Back to Hart

The essay addresses two different senses of important “problems” for contemporary legal philosophy. In the first case, the “problem” is having forgotten things we learned from H.L.A. Hart, and, partly as a result, encouraging pointless metaphysical inquiries in other directions that take us very far from questions about the nature of law and legal reasoning. In the second case, the “problem” is to attend more carefully to Hart’s views and his philosophical context to think about the problem of theoretical disagreement, and to understand the way in which later commentators have misunderstood his behaviorist (Rylean) analysis of “accepting a rule from an internal point of view.”

Refuser d’être l’aveugle des autres Dynamiques et pratiques de l’écriture de soi, à l’encontre des représentations sociales de la cécité

This paper aims at exploring the autobiographical writing of blind, deaf-blind or partially sighted people from a sociopoetical perspective. It contends the following idea: for the authors to be considered, the first-person text opens up a space which allows them to refuse and deconstruct the conception of blindness shared by sighted persons. This literary process, from which the construction of a counter-discourse that can even go as far as subversion emerges, gives the author the opportunity to reappropriate his or her blindness beyond the imaginary, the myths and the fancies deriving from what is commonly understood and depicted as an impairment and a deprivation. Focusing on the fundamental concept of “préjugé de la cécité” (“prejudice of blindness”) developed by the French blind intellectual Pierre Villey, the article shall furthermore demonstrate that this common imaginary and these collective social representations are deeply rooted in culture and literature: They turn out to be an archetype one cannot easily avoid, inhabiting autobiographical texts and taking the form of stereotyped associations. This archetype is nevertheless swiftly challenged and deconstructed by the autobiographer’s writing, therefore leaving room for a representation of blindness from an internal point of view, based on individual experience and nurtured by everyday life. This paper thus argues that autobiographical space and textuality display a discursive power that the author can use as he or she wishes, in order to dismantle stereotypes and transform collective and social representations of blind people and blindness.

In defence of constitutive rules

Although the notion of constitutive rule has played an important role in the metaphysical debate in social and legal philosophy, several authors perceive it as somewhat mysterious and ambiguous: the idea of a specific kind of rules that are supposed to be “magically” constitutive of reality seems suspicious, more a rationalistic fiction than a genuine explanation. For these reasons, reductionist approaches have been put forward to deflate the explanatory role of this notion. In this paper, I will instead try to defend constitutive rules. My thesis is that the notion of constitutive rule is explanatorily helpful because it gives a complete account of an important phenomenon in the social and legal domain, namely, that of artifactual entities endowed with statuses that can have emergent normative properties. Conceiving of these entities as rule-constituted artifacts is an important part of what H. L. A. Hart called “the internal point of view” toward law, and for this reason constitutive rules should be included in an explanation of that point of view as an integral part of the life of institutions. The structure of my argument will be as follows. First, I will provide an example of an important phenomenon in the internal point of view, namely, the fact that individuals can have normative reactions not about the specific regulation of an institution but about its underlying purpose and rationale—what in the legal domain is called the ratio of a norm. Then I will identify two reductionistic approaches on constitutive rules. The first approach is exemplified by Brian Epstein’s idea that the phenomena explained by constitutive rules are better explained in terms of metaphysical (grounding/anchoring) relations. The second kind of reductionism is instead exemplified by the idea (held by several authors, among whom Alf Ross, Riccardo Guastini, Frank Hindriks, and Francesco Guala) that the phenomena explained by constitutive rules can be accounted for in terms of regulative rules plus a certain terminology. I will try to show that neither of these approaches can explain normative reactions to the ratio of an institution from an internal point of view: While the first cannot explain the fact that the reaction is strongly normative, the second cannot explain the fact that the reaction is about the ratio of a normative entity. Constitutive rules can instead explain both things and should be preserved as an important notion for the analysis of institutional ontology. By way of constitutive rules we create something: immaterial, rule-based institutional artifacts that can have emergent normative properties.

Inverse Thermoelastic Analysis of a Thick Rectangular Plate

Thermal stresses and displacement functions are obtained for a rectangular plate occupying the space R: -a < x < a, 0 < y < b, -h < z < h, with the known boundary and initial conditions. In this inverse problem the unknown surface temperature is determined on the boundary along the y-axis when the temperature at some internal point is known. The governing heat conduction equation has been solved by applying Marchi – Fasulo transform and Laplace transform techniques. The solutions are obtained in form of infinite series. The results for displacement and thermal stresses have been computed numerically and illustrated graphically for Aluminium plate. MSC 2010: 74A10,74J25, 74H99, 74D99

Islamic Law from the Internal Point of View

Haider Hamoudi notes the different perspectives lawyers and historians employ in making sense of the law. Invoking H.L.A. Hart’s famous distinction between “internal” and “external” points of view with respect to law and legal rules, Hamoudi describes lawyers as primarily adopting the former, and historians, the latter point of view. This is not to suggest that lawyers do not take history into consideration, but rather to mean that when they do, their focus is results oriented in that they use history to understand the ultimate endpoint, the contemporaneous meaning of a legal rule or institution. Hamoudi observes two consequences emanating from lawyers’ adoption of the internal view that puts lawyers somewhat at odds with the demands of historical method and meaning. While deliberately omitting discussion on the normative desirability of either method, Hamoudi concludes by observing value in merely pointing out the differences between the internal and external viewpoints of law and history, respectively, to help expose “our own biases and assumptions.”

The Logic of Internal Rational Agent

In this paper, we introduce a new four-valued logic which may be viewed as a variation on the theme of Kubyshkina and Zaitsev's Logic of Rational Agent \textbf{LRA} \cite{LRA}. We call our logic $ \bf LIRA$ (Logic of Internal Rational Agency). In contrast to \textbf{LRA}, it has three designated values instead of one and a different interpretation of truth values, the same as in Zaitsev and Shramko's bi-facial truth logic \cite{ZS}. This logic may be useful in a situation when according to an agent's point of view (i.e. internal point of view) her/his reasoning is rational, while from the external one it might be not the case. One may use \textbf{LIRA}, if one wants to reconstruct an agent's way of thinking, compare it with respect to the real state of affairs, and understand why an agent thought in this or that way. Moreover, we discuss Kubyshkina and Zaitsev's necessity and possibility operators for \textbf{LRA} definable by means of four-valued Kripke-style semantics and show that, due to two negations (as well as their combination) of \textbf{LRA}, two more possibility operators for \textbf{LRA} can be defined. Then we slightly modify all these modalities to be appropriate for $\bf LIRA$. Finally, we formalize all the truth-functional $ n $-ary extensions of the negation fragment of $\bf LIRA$ (including $\bf LIRA$ itself) as well as their basic modal extension via linear-type natural deduction systems.