Psychology and Obligation in Hobbes: The Case of “Ought Implies Can”

2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-171
Author(s):  
Paul Garofalo
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
External Constraint ◽  
Motivational Psychology

Abstract Many interpreters use Hobbes’s endorsement of “ought implies can” to justify treating Hobbes’s motivational psychology as an external constraint on his normative theory. These interpreters assume that, for Hobbes, something is “possible” for a person to do only if they can be motivated to do it, and so Hobbes’s psychological theory constrains what obligations people have. I argue this assumption about what is “possible” is false and so these arguments are unsound. Looking to Hobbes’s exchange with Bramhall on free will, I argue that the sense of “possible” relevant for “ought implies can” in Hobbes’s philosophy only concerns an agent’s capacity to do something if they decide to do it. Whether a person can be motivated to do something, then, does not determine if it is possible for them. Consequently, Hobbes’s motivational psychology cannot determine what our obligations are by invoking the principle that “ought implies can.”

scholarly journals To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-32
Author(s):  
Nadine Elzein ◽  
Tuomas K. Pernu
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Libertarian Free Will

A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not justified in asserting P. While such arguments often appeal to principles with wide appeal, such as the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, they also require a commitment to principles that seem far less compelling, e.g. the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’ or the principle that having an obligation entails being responsible. It is argued here that these further principles are dubious, and that it will be difficult to construct a valid transcendental argument without them.

scholarly journals Two Dogmas of Moral Theory? Comments on Lisa Tessman’s Moral Failure

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva F Kittay
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Moral Failure ◽  
Guiding Principles

In Moral Failure, Lisa Tessman argues against two principles of moral theory, that ought implies can and that normative theory must be action-guiding. Although Tessman provides a trenchant account of how we are thrust into the misfortune of moral failure, often by our very efforts to act morally, and although she shows, through a discussion well-informed by the latest theorizing in ethics, neuroethics, and psychology, how much more moral theory can do than provide action-guiding principles, I argue that the two theses of moral theory that she disputes remain indispensable for ethical theory.

scholarly journals Is Free Will Scepticism Self-Defeating?

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Strong Connection

Free will sceptics deny the existence of free will, that is the command or control necessary for moral responsibility. Epicureans allege that this denial is somehow self-defeating. To interpret the Epicurean allegation charitably, we must first realise that it is propositional attitudes like beliefs and not propositions themselves which can be self-defeating. So, believing in free will scepticism might be self- defeating. The charge becomes more plausible because, as Epicurus insightfully recognised,there is a strong connection between conduct and belief—and so between thecontent of free will scepticism (since it is about conduct) and the attitude of believing it. Second, we must realise that an attitude can be self- defeating relative to certain grounds. This means that it might be self-defeating to be a free will sceptic on certain grounds, such as the putative fact that we lack leeway or sourcehood. This charge is much more interesting because of the epistemic importance of leeway and sourcehood. Ultimately, the Epicurean charge of self-defeat fails. Yet, it delivers important lessons to the sceptic. The most important of them is that free will sceptics should either accept the existence of leeway or reject the principle that ‘“ought” implies “can”’.

Self-control observed

1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-159
Author(s):  
Howard Rachlin
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Conscious Thought ◽  
Overt Behavior ◽  
Teleological Behaviorism ◽  
Scientific Legitimacy ◽  
Mediating Mechanisms ◽  
Complex Cases

AbstractComplex cases of self-control involve processes such as guilt-avoidance, inhibition, self-punishment, conscious thought, free will, and imagination. Such processes, conceived as internal mediating mechanisms, serve the function in psychological theory of avoiding teleological causation. Acceptance of the scientific legitimacy of teleological behaviorism would obviate the need for internal mediation, redefine the above processes in terms of temporally extended patterns of overt behavior, and clarify their relation to selfcontrol.

Love and Freedom

2021 ◽  
pp. 123-148
Author(s):  
Derk Pereboom
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The Other ◽  
Personal Relationships ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Ethical Considerations ◽  
Ability To Do Otherwise

Chapter 6 contends that love and relationships need not be compromised if we, motivated by ethical considerations and skepticism about free will, relinquished the retributive emotions. When we are wronged in relationships, there are non-retributive emotions available to us, whose expressions can play the relevant roles. These emotions include feeling hurt or shocked or disappointed about what the offending agent has done, and sadness or sorrow and concern for him, and taking on the stance of moral protest against him. Personal relationships might presuppose free will due to being structured by moral obligations, and, by way of the ‘ought implies can principle,’ moral obligations presupposing the ability to refrain from wrongdoing. Two responses are offered, one compatibilist about the relevant ability to do otherwise, and the other invoking a sense of ‘ought’ that does not imply ‘can’ in the threatening sense.

