scholarly journals KANTIŠKOJI „DAIKTO PATIES SAVAIME“ PROBLEMA RAE LANGTON INTERPRETACIJOJE

Problemos ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 144-156
Author(s):  
Edvardas Rimkus

Straipsnyje pristatomas ir nagrinėjamas Rae Langton požiūris į kantiškąją „daikto paties savaime“ problemą. Autorė noumeno ir fenomeno perskyrą interpretuoja kaip dviejų „daikto paties savaime“ savybių rūšių perskyrą. Fenomenas – tai išoriškai noumeno atžvilgiu pasireiškiančios jo savybės. Išorinės savybės yra noumeno generuojamos jėgos. Noumenas turi ir vidines savybes, vidinę prigimtį, kuri nepasireiškia išoriškai ir todėl nėra prieinama pažinimui. „Vidinių savybių“ koncepcija kritikuojama teigiant, jog ji pernelyg išplečia Kanto apriorinių intelekto kategorijų taikymo sferą ir yra nesuderinama su noumeno, kaip nekonceptualizuoto ir nepriklausomo nuo juslinio receptyvumo daikto, galima reikšme Kanto filosofinėje teorijoje.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Langton, Kantas, daiktas pats savaime, išorinės savybės, vidinės savybės.Rae Langton’s Interpretation of the Kantian Problem of the Thing-in-ItselfEdvardas Rimkus SummaryThe paper presents and examines Rae Langton’s approach to the Kantian problem of noumena. Langton treats the distinction between noumena and phenomena as a distinction between two kinds of properties of the thing-in-itself. Phenomena are externally manifested qualities of noumena. Appearance is the power generated by noumena. Noumena also have intristic properties or the inner nature, which are not externally manifest and thus are not accessibleto cognition. The paper criticizes such conception of intrinsic properties, since it extends the scope of application of Kant’s intellectual apriori categoriesand are not compatible with the possible significance of noumena as nonconceptual things independent of sensory receptivity.Key words: Langton, Kant, thing-in-itself, intrinsic property, extrinsic property.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophia Wienbar ◽  
Gregory Schwartz

The output of spiking neurons depends both on their synaptic inputs and on their intrinsic properties. Retinal ganglion cells (RGCs), the spiking projection neurons of the retina, comprise over 40 different types in mice and other mammals, each tuned to different features of visual scenes. The circuits providing synaptic input to different RGC types to drive feature selectivity have been studied extensively, but there has been substantially less research aimed at understanding how the intrinsic properties of RGCs differ and how those differences impact feature selectivity. Here, we introduce an RGC type in the mouse, the Bursty Suppressed-by-Contrast (bSbC) RGC, whose contrast selectivity is shaped by its intrinsic properties. Surprisingly, when we compare the bSbC RGC to the OFF sustained alpha (OFFsA) RGC that receives similar synaptic input, we find that the two RGC types exhibit starkly different responses to an identical stimulus. We identified spike generation as the key intrinsic property behind this functional difference; the bSbC RGC undergoes depolarization block in conditions where the OFFsA RGC maintains a high spike rate. Pharmacological experiments, imaging, and compartment modeling demonstrate that these differences in spike generation are the result of differences in voltage-gated sodium channel conductances. Our results demonstrate that differences in intrinsic properties allow these two RGC types to detect and relay distinct features of an identical visual stimulus to the brain.



Author(s):  
J. Peter Denny

A general problem in Algonquian verb derivation is the role of various morphemes conveying abstract meanings, in contrast to those conveying the main concrete meaning of the verb. Usually, the specific action taking place is quite well described by the root, medial and concrete final, but other morphemes appear such as pre-medials, post-medials and abstract finals which have much more abstract but nonetheless vital meanings. The abstract morphemes are especially important because they are few in number, but occur frequently, so that the abstract meaning of any one of them is a component of the meaning of large numbers of verbs. In previous papers I have tried to show what some of these abstract meanings are. In Denny and Mailhot (1976) we showed that, in Cree-Montagnais, pre-medial -ā- indicates that the root expresses an extrinsic property of the object referred to by the medial, e.g., ossisk ā kam-āw ‘cypress-EXTRINSIC-lake-it.is = it is a cypress lake,’ whereas lack of pre-medial -ā- indicates that the root expresses an intrinsic property, e.g., čino-kam-āw ‘long-lake-it.is = it is a long lake.’



