On the Epoché in Phenomenological Psychology: A Schutzian Response to Zahavi

Dan Zahavi has questioned whether the use of a transcendental phenomenological epoché is essential for phenomenological psychology. He criticizes the views of Amedeo Giorgi by asserting that Husserl did not view the transcendental reduction as needed for an entrance into phenomenological psychology and that, if one thinks so, phenomenological psychology would be in danger of being absorbed within transcendental phenomenology. Thirdly, rather than envisioning transcendental phenomenology as a purification for phenomenological psychology, Zahavi recommends a dialogue between transcendental phenomenologists and psychologists. However, the two disciplines are closer for Husserl who also conceives phenomenological psychology as a self-standing science, and Giorgi is not as rigid on the necessity of transcendental phenomenology for phenomenological psychology. Alfred Schutz, following Husserl’s “Nachwort,” develops his own distinctive phenomenological psychology that appreciates disciplinary convergences and respects boundaries, while also articulating a wider understanding of epoché as an anthropological fact operative beyond the limits of transcendental phenomenology.

Ideas I. El periodo programático y sus insuficiencias teóricas

La investigación propuesta tratará de contextualizar las insuficiencias teóricas de la fenomenología “clásica” antes de su despliegue genético. Ideen I aparecerá como la culminación de un periodo programático. La estructura de correlación, la naturaleza de la reducción trascendental, la necesidad de aunar la reducción fenomenológica y la reducción eidéti-ca, y la proliferación indiscriminada de metábasis de todo tipo, serán indicadores de la exigencia de una fenomenología “no-clásica”. La disociación entre Intencionalidad y Eidética nos mostrará la necesidad de una “ampliación” de la fenomenología en forma de una arquitectónica de niveles, ya anunciada en los textos, pero más allá del lema programático: A los textos mismos.Our investigation will seek to contextualize the theoretical inadequacies of "classical" phenomenology before its genetic deployment took place. Edmund Husserl’s Ideen I will signify the culmination of a programmatic period. The correlation structure, the nature of transcendental reduction, the need to make phenomenological and eidetic reductions coalesce and the indiscriminate proliferation of all kinds of metabasis all are indicators of the need for a "non-classical" phenomenology. The dis-sociation between Intentionality and Eidetics will show the need for an "extension" of phenomenology into architectural levels−already announced in the texts−but beyond the pro-grammatic slogan: To the texts themselves.

Meaning of Life: A Perspective of Javanese Local Wisdom

Meaning is the main element needed to achieve happiness; including the meaning of life. In many studies, meaning of life is defined in terms of purpose, significance, or a multifaceted construct. One of the empirical reviews that is still necessitated in the study of meaning of life is the one which focuses on significance. This article attempts to provide answers to this question according to the perspective of the local wisdom of the Samin tribe as a part of the Javanese tribe. The Samin tribe is the name presented to the community that adheres to a doctrine in regards to “laku” or behavior that is believed to be taught by Samin Surosentiko. In other words, they are also known as “Sedulur Sikep”. Historically it can be traced that their presence was closely related to the passive resistance to the Dutch colonial government that colonized Indonesia around the 19th century. For the Samin tribe, there are no colonial laws. Instead, there are only laws of action, speech and necessity, which include not committing crimes, not arguing, not fighting, not having jealousy, not coveting or stealing, and not lying or slandering. The Samin tribe teaches these values to their generation because they believe that if they behave and act based on these values, they will live happily. The technique used is referred to as “kanda/pitutur” or giving advice by giving examples. This study used a qualitative approach in the form of phenomenology to understand the personal dimensions of the subject’s subjective experience on the meaning of the values of kanda/pitutur of sedulur sikep. The data were collected through in-depth interviews and observations on the Samin people. The data were analyzed in three stages, which were phenomenological reduction, eidetic reduction, and transcendental reduction. The results of this study provide a description of the reasons that make life worth living; as a transformation of the significance of meaning of life. The cognitive dimension as an evaluative component is related to self-acceptance, self-control, productive attitudes, autonomy, and positive relationships and harmonization with fellow living beings. In addition, there are also the affective and motivational dimensions shown.

