scholarly journals Hume’s and Kant’s understanding of epistemic normativity

2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 91-112
Author(s):  
Petar Nurkic
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Empirical Approach ◽  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Doxastic Voluntarism ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
General Rules ◽  
As If

Question (d) how do we form beliefs?, implies descriptive answers. On the other hand, the question (n) how should we form beliefs?, implies normative answers. Can we provide answers to (n) questions without answering (d) questions? This (n) - (d) relation can be characterized as epistemic normativity. Hume and Kant provide answers to both questions. Hume is more inclined to psychologize these answers through an empirical approach to questions related to beliefs. While Kant is more inclined to consider a priori conditions of our reasoning. Through general rules and epistemic maxims, Hume and Kant provide normative guidelines in accordance which we should form beliefs. However, in order to be able to talk about normativity, at all, we need to answer questions related to doxastic voluntarism. For Kant, the question of freedom is, to some extent, an obvious precondition for his critiques (especially of the practical mind). While with Hume, precisely because of his empirical approach to beliefs and desires, the matter is more obscure, and it seems as if Hume advocates doxastic involuntarism. In this paper, I will try to present the similarities between Hume and Kant in terms of epistemic normativity. Where it seems as if their views are incompatible, I will try to examine why this is the case. I will focus on Hume?s Treatise of Human Nature and Kant?s Second Analogy. In the end, I will present a couple of thought experiments and try to ?test? Hume and Kant. If I manage to confirm the initial hypotheses, then this paper will be a successful epistemic endeavor. However, if I fail to find the expected similarities between Hume?s and Kant?s understanding of epistemic normativity, then this work can be characterized as a historical approach to the normative framework of ?dogmatic slumber?.

WAR OR PEACE?: A DYNAMICAL ANALYSIS OF ANARCHY

2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER VANDERSCHRAAF
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Analysis ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Dynamical Analysis ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Different Types

I propose a dynamical analysis of interaction in anarchy, and argue that this kind of dynamical analysis is a more promising route to predicting the outcome of anarchy than the more traditional a priori analyses of anarchy in the literature. I criticize previous a priori analyses of anarchy on the grounds that these analyses assume that the individuals in anarchy share a unique set of preferences over the possible outcomes of war, peace, exploiting others and suffering exploitation. Following Hobbes' classic analysis of anarchy, I maintain that typically in anarchy some moderate individuals will most desire mutual cooperation while other dominators will most desire to exploit others' cooperation. I argue that once one allows for different types of individuals in anarchy, any a priori analysis of anarchy requires unrealistic assumptions regarding the agents' common knowledge of their situation. However, this move also suggests a dynamical analysis of anarchy, one that assumes no common knowledge. In the Variable Anticipation threshold model developed here, individuals modify their behavior as they learn from repeated interactions. I present specific instances of this model where the individuals in anarchy converge to different equilibria corresponding to either peace or war, depending on the initial conditions. I show that individuals are liable to converge to Hobbes' war of all against all even if only a small percentage of are dominators. The presence of only a few “nasty” individuals gradually drives all, including those inclined to be “nicer”, to imitate the “nasty” conduct of these few. This dynamic analysis suggests that the Hobbesian war in anarchy is indeed inevitable in most realistic circumstances.You have the same propension, that I have, in favor of what is contiguous above what is remote. You are, therefore, naturally carry'd to commit acts of injustice as well as I. Your example both pushes me forward in this way by imitation, and also affords me a new reason for any breach of equity, by showing me, that I shou'd be the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou'd impose on myself a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness of others. (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature)

Ptolemy Bk. VII, Ch. 1, S. 83: Some Names and Some Comments

1947 ◽  
Vol 79 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 184-187
Author(s):  
J. A. B. Palmer
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Third ◽  
Critical Text ◽  
Final Syllable ◽  
As If

