Incident

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2288-2294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curt Clumpner ◽  
Barbara Callahan

ABSTRACT Mitigating the impact of an oil spill on wildlife is one of the stated priorities in nearly every oil spill. Wildlife in some way is regularly included in drills and exercises in many places around the world. While planning, training, and exercising are critical to wildlife preparedness, responders know that nothing compares to real world experience. In many spills and near miss situations, the Wildlife Branch is not activated until after there are documented wildlife impacts. Most incident management teams will only bring in professional oiled wildlife responders when oiling of wildlife has occurred or is imminent. During the December 2013 response to the Kulluk Tow Incident, a small Wildlife Branch was activated as an integral part of the Incident Command structure put in place. The Wildlife Branch proceeded to provide a detailed plan for an active response, if one was needed. Over the next week, while the rig grounded, refloated and finally towed to a place of refuge, the Wildlife Branch, working with the Environmental Unit, developed a wildlife plan that identified the resources at risk, the wildlife response options and the personnel, equipment and facilities that would be needed if oil were to be released. The Alaska Wildlife Response Center was prepared for activation, wildlife responder's availability, and travel time was documented and incident specific equipment gaps were identified and sourced. Additionally, specific incident plans were developed for hazing (bird deterrence), solid waste and wastewater that stood ready for implementation. While Alaska has a robust preparedness and exercise program, the quick decision by Shell and the Unified Command to ensure wildlife response was in place, if needed, provided a real test of the oiled wildlife response system with all the problems, challenges and changing parameters of a real event. It added real value by showing the public and trustees the importance that was placed on wildlife protection as well as by increasing integration, confidence and teamwork in the Alaskan response community.

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2253-2259
Author(s):  
Kasey Talbot ◽  
Jeff Dauzat

ABSTRACT Hurricane Isaac made landfall on August 29, 2012 over Louisiana, lingering overhead for more than 60 hours. While most were concerned with surviving the 80+ mph winds and ensuing storm surge and floods, Coast Guard members statewide knew there would be no calm after the storm; instead it would be a grueling fight to restore the port to normalcy. The slow moving storm caused grounded deep draft vessels and barges, spilled oil, releases of hazardous materials (HAZMAT), and damage to various buildings and infrastructures. U.S. Coast Guard Sector New Orleans integrated local, states, and federal agencies into a Unified Command structure to coordinate limited resources post-storm. Within Sector New Orleans, the Incident Management Division (IMD) made it their primary mission to mitigate any substantial threats of oil discharges or HAZMAT releases and ensure proper cleanup. On September 2, 2012, IMD utilized the Incident Command System (ICS) to establish a Marine Environmental Response (MER) Incident Management Team (IMT) to achieve their post storm mission. The MER IMT consisted of 200 personnel, of which 60 were Coast Guard members, and included representatives from the National Strike Force, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ), Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator's Office (LOSCO), Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF), and three Oil Spill Removal Organizations (OSROs); together the team collected 4500 barrels of oily water and 1200 HAZMAT containers, deployed over 11,000 feet of containment boom, and federalized three pollution projects. The MER IMT was disestablished on September 28, 2012 leaving Sector New Orleans IMD to maintain complete management of the ongoing federalized projects, “Fantome”, “Map Drilling”, and “Gulf South”. The projects included oil discharges in adjacent waterways of two oil production/storage facilities, oil discharges from fixed facility barges, and oil discharges from a storage platform along the marsh shoreline. Sector New Orleans executed $9.5 million in Oil Spill Liability Trust Funds towards emergency response efforts and successfully restored safety to the public health, welfare, environment, and maritime community.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-101
Author(s):  
Richard F. Packard ◽  
Richard J. Wozmak ◽  
Kevin D. Trainer

ABSTRACT The response to a marine oil spill incident in the United States involves mobilization of Federal, State, Local, and Responsible Party (RP)-contracted resources, using the National Incident Management System, Incident Command System (NIMS-ICS). The NIMS-ICS utilizing a Unified Command structure provides a mechanism for responding agencies to establish response priorities and implement cleanup strategies. A recent marine oil spill response in Massachusetts demonstrated that the incorporation of specific state environmental regulatory programs within the NIMS Unified Command system could be a challenging, but advantageous element in the successful cleanup of a marine oil spill. On April 27, 2003, a tank barge grounded in Buzzards Bay, spilling approximately 98,000 gallons of #6 fuel oil. Early in the response, the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP), also the State On-Scene Coordinator (SOSC), recognized the importance of utilizing the State'S Licensed Site Professional (LSP) program to assess cleanup effectiveness, characterize residual impacts, and identify clean up endpoints. Massachusetts established the LSP program in 1993 to place greater responsibility for cleaning up sites on the private sector, reduce the burden of approvals on the MassDEP, and to accelerate the cleanup of hazardous wastes sites. The 2003 Buzzards Bay spill was the first time that MassDEP integrated the LSP program into the early stages of a marine oil spill response and the NIMS Unified Command Structure. Including the LSP early in the process also facilitated the transition for conducting LSP-directed clean up after the NIMS Unified Command structure was deactivated. This paper describes the challenges and advantages associated with incorporating a privatized regulatory entity into this well-established and complex organizational matrix. The Massachusetts regulatory structure behind the LSP program is discussed, and recommendations are made for future application of the LSP program in marine oil spill response.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 761-765
Author(s):  
William Boland ◽  
Pete Bontadelli