Nature, value, and normativity: An introduction

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-114
Author(s):  
Gabriele De Anna ◽  
Mario De Caro
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Naturalistic Fallacy ◽  
Hard Time

This brief introduction expounds the reasons behind the collection of essays entitled ‘Nature, Value and Normativity’. Political and social philosophers have usually a hard time finding a role for considerations about nature (and human nature in particular) in their accounts of normativity, due to the risk of committing the naturalistic fallacy and/or running against people’s autonomy. Scepticism about appeals to nature in normative accounts of politics and society, however, seems bound to clash with the fact that nature constrains human action. The essays of the collection tackle some specific questions about the role of nature in accounts of value and normativity: the fact–value distinction, the relevance of emotions for normativity and values, the role of intersubjectivity in normative theory, as well as free will and action.

Language in mental retardation: Individual and syndromic differences, and neurogenetic variation 1Based on a keynote presentation at the Third European Conference on Psychological Theory and Research in Mental Retardation, Geneva, September 1st, 2000.

2001 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 161-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean A. Rondal
Keyword(s):  
Mental Retardation ◽  
Language Development ◽  
Oral Language ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Genetic Syndromes ◽  
Explanatory Variables ◽  
Keynote Presentation ◽  
Genetic Origins ◽  
The Sixties ◽  
The Individual

Predominantly non-etiological conceptions have dominated the field of mental retardation (MR) since the discovery of the genetic etiology of Down syndrome (DS) in the sixties. However, contemporary approaches are becoming more etiologically oriented. Important differences across MR syndromes of genetic origin are being documented, particularly in the cognition and language domains, differences not explicable in terms of psychometric level, motivation, or other dimensions. This paper highlights the major difficulties observed in the oral language development of individuals with genetic syndromes of mental retardation. The extent of inter- and within-syndrome variability are evaluated. Possible brain underpinnings of the behavioural differences are envisaged. Cases of atypically favourable language development in MR individuals are also summarized and explanatory variables discussed. It is suggested that differences in brain architectures, originating in neurological development and having genetic origins, may largely explain the syndromic as well as the individual within-syndrome variability documented. Lastly, the major implications of the above points for current debates about modularity and developmental connectionism are spelt out.

Smokers’ (Dis)satisfaction, Persuasive Constraint, and Influence of Expert and Non-Expert Sources

2006 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan M. Falomir-Pichastor ◽  
Gabriel Mugny ◽  
Federica Invernizzi
Keyword(s):  
Intention To Quit ◽  
Motivation To Change ◽  
Internal Motivation ◽  
Quit Smoking ◽  
External Constraint ◽  
Source Study ◽  
Expert Sources

The present research tested the hypothesis that an internal motivation to change is elaborated as an external constraint and is less predictive of change when the source is expert than when it is non-expert. In two studies, smokers were categorized as either dissatisfied or moderately satisfied according to their degree of dissatisfaction with their image as smokers (i.e., internal motivation to change). They were then exposed to an antismoking argument attributed either to an expert or to a non-expert source. Compared to moderately satisfied smokers, dissatisfied smokers perceived the source as making less effort to convince them (Study 1, N = 43), and as being less disrespectful (Study 2, N = 81), but this pattern was significant only for the non-expert source. Study 2 also showed that experts had more influence on intention to quit smoking among moderately satisfied smokers, whereas non-experts had more influence among dissatisfied smokers.

Can a Theory of Suicide Predict All “Suicides” in the Elderly?

Crisis ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antoon A. Leenaars
Keyword(s):  
Sigmund Freud ◽  
Terminally Ill ◽  
Later Life ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
The Elderly ◽  
Theory Building ◽  
Personality Factors ◽  
Comprehensive Model ◽  
Suicide Notes ◽  
Psychiatric Study

Summary: Older adults consistently have the highest rates of suicide in most societies. Despite the paucity of studies until recently, research has shown that suicides in later life are best understood as a multidimensional event. An especially neglected area of research is the psychological/psychiatric study of personality factors in the event. This paper outlines one comprehensive model of suicide and then raises the question: Is such a psychiatric/psychological theory applicable to all suicides in the elderly? To address the question, I discuss the case of Sigmund Freud; raise the topic of suicide and/or dignified death in the terminally ill; and examine suicide notes of the both terminally ill and nonterminally ill elderly. I conclude that, indeed, greater study and theory building are needed into the “suicides” of the elderly, including those who are terminally ill.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document