Sugar and Democracy in Fiji: the Material Foundations of Post-Colonial Authoritarianism 1970-2005

<p>Fiji became independent in 1970, and functioned for 17 years under a constitution with democratic elements, including elections. Three times since 1987, however, armed force has overthrown constitutionally elected governments. Some observers see this as a failure of the consolidation of Fijian democracy, while others acknowledge the facade of Fijian democracy. Among those who acknowledge Fiji's authoritarian institutions, conflict persists as to whether authoritarianism is the inevitable product of ethnic conflict in Fijian society, or a consequence of post-colonial institutional legacies. No movement toward democracy in Fiji is likely to succeed until we understand the material foundations underlying Fiji's authoritarian politics. This thesis argues that Fiji' authoritarian political institutions, established under colonial rule, have been sustained since independence by forces in the international economy. These forces have helped to maintain the economic, social and political dominance of a Pacific-Fijian chiefly elite over Fijian society. Specially, chiefly control of the sugar industry, Fiji's principal export, has provided chiefs with sufficient patronage resources to retain their control over Fijian society through electoral politics or, at the event of undesirable electoral outcomes, through armed opposition. Through post-colonial structures, the chiefs control the land-tenure system, and through their setting and receipt of land rents, they have been the principal beneficiaries of Fiji's sugar exports. This comparatively inefficient industry, and the social and political institutions that it rests on, have survived because Fiji, as party to the European Union's Sugar Protocol, has received two-and-a-half to three times the world market price for its sugar exports between 1975 and 2009. This thesis makes its case through close textual analysis of Fiji's three constitutions, detailed inspection of Fiji's land-tenure system, and, specifically, the accounts of the Native Land Trust Board, as well as examination of the secondary literature on Fiji's sugar industry.</p>

Sugar and Democracy in Fiji: the Material Foundations of Post-Colonial Authoritarianism 1970-2005

<p>Fiji became independent in 1970, and functioned for 17 years under a constitution with democratic elements, including elections. Three times since 1987, however, armed force has overthrown constitutionally elected governments. Some observers see this as a failure of the consolidation of Fijian democracy, while others acknowledge the facade of Fijian democracy. Among those who acknowledge Fiji's authoritarian institutions, conflict persists as to whether authoritarianism is the inevitable product of ethnic conflict in Fijian society, or a consequence of post-colonial institutional legacies. No movement toward democracy in Fiji is likely to succeed until we understand the material foundations underlying Fiji's authoritarian politics. This thesis argues that Fiji' authoritarian political institutions, established under colonial rule, have been sustained since independence by forces in the international economy. These forces have helped to maintain the economic, social and political dominance of a Pacific-Fijian chiefly elite over Fijian society. Specially, chiefly control of the sugar industry, Fiji's principal export, has provided chiefs with sufficient patronage resources to retain their control over Fijian society through electoral politics or, at the event of undesirable electoral outcomes, through armed opposition. Through post-colonial structures, the chiefs control the land-tenure system, and through their setting and receipt of land rents, they have been the principal beneficiaries of Fiji's sugar exports. This comparatively inefficient industry, and the social and political institutions that it rests on, have survived because Fiji, as party to the European Union's Sugar Protocol, has received two-and-a-half to three times the world market price for its sugar exports between 1975 and 2009. This thesis makes its case through close textual analysis of Fiji's three constitutions, detailed inspection of Fiji's land-tenure system, and, specifically, the accounts of the Native Land Trust Board, as well as examination of the secondary literature on Fiji's sugar industry.</p>

LAND RENT AS A SOCIO-ECONOMIC DETERMINATION

The issues of land rents are of particular importance today, the new times have brought them to the fore, now they are new dimensions. Previously in the works of Plato, Xenophon and others it was mentioned but not used as a term. With the entry of capitalism into agricultural politics - everyone talks about it. Agriculture became the main branch of social production, and rent became the object of study. Contribution to the development of the problem have: У. Petit, Fr. F. P?ti, F. Kenet, A. Smith, D. The work of Marx is indisputable. The neoclassical theory advocates a subjective treatment of the problem -opposed to Marx. The reasons are to be sought in the following circumstances: capitalism has undergone fundamental changes; it has entered a stage of global integration; the scientific-technical revolution has raised it to a greater height; new technologies have entered the economy; electronization, robotization, computerization, science has penetrated all spheres of life, has become an immediate productive force; it is rising to a higher level; production is being naturalized, it is becoming a field of application of science. History, however, follows its own logic. The immature economic forms of production do not submit to exact theoretical reflections; as they change, so do our ideas about them.

