Are there really so many moral emotions? Carving morality at its functional joints

In recent decades, a large body of work has highlighted the importance of emotional processes in moral cognition. Since then, a heterogeneous bundle of emotions as varied as anger, guilt, shame, contempt, empathy, gratitude, and disgust have been proposed to play an essential role in moral psychology. However, the inclusion of these emotions in the moral domain often lacks a clear functional rationale, generating conflations between merely social and properly moral emotions. Here, we build on (i) evolutionary theories of morality as an adaptation for attracting others’ cooperative investments, and on (ii) specifications of the distinctive form and content of moral cognitive representations. On this basis, we argue that only indignation (“moral anger”) and guilt can be rigorously characterized as moral emotions, operating on distinctively moral representations. Indignation functions to reclaim benefits to which one is morally entitled, without exceeding the limits of justice. Guilt functions to motivate individuals to compensate their violations of moral contracts. By contrast, other proposed moral emotions (e.g. empathy, shame, disgust) appear only superficially associated with moral cognitive contents and adaptive challenges. Shame doesn’t track, by design, the respect of moral obligations, but rather social valuation, the two being not necessarily aligned. Empathy functions to motivate prosocial behavior between interdependent individuals, independently of, and sometimes even in contradiction with the prescriptions of moral intuitions. While disgust is often hypothesized to have acquired a moral role beyond its pathogen-avoidance function, we argue that both evolutionary rationales and psychological evidence for this claim remain inconclusive for now.

Influence of an individual’s unethical behaviour on peers’ vicarious learning in organisations: the role of moral anger

Purpose Because unethical behaviour pervades in organisations, how to inhibit the interpersonal influence of unethical behaviour has become increasingly important. This study aims to integrate the deontic justice theory and affective events theory to examine the relationship between an individual’s unethical behaviour and his or her peers’ vicarious learning by highlighting the mediating effect of peers’ moral anger and the moderating effect of task interdependence on this relationship. Design/methodology/approach Data were collected in two waves from 254 employees of a large manufacturing company in the People’s Republic of China. Findings The hypothesised moderated mediation model was supported. Specifically, as expected, peers’ moral anger mediated the negative relationship between an individual’s unethical behaviour and peers’ vicarious learning. Task interdependence moderated the direct relationship between the individual’s unethical behaviour and his or her peers’ moral anger and the indirect relationship between an individual’s unethical behaviour and his or her peers’ vicarious learning via the peers’ moral anger such that these relationships were stronger when the level of task interdependence was higher. Originality/value This study argues that the deontic justice theory is a supplement for the social learning theory in explaining the interpersonal influence of unethical behaviour. Drawing on the deontic justice theory, this study demonstrates that an individual’s unethical behaviours are unlikely to be rewarded or accepted, and by integrating the theories of deontic justice and affective events, offers a rationale for the emotional mechanism that underlies the interpersonal influence of unethical behaviour.

Is Anger a Hostile Emotion?

In this article I argue that characterizations of anger as a hostile emotion may be mistaken. My project is empirically informed and is partly descriptive, partly diagnostic. It is descriptive in that I am concerned with what anger is, and how it tends to manifest, rather than with what anger should be or how moral anger is manifested. The orthodox view on anger takes it to be, descriptively, an emotion that aims for retribution. This view fits well with anger being a hostile emotion, as retribution is punitive. I will argue that a different view of anger deserves our attention. On this alternative view, anger aims for recognition of harms done, rather than for the punishment of those who have committed them. I argue that we have reason to favour a strong view that excludes retribution from anger’s main aims. In addition, I offer a diagnosis of the reasons that led the retributive view of anger to become, and remain, orthodoxy. This diagnosis provides indirect reason to give my descriptive proposal serious consideration, for it highlights that the orthodox view has dominated folk and philosophical conceptions of anger for reasons that do not speak in favour of the view’s veracity. The view that anger is a hostile emotion will therefore emerge as in need of serious scrutiny.