ABSTRACT The Marine Safety Division of the 11th Coast Guard District and the California Office of Oil Spill Prevention and Response are pursuing new avenues to assure that federal, state, and local efforts in California achieve the goals of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990. Coordination of the seven California area committees, publishing detailed area contingency plans, and the implemention of a memorandum of agreement on oil spill prevention and response highlight recent cooperative successes. In 1994 a joint Coast Guard/state/industry incident command system task force drafted an ICS field operations guide and incident action plan forms that meet National Interagency Incident Management System and fire scope ICS requirements.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 969-972

ABSTRACT The National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program has been in effect for over a decade. There is no doubt that it has been a principal factor in moving the response community from the concept of developing incident management from scratch, to unified performance through organized teams. However, in the past couple of years the PREP approach has reached a certain level and stalled. When one goes to exercise design meetings throughout the country and commonly hear, “we are not ready to deal with this issue,” one must wonder why plans cannot or will not be fully tested after a decade of experience. Is the program working to the degree that is necessary and achievable? For continuous growth of the response community's level of competency in the Incident Command System and oil/hazardous substance response operations, a dynamic exercise program must exist. It is pertinent to ask?Has the National PREP Program reached status quo, and if so are we willing to change in order to improve?What is gained by testing the initial 24-hour period of the response over and over?Do core components of a plan tested during smaller exercises satisfy the effort that would be required for the Worst Case Discharge event?What works best, self-evaluation or independent evaluation?Is agency verification of exercises being done?Are unresolved issues and lessons learned documented, studied, and resolved before the next training or spill?Are lessons learned shared between companies for incorporation into plans?Do either the national or state modified PREP programs promote increased capability of oil spill removal organizations and spill management teams at local, regional, and national levels?Is the true availability of response resources tested through PREP? This paper will compare and contrast the National PREP program conducted by Federal Agencies, to the State of Washington's modified PREP program. The authors will answer these questions and provide recommendations for changes to PREP that will create a more dynamic and meaningful training program.


2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1051-1055
Author(s):  
K. Moore

ABSTRACT On January 12, 2007 the MIV TONG CHENG, a 485 ft. Chinese flag break bulk vessel loaded with cargo and 130,000 gallons of oil, en route to the Panama Canal, notified Coast Guard Sector Honolulu that it had suffered damage to its #2 cargo hold and the hold was full of seawater. Located 700 miles from the nearest port (Honolulu), the vessel'S pumps were unable to keep up with the flooding, and with 26 personnel on board, the vessel advised it was diverting to Honolulu for emergency repairs. As the vessel proceeded toward Honolulu, its decreasing speed, the presence of two additional cargo ships in escort and the discovery of an oil sheen trailing the vessel raised significant concerns over the threat this posed to Hawaii. At stake in allowing the vessel a safe haven were the pristine shorelines of the Hawaiian Islands and potential crippling of the port'S vital lifeline to commercial marine traffic, its only source of sustenance. A myriad of issues had to be addressed as the vessel made preparations to come into Honolulu Harbor and a multi-agency, international Unified Command was established. The Unified Command, using the Incident Command System, managed the various contingencies from search and rescue of the crew if the ship were lost, to the potential discharge of 130,000 gallons of fuel. A risk-based decision process was employed to weigh the off-shore response challenges against the near-shore risks while taking into account the remoteness and sensitive marine environment of the Hawaiian Islands. This paper provides insight into the dynamic and complex response and the incident management teams decisions regarding allowing this vessel in distress to enter a critical and environmentally sensitive port. The vessel was successfully repaired and allowed to depart Hawaii. This case is a classic example of proper decision making and risk balancing for a critical safe refuge request.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 300125
Author(s):  
Richard Packard ◽  
Mike Popovich ◽  
John Stengel

