A Reputation for Resolute Action

2020 ◽  
pp. 89-114
Author(s):  
Danielle L. Lupton

This chapter explores how Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev viewed the resolve of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, considering Khrushchev's decision making surrounding the 1958 Berlin Crisis. The historical record shows that Eisenhower's early statements were particularly influential to the formation of his reputation, as they created expectations of how he would behave in the future. However, Eisenhower was unable to solidify his reputation for resolve at the 1955 Geneva Summit, as Khrushchev perceived Secretary of State John Foster Dulles rather than President Eisenhower as being in direct control of negotiations at the summit. Yet, in the year leading up to the 1958 Berlin Ultimatum, Khrushchev's perception of who was in control of U.S. foreign policy shifted to emphasize the importance of Eisenhower to America's Berlin policy. And the president's statements leading up to the Berlin Crisis led Khrushchev to believe Eisenhower was unlikely to make major concessions on the issue. Eisenhower's subsequent firm response to the Berlin Crisis then confirmed Khrushchev's expectations of the president's resolve. Accordingly, Eisenhower established a reputation for resolute action that would last until the end of his presidency. Further evidence suggests that Eisenhower's actions as a general during World War II were influential to Khrushchev's early perceptions of the president.

Author(s):  
Paul Stangl

The center of Berlin lay in ruins at the end of World War II. Cultural and political leaders faced decisions regarding what to restore, rebuild, or raze. Yet the future of Berlin would not be envisioned in a vacuum. They would wittingly and unwittingly draw from inherited traditions, ideologies, and theories to structure their understanding of the city and guide decision-making about its future. For Berliners, the rebuilding of their destroyed city would remain a central part of their lives for years. Communist political leaders sought to mobilize the population for the reconstruction effort and to use this effort in the political socialization of the citizenry.


2021 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 84-125
Author(s):  
Charlotte Grech-Madin

Abstract For much of human history, water was a standard weapon of war. In the post–World War II period, however, nation-states in international conflict have made concerted efforts to restrain the weaponization of water. Distinct from realist and rationalist explanations, the historical record reveals that water has come to be governed by a set of intersubjective standards of behavior that denounce water's involvement in conflict as morally taboo. How did this water taboo develop, and how does it matter for nation-states? Focused process-tracing illuminates the taboo's development from the 1950s to the 2010s, and indicates that (1) a moral aversion to using water as a weapon exists; (2) this aversion developed through cumulative mechanisms of taboo evolution over the past seventy years; and (3) the taboo influences states at both an instrumental level of compliance, and, in recent decades, a more internalized level. These findings offer new avenues for research and policy to better understand and uphold this taboo into the future.


2018 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-139
Author(s):  
Younis Chughtai ◽  
Khurram Iqbal

Trump’s foreign policy outlook and his rhetorical predispositions suggest that the American foreign policy is about to undergo drastic changes in terms of substance matter of policy. The arrival of Trump at the helm of affairs has built a conventional perception of gradual American retreat from the Obama’s rebalancing policy and its pacific-centric outlook. Any abrupt change in this policy of rebalancing will have serious repercussions for the regional economic, political and security architecture designed by America since world-war II. In this context, Offensive Realism, that takes system level variables as the primary determinants of foreign policy of great powers, offers a valuable framework to understand and explain the future course of Obama’s policy of rebalancing under the incumbent administration. To this end, this article is aimed at delving into the theoretical and historical reservoirs related to the US foreign policy along with the current practices of Trump administration to test the claims of continuity or transformation in the US foreign policy of rebalancing in the Asia Pacific region. This article asserts that Obama’s rebalancing policy would continue in the future with certain tactical adjustments related to the implementation of policy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 79-92
Author(s):  
Burhanettin Duran

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the domestic and foreign policy agendas of all countries have been turned upside down. The pandemic has brought new problems and competition areas to states and to the international system. While the pandemic politically calls to mind the post-World War II era, it can also be compared with the 2008 crisis due to its economic effects such as unemployment and the disruption of global supply chains. A debate immediately began for a new international system; however, it seems that the current international system will be affected, but will not experience a radical change. That is, a new international order is not expected, while disorder is most likely in the post-pandemic period. In an atmosphere of global instability where debates on the U.S.-led international system have been worn for a while, in the post-pandemic period states will invest in self-sufficiency and redefine their strategic areas, especially in health security. The decline of U.S. leadership, the challenging policies of China, the effects of Chinese policies on the U.S.-China relations and the EU’s deepening crisis are going to be the main discussion topics that will determine the future of the international system.


1968 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Epstein

Schwarz's study Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik is, in the opinion of this reviewer, the single most important book on the occupation studyperiod in Germany after World War II that has yet appeared. It is not an ordinary narrative history—indeed, it presupposes a good deal of prior knowledge—but is rather a topical analysis of the following problems: the various possible solutions to the German question in the years after 1945; the policies toward Germany of the four victorious powers—Russia, France, Britain, and the United States; the development of German attitudes on the future political orientation of one or two Germanies; and finally, the factors that led to the voluntary acceptance of Western integration by most West Germans even though this integration meant the partition of Germany.


Author(s):  
E. Komkova

The management of the Canada–U.S. asymmetry might be defined as rather successful example. After the World War II Canadian and American officials have developed a set of specific bargaining norms, which can be referred to as the “rules of the game”, and “diplomatic culture”. Their existence leads to predictability of relationships, to empathy, and to expectations of “responsible” behavior. The study of the Canada–U.S. model of civilized asymmetrical relationship lays grounds for further investigation on how it can be applied to the foreign policy strategy of the Russian Federation in its relations with asymmetrical partners from the “near neighbourhood”.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-218
Author(s):  
Stanislav Gennadyevich Malkin

The following paper deals with methodological features of studying of empires legacy role in policy of the leading powers in the countries of the third world through a prism of asymmetric conflicts historical modeling. The author pays special attention to the role of Great Britain and the USA foreign policy course defining after World War II during Cold War in the second half of the 20th century and Global War on Terror at the beginning of the 21st century. The author pays attention to methodological traps (such as the probability of the research problem on the given variable and terminological confusion) as well as to research opportunities which are opened by such approach in the field of the historical and political analysis (for example, evolution of the international relations theory and practice in the conditions of the world order transformation after World War II). Special attention is given to the value of such methodological reception as asymmetric conflicts historical modeling in expert estimates of the leading powers foreign policy. The paper also deals with the role of expert community and academic expertize as an important component of that analytical operation which is carried out within historical simulation of the asymmetrical conflicts.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Simeone ◽  
Advaith Gundavajhala Venkata Koundinya ◽  
Anandh Ravi Kumar ◽  
Ed Finn

The trajectory of science fiction since World War II has been defined by its relationship with technoscientific imaginaries. In the Golden Age of the 1930s and 1940s, writers like Isaac Asimov and Robert Heinlein dreamed of the robots and rocket ships that would preoccupy thousands of engineers a few decades later. In 1980s cyberpunk, Vernor Vinge, William Gibson, and Bruce Sterling imagined virtual worlds that informed generations of technology entrepreneurs. When Margaret Atwood was asked what draws her to dystopian visions of the future, she responded, "I read the newspaper." This is not just a reiteration of the truism that science fiction is always about the present as well as the future. In fact, we will argue, science fiction is a genre defined by its special relationship with what we might term "scientific reality," or the set of paradigms, aspirations, and discourses associated with technoscientific research.


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