2004 ◽  
Vol 13 (02) ◽  
pp. 425-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
UNG CHAN TSAN

An electrically charged particle is necessarily different from its antiparticle while an electrically neutral particle is either identical with or different from its antiparticle. A truly neutral particle is a particle identical to its antiparticle, which means that all its algebraic intrinsic properties are equal to zero since particle and antiparticle have all their algebraic intrinsic properties opposite. We propose two complementary methods to recognize the true nature of any electrically neutral particle. On the one hand, any non-null algebraic intrinsic property of a particle (properties such as Q, magnetic moment already known from classical physics, or quantum numbers such as baryonic number A, lepton number L or flavors, which are meaningful only in the quantum world) reveals that it is distinct from its antiparticle. On the other hand, any particle decaying through a self-conjugate channel or/and through both two conjugate channels is a truly neutral particle implying then that all algebraic intrinsic properties, known or yet unknown, of this particle are null. According to these methods, the neutrino, like any fermion, cannot be its own antiparticle, so neutrinoless double beta decay cannot take place in nature. We point out the internal contradiction required by the existence of hypothetical neutrinoless double beta decay. We suggest that persistent failure to find experimental evidence for this decay mechanism despite huge efforts dedicated to this aim is consistent with the physics of this process. The immediate consequence would be that limits of neutrino mass deduced from neutrinoless double beta decay cannot be used as constraints in contrast with mass limits deduced from the behavior of the end-point in simple beta spectra.



2021 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-131
Author(s):  
Frank C. Hawthorne ◽  
Stuart J. Mills ◽  
Frédéric Hatert ◽  
Mike S. Rumsey

AbstractOntology deals with questions concerning what things exist, and how such things may be associated according to similarities and differences and related within a hierarchy. Ontology provides a rigorous way to develop a general definition of a mineral species. Properties may be divided into two principal groups: an intrinsic property is characteristic of the object and is independent of anything else; an extrinsic property depends on the relation between the object and other things. A universal is an entity that is common to all objects in a set. Here the objects are mineral samples, each entity is a specific property of these minerals, and the set of objects is all mineral samples of that mineral species. The key intrinsic properties of a mineral species are its name, its end-member formula and Z (the number of formula units in the unit cell), its space group and the bond topology of the end-member structure. These are also universals as they are common to all mineral samples belonging to that mineral species. An archetype is a pure form which embodies the fundamental characteristics of an object. Thus the archetype of a mineral species embodies the above set of universals. Real mineral samples of this mineral species are imperfect copies of that archetype, with a range of chemical composition defined by the boundaries between end-member formulae of this and other end members of the same bond topology. The result is a formal definition of a mineral species: A specific mineral species is the set of imperfect copies of the corresponding archetype and is defined by the following set of universals: name, end-member formula and Z, space group, and bond topology of the end-member structure, with the range of chemical composition limited by the compositional boundaries between end members with the same bond topology.



Author(s):  
Joseph Levine

There are two basic philosophical problems about colour. The first concerns the nature of colour itself. That is, what sort of property is it? When I say of the shirt that I am wearing that it is red, what sort of fact about the shirt am I describing? The second problem concerns the nature of colour experience. When I look at the red shirt I have a visual experience with a certain qualitative character – a ‘reddish’ one. Thus colour seems in some sense to be a property of my sensory experience, as well as a property of my shirt. What sort of mental property is it? Obviously, the two problems are intimately related. In particular, there is a great deal of controversy over the following question: if we call the first sort of property ‘objective colour’ and the second ‘subjective colour’, which of the two, objective or subjective colour, is basic? Or do they both have an independent ontological status? Most philosophers adhere to the doctrine of physicalism, the view that all objects and events are ultimately constituted by the fundamental physical particles, properties and relations described in physical theory. The phenomena of both objective and subjective colour present problems for physicalism. With respect to objective colour, it is difficult to find any natural physical candidate with which to identify it. Our visual system responds in a similar manner to surfaces that vary along a wide range of physical parameters, even with respect to the reflection of light waves. Yet what could be more obvious than the fact that objects are coloured? In the case of subjective colour, the principal topic of this entry, there is an even deeper puzzle. It is natural to think of the reddishness of a visual experience – its qualitative character – as an intrinsic property of the experience. Intrinsic properties are distinguished from relational properties in that an object’s possession of the former does not depend on its relation to other objects, whereas its possession of the latter does. If subjective colour is intrinsic, then it would seem to be a neural property of a brain state. But what sort of neural property could explain the reddishness of an experience? Furthermore, reduction of subjective colour to a neural property would rule out even the possibility that forms of life with different physiological structures, or intelligent robots, could have experiences of the same qualitative type as our experiences of red. While some philosophers endorse this consequence, many find it quite implausible. Neural properties seem best suited to explain how certain functions are carried out, and therefore it might seem better to identify subjective colour with the property of playing a certain functional role within the entire cognitive system realized by the brain. This allows the possibility that structures physically different from human brains could support colour experiences of the same type as our own. However, various puzzles undermine the plausibility of this claim. For instance, it seems possible that two people could agree in all their judgments of relative similarity and yet one sees green where the other sees red. If this ‘inverted spectrum’ case is a genuine logical possibility, as many philosophers advocate, then it appears that subjective colour must not be a matter of functional role, but rather an intrinsic property of experience. Faced with the dilemmas posed by subjective colour for physicalist doctrine, some philosophers opt for eliminativism, the doctrine that subjective colour is not a genuine, or real, phenomenon after all. On this view the source of the puzzle is a conceptual confusion; a tendency to extend our judgments concerning objective colour, what appear to be intrinsic properties of the surfaces of physical objects, onto the properties of our mental states. Once we see that all that is happening ‘inside’ is a perceptual judgment concerning the properties of external objects, we will understand why we cannot locate any state or property of the brain with which to identify subjective colour. The controversy over the nature of subjective colour is part of a wider debate about the subjective aspect of conscious experience more generally. How does the qualitative character of experience – what it is like to see, hear and smell – fit into a physicalist scientific framework? At present all of the options just presented have their adherents, and no general consensus exists.



Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Seungbae Park

Abstract Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, we can know that the parts of the system are entangled and spatially separated from each other. In addition, the concept of supervenience neither illuminates quantum entanglement nor helps structural realism.



Philosophy ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 537-558
Author(s):  
Han-Kyul Kim

AbstractIt has often been claimed that Locke's agnostic remarks in the Essay represent his suspension of philosophical judgment on crucial ontological issues or his hesitation over which metaphysical stance to adopt. Against this often-raised criticism, I argue that Locke actually held a clear position – a type of functionalism about thingness in general, whether macro or micro, or whether mental or physical. What Locke refers to as a ‘nominal essence’, I further argue, represents a set of functional roles that a thing plays in order to be classified as of a kind to which it belongs. Our empirical knowledge about things – confined to their nominal essences – can only tell us about their functional roles but not their intrinsic properties that realize those roles. One remains therefore incurably ignorant about the intrinsic property of things in themselves. I explore the historical and philosophical significance of Locke's functional approach.



Blood ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 128 (22) ◽  
pp. 5232-5232
Author(s):  
Lucie Laplane

Abstract What are leukemic stem cells (LSCs)? This is a biological, a semantic, and a philosophical question. Leukemic stem cells raise a number of questions for onco-hematologists in particular when it comes to their clinical relevance. What are their functions in the initiation and in the progression of the disease? How to identify them? How to target them without damaging the non-malignant hematopoietic stem cells (HSCs)? Given that LSCs come from HSCs or progenitors, a semantic question arises: should we rather call them leukemic initiating cells? or leukemic propagating cells? As a philosopher, I approach all these biological and semantic issues with a slightly different perspective. Instead of asking what are LSCs, I will start by asking what kind of property is stemness. In previous work, I performed an analysis of the scientific literature on stem cells (including cancer stem cells) and framed a classification of their possible identities (Laplane, HUP 2016; reviewed in Clevers, Nature 2016):Categorical: stemness is a purely intrinsic property (e.g. of categorical property: the atomic number of chemical elements).Dispositional: stemness is an intrinsic property whose expression depends on extrinsic stimuli from the niche (e.g. of dispositional property: fragility).Relational: stemness is an extrinsic property that depends on a relationship between the cell and its environment; the microenvironment can induce stemness (e.g. of relational property: being the sister of someone).Systemic: stemness is an extrinsic property, maintained and controlled at the level of the system (e.g. of systemic properties: soccer positions that depend on the system of play) Here, I applied this framework to LSCs, in particular in acute myeloid leukemia. This analysis of the identity of stemness matters for onco-hematology because we cannot get rid of categorical, disposition, relational, and systemic properties in the same way. Thus, different therapeutic strategies will have different efficacy depending on the identity of LSCs. For example, targeting LSCs will be much more efficient if they are categorical or dispositional. Targeting the stem cell niche will be more efficient if they are dispositional or relational. But both strategies will lack efficiency if they are systemic. In such cases multi-drug treatments will predictably be more appropriate than targeted therapies. We think about properties as having fixed identities. This is how we study, learn, teach, and investigate biology, and more generally this is how we think. This typological thinking, inherited from Aristotle and Plato, applies well to normal hematopoiesis where most if not all reports describe stemness as a dispositional property. However, the progression of hematological malignancies, from clonal hematopoiesis and pre-malignant stages to chronic and acute leukemia, questions the relevance of this typological thinking in cancer. A first question is whether HSCs, pre-LSCs, and LSCs have the same identity. A second one is whether LSCs of different hematological malignancies and the LSCs in one patient all have the same identity. I will discuss cases of genetic and epigenetic alterations that suggest possible switches in stemness identity and their consequences for therapies. To conclude, I used a classical philosophical method developed in three steps: i- analysis of the scientific literature, ii- production of conceptual distinctions, iii- analysis of their consequences. I suggested the distinction between four stemness identities (categorical, dispositional, relational, systemic). HSCs fits the dispositional identity, suggesting that both LSCs-targeting and niche-targeting therapies could be efficient (provided that we can identity and target them properly). However, the identity of LSCs can differ from that of HSCs. Moreover, in contrast with HSCs that have one unique and stable identity, LSCs can be categorical, dispositional, relational, or systemic, and they can switch from one to another identity following particular genetic and epigenetic insults. This drastically complicates the therapeutic approaches and highlights the need to develop multiple therapies. References Laplane L, Cancer Stem Cells: Philosophy and Therapies. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 2016. Clevers H, Cancer Therapy: Defining Stemness. Nature 2016; 534(7606): 176-177. Disclosures No relevant conflicts of interest to declare.