Moving between frustration and anger

Frustration is widely recognised to be central to many cases of moral anger in a political context, yet little philosophical attention has been paid to it. In this paper, I offer a much-needed philosophical analysis of frustration, working primarily with the example of the recent South African student protests. By developing a deeper philosophical understanding of frustration and its connections to moral anger, I argue that the movement between the two has a couple of important aspects. First, the movement involves a transformation from simply responding to some opposition to viewing that opposition as wrongfully imposed by an agent; second, in the cases that are my focus, the movement is a response to a persistent opposition that is compounded by an erosion of trust, confidence and hope within a moral community, which ultimately changes the very nature of the opposition into a form of wrongdoing. These aspects allow us to assess the appropriateness of the movement, thereby developing a rich analysis of moral anger arising out of frustration in a political context.

Persuasion Through Bitter Humor: Multimodal Discourse Analysis of Rhetoric in Internet Memes of Two Far-Right Groups in Finland

This study focuses on the role of Internet memes in the communication of two far-right groups in Finland. The material consists of 426 memes posted by Finland First and the Soldiers of Odin between the years 2015 and 2017 on Facebook. Multimodal discourse analysis was applied to understand the contents, forms, and rhetorical functions communicated via the Internet memes. The analysis shows that the contents of the memes revolve around six themes: history, humor, mythology, symbols, news and mottos. By using Internet memes, the groups aim to construe a heroic imagined past, to lend legitimacy to the nationalist cause, to arouse moral anger and hate toward refugees, and to encourage the movements’ followers to fight. We argue that, for the extreme groups, Internet memes are tools to crystallize their arguments in an easily shareable and concise form, which makes the memes useful tools in persuasion and mobilization, as well as attracting new audiences.

Linking Moral Identity With Moral Emotions: A Meta-Analysis

This meta-analysis examined the relationship between moral identity and moral emotions drawing on 57 independent studies. Moral identity was significantly associated with moral emotions, r = .32, p < .01, 95% confidence interval [CI: .27, .36]. Effect sizes were moderated by the type of moral emotion. Studies reporting other-regarding emotions (sympathy, empathy, and compassion) had the largest effect sizes ( r = .41), while negative other-evaluative emotions (moral anger, contempt, and disgust) had the smallest ( r = .16). Self-evaluative and other-evaluative positive emotions had intermediate effect sizes ( r values between .29 and .32). The type of emotion measure also was a significant moderator, with trait measures of emotion ( r = .38) correlating more strongly with moral identity than state measures ( r = .24). Effect sizes did not differ for the type of moral identity measure being used, publication status, or cultural origin of the study sample. The results of this meta-analysis demonstrate a robust empirical connection between moral identity and moral emotions, which confirms the multifaceted role of moral identity in moral functioning.

Rage against the machine: moral anger in whistleblowing

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to offer a theoretical framework of whistleblowing that gives due recognition to the emotional and reflexive processes that underpin it. Modes of anger are integrated into the model based on a reading of Geddes and Callister (2007), and developed by Lindebaum and Geddes (2016) work on moral anger. Design/methodology/approach The model is derived by interrogation of the extant literature on whistleblowing with due recognition accorded to emotional and reflexive dimensions that have been underrepresented in previous research. The model was tested by a qualitative study that uses memoir analysis to interrogate a board level whistle-blower’s account of the complex, traumatic and like-changing nature of his experience. Findings The paper identifies key stages in whistle-blower thinking before, during and subsequent to a decision to expose corporate wrongdoing. It demonstrates how emotional and reflexive processes influence a whistle-blower’s mode of anger expression, and how different perspectives by the whistle-blower and the focal organisation may view this expression as moral or deviant anger. Research limitations/implications The complexity of the whistleblowing process, together with possible alternative perspectives of it, makes identifying every influencing variable extremely challenging. Also, reliance on a whistle-blower’s own account of his experience means that recall may be partial or self-serving. The model can be used to analyse other whistle-blower accounts of their experience, and further confirm its applicability. Originality/value This is the first application of memoir analysis to a whistle-blower’s account of his experience that relates modes of anger expression to stages in the whistleblowing episode. It addresses a significant imbalance in whistleblowing research that hitherto has emphasised rationality in whistle-blower decision making and downplayed the influence of reflexivity and emotion.