Signaling Quality with Return Insurance: Theory and Empirical Evidence

This paper examines an innovative return policy, return insurance, emerging on various shopping platforms such as Taobao.com and JD.com. Return insurance is underwritten by an insurer and can be purchased by either a retailer or a consumer. Under such insurance, the insurer partially compensates consumers for their hassle costs associated with product return. We analyze the informational roles of return insurance when product quality is the retailer’s private information, consumers infer quality from the retailer’s price and insurance adoption, and the insurer strategically chooses insurance premiums. We show that return insurance can be an effective signal of high quality. When consumers have little confidence about high quality and expect a significant gap between high and low qualities, a high-quality retailer can be differentiated from a low-quality retailer solely through its adoption of return insurance. We confirm, both analytically and empirically with a data set consisting of more than 10,000 sellers on JD.com, that return insurance is more likely adopted by higher-quality sellers under information asymmetry. Furthermore, we find that the presence of the third party (i.e., the insurer) leads to double marginalization in signaling, which strengthens a signal’s differentiating power and sometimes renders return insurance a preferred signal, in comparison with free return, whereby retailers directly compensate for consumers’ return hassles. As an effective and costly signal of quality, return insurance may also improve consumer surplus and reduce product returns. Its profit advantage to the insurer is most pronounced under significant quality uncertainty. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.

Reflections on the Political Economy of European Wine Appellations

Today’s European wine policy is centered on a system of appellations, implemented as geographical indications (GIs), that entail significant technological regulations—restricting the varieties that may be grown, while imposing maximum yields per hectare and other rules regarding grape production and winemaking practice. This paper outlines the historical development of European wine policy under the CAP, and presents a more detailed analysis of the economic consequences of the rules and regulations under the appellation system. The introduction of these rules and regulations was probably beneficial initially, both for their didactive effect on wine producers and consumers and as a way of overcoming a significant “lemons” problem in the market. However, those same rules and regulations are much less valuable today, given (1) the potential for alternative sources of information to solve the lemons problem, and (2) evidence that the appellation system per se might not be effectively serving that purpose as well as it once did, while some of the regulations impose significant social costs. Yield restrictions, in particular, are economically inefficient as a way of enhancing and signaling quality (their ostensible purpose) and as a way of restricting total supply to support market prices and thus producer incomes (a significant motivation). The inherent weaknesses of the policy design are compounded by failures of governance. A less heavy-handed approach to policy would allow more scope for the market mechanism to match supply and demand for this signature product from European agriculture.

When Consumers Learn, Money Burns: Signaling Quality via Advertising with Observational Learning and Word of Mouth

When consumers learn via observations or word of mouth, a firm may strategically spend more on advertising to credibly signal its quality.

Occupational Licensure and Entrepreneurs: The Case of Tax Preparers in the United States

The authors examine the relationship between entrepreneurship and occupational licensure using data on the universe of more than 700,000 tax preparers in the United States. Prior research suggests that occupational licensure has negative effects on entrepreneurship because it increases the costs of operating a business. By contrast, the authors argue that licensure may allow entrepreneurs to signal quality and enhance their legitimacy. States that require tax preparers to be licensed have higher average rates of entrepreneurship—approximated by tax practice ownership—and, in high-income ZIP codes, more demand for paid preparer services. In the analysis of the introduction of a federal license requirement in tax preparation in 2013, voluntary early adoption of the license by preparers predicts higher chances of survival in the industry. Entrepreneurs are less likely to adopt the license early than are non-entrepreneurs, unless they lack other state-level credentials. Results thus suggest that licensure represents a trade-off for entrepreneurs between the costs of obtaining a license and the benefits of signaling quality and legitimacy.