Psychology and Obligation in Hobbes: The Case of “Ought Implies Can”

Many interpreters use Hobbes’s endorsement of “ought implies can” to justify treating Hobbes’s motivational psychology as an external constraint on his normative theory. These interpreters assume that, for Hobbes, something is “possible” for a person to do only if they can be motivated to do it, and so Hobbes’s psychological theory constrains what obligations people have. I argue this assumption about what is “possible” is false and so these arguments are unsound. Looking to Hobbes’s exchange with Bramhall on free will, I argue that the sense of “possible” relevant for “ought implies can” in Hobbes’s philosophy only concerns an agent’s capacity to do something if they decide to do it. Whether a person can be motivated to do something, then, does not determine if it is possible for them. Consequently, Hobbes’s motivational psychology cannot determine what our obligations are by invoking the principle that “ought implies can.”

Reshaping the external constraint. Franco Modigliani, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa and the EMS, 1977-1993

During a decade of stagflation in the 1970s, a sea of changes on the interna-tional stage led to major macroeconomic imbalances that gave central bankers a different role in relation to governments and policy-makers. In Europe, this coin-cided with the relaunching of the project for European integration. The Italian case shows how governments and central bankers interacted in shaping adjustment strategies. The Bank of Italy had a pivotal role in shaping the country's economic policies, relying on its capacity for economic analysis. The adjustment strategy formulated in the "Pandolfi Plan" of 1978 was conceived largely by an economist at the Bank of Italy, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. Further developing analyses conducted jointly with Franco Modigliani the previous year, the plan focused on the macroeconomic effects of high labour costs in the wake of a full ("100% and plus") wage indexing and rising government deficits. The policy proposal revolved around a few targets, namely investments and economic growth, and an explicit principle of fairness in the labour market. The Pandolfi Plan pledged to Italy's en-during participation in the European integration process by combining economic development with adhesion to the "European choice", which meant joining the European Monetary System (EMS). The European agreements governing EMS membership replaced the standard external economic constraints, i.e. the balance of payments and exchange rate, with a new kind of semi-legal external constraint ingrained in the governance structure of the European Community. The nature of this new semi-legal external constraint as a fiscal discipline mechanism eventually emerged more clearly with the Maastricht Treaty.

Compulsory medical intervention versus external constraint in pandemic control

Would compulsory treatment or vaccination for COVID-19 be justified? In England, there would be significant legal barriers to it. However, we offer a conditional ethical argument in favour of allowing compulsory treatment and vaccination, drawing on an ethical comparison with external constraints—such as quarantine, isolation and ‘lockdown’—that have already been authorised to control the pandemic in this jurisdiction. We argue that, if the permissive English approach to external constraints for COVID-19 has been justified, then there is a case for a similarly permissive approach to compulsory medical interventions.

The Readiness Potential reflects expectation, not uncertainty, in the timing of action

Actions are guided by a combination of external cues, internal intentions and stored knowledge. Self-initiated voluntary actions, produced without any immediate external cue, may be preceded by a slow EEG Readiness Potential (RP) that progressively increases prior to action. The cognitive significance of this neural event is controversial. Some accounts link the RP to the fact that timing of voluntary actions is generated endogenously, without external constraints, and perhaps even randomly. Other accounts take the RP as reflecting the unique role of planning, therefore of temporal expectation, in voluntary actions. In many previous experiments, actions are both unconstrained by external cues, but also potentially involve preplanning and anticipation. To separate these factors, we developed a reinforcement learning paradigm where participants learned, through trial and error, the optimal time to act. If the RP reflects freedom from external constraint, its amplitude should be greater early in learning, when participants do not yet know the best time to act. Conversely, if the RP reflects planning, it should be greater later on, when participants have learned, and know in advance, the time of action. We found that RP amplitudes grew with learning, suggesting that this neural activity reflects planning and anticipation for the forthcoming action, rather than freedom from external constraint.