2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 64
Author(s):  
Kelly Saporta Sorozon

Studies show a product's shape affects consumer judgments. Yet, the basic principle that governs shape effects is unclear. In this study, we fill this gap by demonstrating that causal-reasoning considerations govern shape effects. Specifically, people expect cause (e.g., an energy drink) and its effect (e.g., fat burning) to exhibit some degree of resemblance or congruency (“like causes like”). This expectation leads them to use the “law of similarity” heuristic when judging artifacts. In two studies, we focused on a product's shape. For half of the products, the shape was an intrinsic property of the product (i.e., had the causal power to produce the effect), and for the other half, the shape was an extrinsic property of the product. For both kinds of properties (extrinsic and intrinsic), we demonstrate that the same ad (e.g., an energy drink that "claims" to produce fat burning) is more persuasive (willingness to purchase the product, and choice between products) when the product's shape is congruent rather than incongruent (e.g., a “tall” can vs. a “short” can) with the effect promised.We strengthen the notion that leaning on a cause-effect-similarity heuristic is very basic, by showing that choice situations accelerate the effect of congruency more for products for which the focal property is extrinsic than for products for which it is intrinsic.In line with other studies that show causal reasoning considerations govern judgment and choice on artifacts (products), the present study demonstrates causal-reasoning considerations govern judgment and choice concerning the cause-effect-similarity heuristic as well.



1995 ◽  
Vol 401 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Jeffrey Snyder ◽  
Ron Hiskes ◽  
Steve DiCarolis ◽  
M. R. Beasley ◽  
T. H. Geballe

AbstractAn investigation designed to display the intrinsic properties of perovskite manganites was accomplished by comparing the behavior of bulk samples with that of thin films; the results show the "colossal magneto resistance" at very low temperatures is not an intrinsic property of the thermodynamically stable 1/3 doped material. Epitaxial 1500 Å films of perovskite La0.67Ca0.33MnO3 and La0.67Sr0.33MnO3 were grown by solid source chemical vapor deposition on LaA1O3 and post annealed in oxygen at 950°C. Crystals were prepared by LASER heated pedestal growth. The magnetic and electrical transport properties are essentially the same. Below Tc/2 the intrinsic magnetization decreases as T2 (as can be expected for itinerant electron ferromagnets) while the intrinsic resistivity increases proportional to T2. The constant and T2 coefficients of the resistivity are largely independent of magnetic field and alkaline earth element (Ca, Sr or Ba). We identify three distinct types of negative magnetoresistance. The largest effect is observed near the Curie temperature and is likely to be due to magnetic critical scattering. There is also magnetoresistance associated with the net magnetization of polycrystalline samples. The high temperature (above Tc) resistivity of La0.67Ca0.33MnO3 is consistent with small polaron hopping conductivity with a transition at 750K, while La0.67Sr0.33MnO3 does not exhibit activated conductivity until about 500K, well above Tc. The limiting low and high temperature resistivities may place a limit on the maximum possible magnetoresistance of these materials.



Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document