Tipos de motivación y vida moral: la propuesta de E. Husserl

La reducción trascendental introdu-cida por Husserl en Ideas I le permite a nuestro autor, ya en Ideas II, definir la “actitud perso-nalista”, donde el “objeto intencional” abre paso a una nueva noción clave que es la de “motivación”. Dada la importancia que tiene la motivación para entender cualquier vida y también, por tanto, la vida moral, mi ponencia busca obtener una clasificación rigurosa de los distintos tipos de motivación que Husserl describe (tanto en Ideas II como en Einleitung in die Ethik). Su objetivo es mostrar que aunque Husserl concede a la motivación “racional” (correcta o incorrecta) toda la importancia que merece, no por ello identifica motivación con racionalidad. En la motivación, que cubre por completo el ámbito personalista (no “causal”), Husserl incluye, en efecto, una motivación “prerracional” o asociativa, que nos lleva al terreno de la fenomeno-logía genética.The transcendental reduction introduced by Husserl in Ideas I allows him, in Ideas II, defining the "personalistic attitude" where the "intentional object" gives way to a new key notion, "motivation." Given the importance of motivation to understand any life and, therefore, moral life, my paper seeks a rigorous classification of the different types of motivation that Husserl describes (in Ideas II and in Einleitung in die Ethik). Its aim is showing that although Husserl gives importance to "rational" (correct or incorrect) motivation, he does not identify motivation with rationality. In the motivation, that covers completely personalistic (no "causal”) level, Husserl includes, in effect, a "pre-rational" or associative motivation, which leads us to the field of genetic phenomenology

CONRAD-MARTIUS: BEING, ESSENCE, EXISTENCE. IN DISCUSSION WITH ARISTOTLE’S, AQUINAS’ AND HUSSERL’S ONTOLOGIES AND METAPHYSICS

The article deals with Conrad-Martius’ conception of being and existence and explores it by contrasting it with the conceptions of Aristotle, Aquinas and Husserl within the framework of their respective ontologies and metaphysics. The article delves into the problems of both the hypostatization and the origin of being in particular. I claim that the hypostatization of being does not concern the Sachverhalt, as Jean Wahl claims, but the noema itself insofar as intentionality transcends what is constituted by consciousness and grasps the essence of the substance itself, whose existence is not absolutely but hypothetically posited. I will further show that even though Conrad-Martius rejects the transcendental reduction, she accepts the eidetic reduction and the positing of a sphere of original and given facts, which are not only absolutely given to consciousness, but also self-grounded and self-sustained. Conrad-Martius’ research traces the origin of these back to a transphysical realm, thus revealing the grounds for the Husserlian sphere of primal facts, which itself remains beyond the reach of phenomenological reflection. Hence Conrad-Martius’ and Husserl’s investigations encounter and complement each other at the point where the real bursts into reality and becomes available to consciousness. These reflections are organized as follows: The first part presents Conrad-Martius’ conception of a real-ontological phenomenology in order to examine her criticism of Husserl’s transcendental reduction. The second part deals with her real-ontological conception of the essence of reality or the “real-reality” and its hypothetically posed existence. The third part concerns the conceptions of being, analogia essendi and categorial being with recourse to Aristotle, Aquinas and Husserl and sets these in relation to Conrad-Martius’ own conception. The fourth part deals with her own understanding of the analogia essendi and of real being in order to shed light on the claim concerning the hypostatization of being. The fifth part explores Husserl’s positing of a sphere of primal facticity, Conrad-Martius’ conception of a real entity and its origin in a transphysical realm. The article finally summarizes the main results of these reflections.

