scholarly journals Comparative Analysis of Tariffs-Restricted Trade Wars between the United States and China Under the Recent Past Four Presidents: Did they Achieve Their Objectives?

2021 ◽  
pp. 9-21
Author(s):  
Oluwole Owoye ◽  
Olugbenga A. Onafowora
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
The United States ◽  
Recent Past ◽  
Important Lesson ◽  
Alternative Hypotheses ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Trade Wars ◽  
Ineffective Policy ◽  
United States Trade

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the tariffs-restricted trade wars between the United States and China under the recent past four presidents of the United States by using the difference-in-differences estimator framework. The overarching objective of three of the four presidential administrations that engaged in trade wars was to reduce the United States’ trade deficits with China. This raised some research questions. Did each administration achieve its objective of reducing the trade deficits with China? If so, which administration more effectively reduced the trade deficits in comparison to their immediate predecessor? What lessons can future administrations and governments around the world draw from the outcomes of the tariffs-restricted trade wars between the United States and China?  To determine which president – Trump, Obama, and Bush – most effectively utilized import tariffs to reduce the trade deficits with China, we specified and tested three different sets of hypotheses. In sync with a controlled experiment, we tested another three sets of hypotheses in which we compared Presidents Trump, Obama, and Bush to President Clinton who did not impose tariffs on China. Based on our estimated results, we rejected all the null hypotheses in favor of the alternative hypotheses, which suggest that Presidents Trump, Obama, and Bush did not achieve any significant reduction in the United States’ trade deficits with China through the use of tariffs relative to President Clinton. The important lesson drawn from these findings is that tariffs are counterproductive and ineffective policy strategy.

scholarly journals Why Tariff and Trade War?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 272
Author(s):  
Jingyu Song
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Antebellum Period ◽  
Time Periods ◽  
Trade War ◽  
Trade Wars ◽  
Trade Conflicts ◽  
United States Trade

<p>By see the tariffs and trade wars in different time periods, each countries’ aim to start the trade war and tariff are protecting themselves. Analyzing and comparing the tariff acts in the colonial and antebellum period, the trade conflicts between the United States and Japan in the 1980s, and 2019’s China-United States trade war, we can see how tariffs work the same but also different in different time periods. </p>

Comparative analysis of the trade policy of Barack Obama and Donald Trump

2020 ◽  
pp. 59-71
Author(s):  
V. Iordanova ◽  
A. Ananev
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
World Economy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Barack Obama ◽  
Scientific Article ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Entire World

The authors of this scientific article conducted a comparative analysis of the trade policy of US presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The article states that the tightening of trade policy by the current President is counterproductive and has a serious impact not only on the economic development of the United States, but also on the entire world economy as a whole.

scholarly journals Assessing the Risk of Democratic Reversal in the United States: A Reply to Kurt Weyland

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Matias López ◽  
Juan Pablo Luna
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Boolean Algebra ◽  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis ◽  
The United States ◽  
American Democracy ◽  
Institutional Dynamics ◽  
The Public ◽  
Original Analysis ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT By replying to Kurt Weyland’s (2020) comparative study of populism, we revisit optimistic perspectives on the health of American democracy in light of existing evidence. Relying on a set-theoretical approach, Weyland concludes that populists succeed in subverting democracy only when institutional weakness and conjunctural misfortune are observed jointly in a polity, thereby conferring on the United States immunity to democratic reversal. We challenge this conclusion on two grounds. First, we argue that the focus on institutional dynamics neglects the impact of the structural conditions in which institutions are embedded, such as inequality, racial cleavages, and changing political attitudes among the public. Second, we claim that endogeneity, coding errors, and the (mis)use of Boolean algebra raise questions about the accuracy of the analysis and its conclusions. Although we are skeptical of crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis as an adequate modeling choice, we replicate the original analysis and find that the paths toward democratic backsliding and continuity are both potentially compatible with the United States.

scholarly journals The Effect of Massachusetts' Health Reform on Employer-Sponsored Insurance Premiums

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
John F Cogan ◽  
R. Glenn Hubbard ◽  
Daniel Kessler
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Health Reform ◽  
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey ◽  
Private Insurance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Medical Expenditure ◽  
Insurance Premiums ◽  
Reform Plan ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Cost

In this paper, we use publicly available data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey - Insurance Component (MEPS-IC) to investigate the effect of Massachusetts' health reform plan on employer-sponsored insurance premiums. We tabulate premium growth for private-sector employers in Massachusetts and the United States as a whole for 2004 - 2008. We estimate the effect of the plan as the difference in premium growth between Massachusetts and the United States between 2006 and 2008—that is, before versus after the plan—over and above the difference in premium growth for 2004 to 2006. We find that health reform in Massachusetts increased single-coverage employer-sponsored insurance premiums by about 6 percent, or $262. Although our research design has important limitations, it does suggest that policy makers should be concerned about the consequences of health reform for the cost of private insurance.

scholarly journals La contrebande des produits du tabac au Canada entre 1985 et 1994 et le cas particulier du Québec

Criminologie ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Alain
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Driving Force ◽  
The United States ◽  
Eastern Canada ◽  
Mass Consumption ◽  
Cigarette Taxes ◽  
Geographical Factors ◽  
The World ◽  
The Difference

The professional smuggling of mass consumption products develops when demand for a product is not adequately fulfilled by the legitimate market. The difficulties encountered in supplying are, in most contemporary cases, caused by real rarity of the desired product. For other cases, however, the rarity is largely virtual in that government taxes aimed at the product in question lead to increasing the product's price to a prohibitive end. This was the case with cigarettes in Canada between 1985 and 1994. Before both, the federal and provincial, governments decided to drastically decrease cigarette taxes in February 1994, the price for a pack of cigarettes was five to six times higher than the same product in the United States. This article begins with a brief review of the contribution made by economists in regard to contemporary smuggling. Focus will be aimed at common characteristics of the smuggling phenomenon across the world. Elements which are more particular to the Canadian smuggling situation will be identified as well. While the difference in the price of cigarettes between Canada and the United States would seem to be the undeniable driving force behind the development of smuggling activities at the countries ' border, one key question remains unexplained. Why was the volume of contraband unequally distributed across Canada even though the price of cigarettes remained largely consistent throughout all provinces? The level of organization of smuggling networks was much higher in Eastern Canada, and particularly in Quebec, than it was in the western provinces. It is argued that the reasons for this are not only due to price, but to a series of political, historical, and geographical factors which allowed cigarette smugglers to function better in Quebec than in the rest of the country.

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