Taxation of Land and Economic Growth

In this paper, we theoretically analyze the effects of three types of land taxes on economic growth using an overlapping generation model in which land can be used for production or consumption (housing) purposes. Based on the analyses in which land is used as a factor of production, we can confirm that the taxation of land will lead to an increase in the growth rate of the economy. Particularly, we show that the introduction of a tax on land rents, a tax on the value of land or a stamp duty will cause the net price of land to decline. Further, we show that the nationalization of land and the redistribution of the land rents to the young generation will maximize the growth rate of the economy.

Land

Private wealth is comprised in part of capitalized future land rents. The Golden Rule of Accumulation is preserved even if we introduce land into our meta-model. Urban land is far more valuable than agricultural land. The risk tied to land leads to a reduction in its value in the form of a “risk premium” α > 0. Land rents can be taxed without any possibility of the tax being passed on to tenants and without loss of efficiency. If the tax is offset by a reduction in income tax, their taxation can even give rise to efficiency gains and positive distributive effects. The possibility of government intervention in the residential rental market represents a further risk for landowners. The sensitivity of the value of land to changes in the interest rate and hence the risk premium α rise with falling interest rates. In light of these many different risks, land as investment can only to a limited extent be a substitute for government bonds and hence for increasing private wealth by way of public debt. We calculate the value of land as asset category in the OECD plus China region. To this end, we primarily rely on data from statistical offices that provide figures for land in their national balance sheets. Our calculations show that the value of land in the countries of the OECD plus China region is about twice annual consumption in the region.

Dairy Joint Ventures in South Africa’s Land and Agrarian Reform Programme: Who Benefits?

Joint Ventures (JVs) between ‘agribusiness’ investors and ‘small farmers’ or ‘customary landowners’ are being promoted in South Africa’s land and agrarian reform programme as a way to include land reform beneficiaries in the country’s competitive agricultural sector. This paper undertakes an in-depth comparative analysis of two JV dairy farms located on irrigation schemes in the former ‘homeland’ of the Ciskei, in South Africa’s Eastern Cape Province. The community, through government investment, brings the fixed assets to the business: land, irrigation infrastructure and milking parlours. The agribusiness partner or ‘sharemilker’ contributes the dairy cows and other movable assets. The paper explores what incentivizes agribusiness partners to enter into these types of ‘sharemilking’ JVs. The research reveals that investing in ‘moveable assets’ is more profitable for agribusiness and is also viewed as a more politically pragmatic way to arrange production in the context of land reform. These arrangements have led to further opportunities for investment in other parts of the dairy value chain. The social relations of production involved in sharemilking JVs also obscure class and race relations in ways that benefit agribusiness partners. Although beneficiaries are receiving benefits in the form of jobs and dividends, which in certain cases make notable contributions to household incomes, the structuring of sharemilking contracts is not a fair return on investment for the customary landowners. It is also argued that the JV model is at risk of equating ‘black emerging farmers’ with a group of ‘beneficiaries’ who are in reality workers and passive recipients of dividends and land rents.

A Theory of State Preferences and Resource Competition

Chapter 2 develops a theory of states’ foreign policy preferences. A state’s preference for territory depends on its economic structure and domestic political institutions. Economic structure determines the state’s source of income. Production-oriented states whose economies are structured to generate income from producing goods will be less interested in resources and territory. In contrast, land-oriented states that are economically dependent on resource rents will have a stronger preference to seek control over resource-rich territory. This effect holds in both autocracies and democracies. However, autocracies should place a greater value on the political benefits associated with land rents because they are a source of wealth that is easier to control and extract. In sum, the more autocratic and land-oriented the state, the stronger its preference for resource rents and the more the state should invest in projecting military force to secure resources.

Possessing the City

This book is a social history of the property market in late-colonial Delhi; a period of much turbulence and transformation. It argues that historians of South Asian cities must connect transformations in urban space and Delhi’s economy. Utilizing a novel archive, it outlines the place of private property development in Delhi’s economy from 1911 to 1947. Rather than large-scale state initiatives, like the Delhi Improvement Trust, it was profit-oriented, decentralized, and market-based initiatives of urban construction that created the Delhi cityscape. A second thematic concern of Possessing the City is to carefully specify the emerging relationship between the state and urban space during this period. Rather than a narrow focus on urban planning ideas, it argues that the relationship be thought of in triangular fashion: the intermediation of the property market was crucial to emerging statecraft and urban form during this period. Finally, the book examines struggles and conflicts over the commodification of land. Rents and prices of urban property were directly at issue in the tussles over housing that are examined here. The question of commodification can, however, also be discerned in struggles that were not ostensibly about economic issues: clashes over religious sites in the city. Through careful attention to the historical interrelationships between state, space, and the economy, this book offers a novel intervention in the history of late-colonial Delhi.