Tarekat Da’wah through the Islamic Educational Institutions at Pesantren Suryalaya

This study seeks to analyze the objectives and methods of da'wah tarekat through Islamic educational institutions at pesantren Suryalaya. The research was conducted by exploring the basic concepts, objectives, principles, ethics, and tarekat-based education methods applied in Islamic education institutions MTs-MA Serbia Bakti. This research uses a qualitative approach with descriptive-analytic methods. The data were collected through observation, interviews, and literature studies, while data analysis was carried out through phenomenological reduction, eidetic reduction, and transcendental reduction. The study results concluded that the basic concepts, principles, and ethics of tarekat da'wah applied in Islamic educational institutions were based on the teachings of TQN, Tanbih manuscripts, Pearl strands, and the exemplary figure of Abah Anom. The tarekat da'wah aims to form human beings who are Cageur-Bageur and Serba-Bakti. This goal is implemented into the vision, mission, and profile of the institution's graduates. Dzikir becomes the epicenter of the tarekat da'wah method as an effort of Tazkiyat al-Nafs. The research implication shows that the commitment and consistency of the teachings of TQN Suryalaya to form a perfect human (insan kamil) in various spheres of life.Penelitian ini berupaya untuk menganalisis tujuan dan metode dakwah tarekat melalui lembaga pendidikan Islam di Pesantren Suryalaya. Penelitian dilakukan dengan menggali konsep dasar, tujuan, prinsip, etika dan metode pendidikan berbasis tarekat yang diterapkan di lembaga pendidikan Islam MTs-MA Serba Bakti. Penelitian menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan metode deskriptif-analitik. Pengumpulan data dilakukan melalui observasi, wawancara dan studi pustaka, sedangkan analisis data dilakukan melalui reduksi fenomenologis, reduksi eiditis dan reduksi transcendental. Hasil penelitian menyimpulkan bahwa konsep dasar, prinsip dan etika dakwah tarekat yang diterapkan di lembaga pendidikan Islam bersumberkan pada ajaran TQN, naskah Tanbih, Untaian Mutiara dan keteladanan dari sosok Abah Anom. Tujuan dakwah tarekat adalah membentuk manusia yang Cageur-Bageur dan Serba Bakti. Tujuan ini dimplementasikan ke dalam visi, misi dan profil lulusan lembaga. Dzikir menjadi episentrum metode dakwah tarekat sebagai upaya Tazkiyat al-Nafs yang pada prakteknya dilakukan untuk mengoreksi tindakan agar tilik pamilih dina nyiar jalan kahadean lahir batin, dunia akhirat, sangkan ngeunah nyawa betah jasad, memperhatikan tindakan dan niat tindakan agar sesuai dengan kebaikan sehingga mencapai kebahagiaan lahir batin, dunia dan akhirat. Implikasi penelitian menunjukkan bahwa komitmen dan konsistensi ajaran TQN Suryalaya dalam upaya membentuk manusia sempurna (insan kamil) dalam berbagai ruang lingkup kehidupan.

Existentialism and Ecstasy: Colin Wilson’s Phenomenological Account of Peak Experiences

This paper critically examines the philosophical foundations of Colin Wilson’s New Existentialism. I will show how Wilson’s writings promoted a phenomenological strategy for understanding states of ecstatic affirmation within so-called ‘peak experiences’. Wilson subsequently attempted to use the life affirming insights bestowed by peak states to establish an ontological ground for values to serve as a foundation for his New Existentialism. Because of its psychological focus however, I argue that Wilson’s New Existentialism contains an ambivalent framework for establishing ontological categories, which leads his thought into theoretical difficulties. More precisely, Wilson’s strategy runs into problems in coherently integrating its explicitly psychological interpretation of Husserl’s theory of intentionality within a broader, and philosophically coherent, phenomenological framework. Wilson’s psychological reading of Husserl’s transcendental reduction, for example, manifests tensions in how it reconciles the empirical basis of acts of transcendence with an essentialist conception of the self as a transcendental ego. The above tensions, I argue, ultimately render the New Existentialism susceptible to criticism from a Husserlian-transcendental perspective. After outlining a Husserlian critique of Wilson’s position, I end the paper by suggesting how some of the central insights of the New Existentialism might help to bridge the gap that persists between pure phenomenological description and metaphysics.