As a result of the Buzzards Bay oil spill in 2003, and subsequent passage of the Oil Spill Act of 2004, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, through its Department of Environmental Protection's (MassDEP) Oil Spill Program, has developed a comprehensive, 3-tiered program to protect coastal resources. The program includes three elements: 1) the development of 160 Geographic Response Plans (GRP) to protect environmentally sensitive areas, 2) the acquisition and distribution of 83 oil spill response equipment trailers to coastal communities and, 3) the development of a training and exercise program to better prepare local first responders, including fire departments, police departments, harbormasters and other town officials, to respond to oil spills that threaten environmentally sensitive areas in their communities. This training and exercise program has increased first responders competency and skills as they relate to oil spill response resulting in a higher degree of readiness and preparedness amongst first responders throughout coastal Massachusetts. The program follows standard Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation protocols with clearly defined goals and objectives. Each exercise includes personnel from multiple municipalities working together to achieve the common goal of protecting coastal resources. The objectives of each exercise include, 1) foster inter-agency planning and coordination by providing the opportunity for local responders to work with each other and with Federal and State responders. 2) deploy a GRP protective booming tactic during a simulated incident, 3) promote resource coordination among local responders by coordinating use of assets from participating towns and agencies, 4) improve local oil spill preparedness by deploying equipment from pre-positioned trailers, providing participants hands-on experience in the field, and 5) evaluate the effectiveness of the booming tactic and identify any modifications necessary. Participants utilize the Incident Command System (ICS), operating within a Unified Command structure, testing their ability to effectively communicate goals, objectives and tactics.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 839-842
Author(s):  
Steve Wischmann ◽  
Lome Thomas ◽  
Jim Gynther

ABSTRACT This paper will discuss the U.S. Coast Guard's response to the need for technological solutions to the incident management challenges posed by oil spills and hazardous material releases. Additionally, this paper will examine some of the difficulties presented by technology itself; that is to say, technological tools come with both implicit and explicit ramifications that must be understood and overcome in order to fully harness the potential contained within such capabilities. With the advent of both the public and Congress demanding increasingly effective spill response and fiscal conservancy, the Coast Guard has sought technological innovations to enhance its ability to coordinate and manage complex, multi-agency response operations. Through the development of the On-Scene Command and Control (OSC2) system, the Coast Guard intends to bring the potential leverage of computer-based technology to the Incident Command System (ICS) by harnessing the advantages of large-screen display, relational databases, and a Geographic Information System (GIS) for mapping response resources and activities. The decision-support and resource tracking advantages produced by OSC2 are expected to contribute mightily to improve performance within the Unified Command/ICS organization. However, the challenges posed by the implementation of OSC2 cannot be ignored. Factors ranging from human resource inhibitions and training requirements to blending individual technical components into a seamless whole must be considered when technological tools are designed, developed, and employed. Technology is not inherently good or bad, but remains always contextual—it is dependent on the intervening factors introduced by the human condition in which it is imagined and then utilized. This paper will discuss these issues and describe the key elements in achieving the success of OSC2 as one of the Coast Guard's spill response management tools.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 913-914
Author(s):  
Jimmy A. Salinas

ABSTRACT Brazoria County, Texas has established a partnership of government, industry, and the public to ensure that management of spills in this county considers the local expertise, resources, and concerns when developing protection strategies and implementing spill response plans. In 1990 the Mega Borg oil spill, which occurred in the Gulf of Mexico, was initially projected to impact Brazoria County beaches and wetlands. In response to this threat the Brazoria County Judge, who is the Local On-Scene Coordinator (LOSC) for the county during emergencies, convened a meeting of the local emergency planning committee (LEPC) and the county's emergency management office. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the spill threat and determine what action, if any, could be taken. The Judge also called on various county officials, industry specialists, local federal trustees, and local environmentalists to participate. The meeting resulted in the establishment of an Oil Spill Subcommittee (OSS) to the LEPC. This subcommittee worked quickly to develop a protection plan should the oil spill threat become a reality. Specific protection priorities for the county's coastal areas was developed and included a contingency of county and industry responders who were prepared to initiate protective measures if required. The County Judge delivered the county's plan, concerns, and support to the Unified Incident Command (UIC) in Galveston, Texas. Since its inception the OSS has been active responding to spill threats, and participating in area wide National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Exercises in the county. The uniqueness of the OSS is that it draws expertise from different stake holders in the county and melds a local partnership that brings a vast amount of knowledge, experience, and resources in a unified effort. The Brazoria County OSS continues to improve its organization and stands ready to assist spill management when an incident threatens Brazoria County.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 987-990
Author(s):  
Kristy Plourde ◽  
Jean R. Cameron ◽  
Vickie Huyck

ABSTRACT The original oil spill Field Operations Guide (FOG) was a product of the Standard Oil Spill Response Management System (STORMS) Task Force comprised of representatives of the U. S. Coast Guard, California Department of Fish and Game Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR), other states, the petroleum industry, oil spill response organizations, and local government. The STORMS Task Force produced this first version of the “oilized” Incident Command System (ICS) FOG and Incident Action Plan (IAP) forms in 1994 and made subsequent revisions in 1995 and 1996. With 2 more years of ICS experience and facilitated by the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, a new group of representatives from federal and state governments, the petroleum industry, and oil spill response professionals met to review and update the 1996 FOG and IAP forms in October 1998. The overall goal was to remain consistent with the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) yet reflect the experience gained using ICS at actual oil spills and drills. The group met quarterly over an 18-month period, working collaboratively to reach a consensus on numerous changes. Some of the changes included adding an Environmental Unit to the Planning Section, revising the planning cycle diagram for the oil spill IAP process, and revising the IAP forms as appropriate to reflect the way oil spills are managed. All significant revisions/improvements will be highlighted in this paper and poster.


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