Constitutional discourse bears the realist earmarks of normative discourse more generally. Those who debate the morality of affirmative action programs, for instance, generally talk as if there were a correct answer from the standpoint of morality. In similar fashion, those who debate the constitutionality of a particular affirmative action program generally talk as if there were a correct answer from the standpoint of constitutional law. The aim of this chapter is to take seriously these earmarks and offer an account of the nature of constitutional facts: facts about what a constitution requires, forbids, or permits. This chapter proposes that constitutional facts are facts about what a specific constitution requires, forbids, or permits when it is interpreted in accordance with norms that are appropriate given the function of a constitution. It argues that this account of constitutional judgments and facts should be accepted because of its explanatory value. Understanding constitutional facts in this way well explains disagreement and patterns of constitutional argument. It explains why first-order constitutional theorizing takes the shape that it does. And it accounts for the objectivity and normativity of constitutional judgments.