Investigating The Values of Guidance and Counseling in Eleganaboi

Eleganaboi was a traditional ceremony in Luro society which contained essential elements of local wisdom. This study aimed to investigating the values of guidance and counseling in Eleganaboi. To investigate the values of guidance and counseling, we use phenomenology qualitative descriptive method. To collect the data, we implemented observation and interview. The observations were carried out during a cultural ceremony in the Luro community. Furthermore, interview was conducted on four traditional leaders. Edicts and transcendental reduction were used to analyze data. The results show eleven fundamental values of guidance and counseling in Eleganaboi. Those values are: gratitude; genuine; humble; honest; discipline; coherent; respect; care; trust; inclusive and togetherness. The community utilized Eleganaboi as a method to guide and counsel each member, including who faced problems in their life.Abstrak: Eleganaboi adalah upacara tradisional masyarakat Luro yang berisi unsur-unsur penting kearifan lokal. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengeksplorasi nilai-nilai bimbingan dan konseling di Eleganaboi. Penelitian deskriptif kualitatif ini menggunakan pendekatan fenomenologi. Untuk mengumpulkan data, dilakukan observasi dan wawancara. Observasi dilakukan pada saat upacara budaya di masyarakat Luro berlangsung. Selanjutnya, dilakukan wawancara pada empat pemimpin tradisional. Reduksi eiditis dan reduksi transendental digunakan untuk menganalisis data. Hasil menunjukkan ada sebelas nilai dasar bimbingan dan konseling di Eleganaboi. Nilai-nilai itu adalah: rasa terima kasih; tulus; rendah hati; jujur; disiplin; koheren; hormat; peduli; percaya; inklusif; dan kebersamaan. Masyarakat Luro menggunakan Eleganaboi sebagai metode untuk membimbing dan menasihati setiap anggota mereka, termasuk mereka yang sedang menghadapi masalah dalam hidup.

Deduction of Freedom vs Deduction of Experience in Kant’s Metaphysics

My aim is to demonstrate the specificities and differences between transcendental deduction of concepts and deduction of the fundamental principles of pure practical reason in Kant’s metaphysics. First of all it is necessary to examine Kant’s attitude to the metaphysics of his time and the problem of its new justification. Kant in his philosophy explicated not only the theoretical world of cognition, but also the practical world of freedom. Accordingly, the fundamental means of proving metaphysics’ claims are the deduction of pure concepts of understanding (deduction of experience) and the deduction of the principles of pure practical reason (deduction of freedom). The underlying premises of the Kantian project of reviving metaphysics, “the Copernican Turn”, the critical methods and basic principles of transcendental (formal) idealism also provide the methodological basis of transcendental deduction, a new method of proving the claims of metaphysics in various spheres of human being. Proceeding from the above, I analyse the essence, structure and the peculiarities as well as the differences between the deduction of experience and the deduction of freedom. I single out the following features of the two types of deduction. First, theoretical use of reason is aimed at objects while practical reason is aimed at noumena, the foundations of will and freedom. Second, the transcendental deduction of space and time, as well as the deduction of categories, is preceded by transcendental reduction, which is absent in the deduction of freedom. Third, Kant orients the methodological movement of deductions in opposite directions. Theoretical deduction proceeds from pure forms of sensible intuition to concepts of understanding and thence to fundamental principles. Practical deduction proceeds from a priori principles to the concepts of the metaphysics of morals and thence to moral feelings. Fourth, deduction in the theoretical sphere forbids speculative reason to go beyond experience. Practical deduction has pointed to the intelligible world and has proved its “legitimacy”.