M. Louis Renou, in his critical text of Ptolemy Bk. VII (Paris: Champion, 1925), gives the first name in ch. 1, s. 83, as Nαγαγοúρα (Nagagoura), with -γ-(-g-) as the third consonant. This is the reading of the MS. Vatic. 191 (X), which M. Renou and other authorities find superior to its competitors. The majority of the other MSS. utilized by M. Renou give the name as Nαϒαρονραρίςc (Nagarouraris), with -ρ- (-τ-) as the third consonant and an added final syllable which looks as if it had crept in from the margin or was some other kind of a corruption: this reading was followed by earlier editions such as that of Nobbe. The choice between -g- and -r- as the third consonant is thus a choice between “the best and the rest”, always embarrassing for a critical editor. One is, in such a case, fully entitled to prefer “the best”, as M. Renou has done. Moreover, it is only fair to mention two extraneous considerations, which could be argued as supporting -g-. First, there is another case where X reads -g- and the rest read -r-, and X is unquestionably right: this is in ch. 1, s. 50, Ȇragassa X, Ȇrarassa al., modern Eraj, ancient Erakaccha. Secondly, the termination -goura might claim some a priori probability if one considers the article by Przyluski in Bull. Soc. Ling., xxvii, p. 218 (not xx as wrongly given in footnote in JRAS., 1929, p. 273); but this point has very little weight, for as Przyluski shows and anyone can quickly see, the consonant which precedes the terminatio -oura in Ptolemy is very variable.

David Hume

1986 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 91-91
Author(s):  
Edward Craig
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Natural Religion ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
History Of ◽  
Psychological Mechanism ◽  
British Embassy ◽  
As If

David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.

scholarly journals Conservation science – a creative tension

Oryx ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 226-228
Author(s):  
Gary K. Meffe
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
A Priori ◽  
The Other ◽  
Conservation Science ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Creative Tension ◽  
Objective Value ◽  
Free Search

Conservation science is born of an inherent conflict. On one hand it is based in science, an objective, value-free search for truth that leads to general laws, with no a priori desire for particular outcomes. On the other hand it is clearly driven by value–laden goals related to making the human–nature relationship an enduring one. In contrast to an objective science, particular outcomes – such as preservation of biodiversity and protection or restoration of functioning ecosystems – are clearly pursued in conservation. The result is a sometimes uncomfortable merging of two human endeavours – one objective and one value-laden – that are inherently antagonistic and can result in tension. To make this tension creative, rather than destructive, we need to understand how both components are necessary and synergistic in forming a complete conservation science.

scholarly journals A Source for Freire’s Philosophy of Human Nature and its Educational Implications

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 19-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred Harris
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
A Priori ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The World ◽  
Educational Implications ◽  
Pedagogy Of The Oppressed ◽  
Definition Of

A major source for Freire’s focus on culture in his codifications and, by implication, his pedagogy of the oppressed, has been neglected in the literature: Erich Kahler’s work (1943). Kahler’s definition of human beings, as beings of discernment and transcendence in contradistinction to animals, forms the backbone of Freire’s own views on human nature. In particular, Freire’s distinction of being in the world and being with the world as conditions for being a subject of education is derived from Kahler’s work. Theoretically, Freire transforms Kahler’s separation of humans from non-human animals into a dialectical unity of discernment and transcendence in which each mediates the other, and pedagogically Freire embodies such a unity in the codifications on culture. The separation of humans from non-human animals also grounds Freire’s insistence that the curriculum must be formulated on site rather than formulated a priori.

David Hume

1986 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 91-91
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Natural Religion ◽  
Treatise Of Human Nature ◽  
Human Understanding ◽  
History Of ◽  
Psychological Mechanism ◽  
British Embassy ◽  
As If

David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.

From Container to Claustrum: Projective Identification in Couples

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamara Feldman
Keyword(s):  
Psychological Health ◽  
Projective Identification ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intimate Partners ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
As If

This paper is a contribution to the growing literature on the role of projective identification in understanding couples' dynamics. Projective identification as a defence is well suited to couples, as intimate partners provide an ideal location to deposit unwanted parts of the self. This paper illustrates how projective identification functions differently depending on the psychological health of the couple. It elucidates how healthier couples use projective identification more as a form of communication, whereas disturbed couples are inclined to employ it to invade and control the other, as captured by Meltzer's concept of "intrusive identification". These different uses of projective identification affect couples' capacities to provide what Bion called "containment". In disturbed couples, partners serve as what Meltzer termed "claustrums" whereby projections are not contained, but imprisoned or entombed in the other. Applying the concept of claustrum helps illuminate common feelings these couples express, such as feeling suffocated, stifled, trapped, held hostage, or feeling as if the relationship is killing them. Finally, this paper presents treatment challenges in working with more disturbed couples.

Thomas More's “rule” of pleasure before, after, and inUtopia

Moreana ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (Number 207) (1) ◽  
pp. 36-56
Author(s):  
Gerard Wegemer
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
The Other ◽  
Biblical Allusions ◽  
De Officiis

After establishing a context of More's lifelong engagement with the “calculus” of pleasure, this essay shows how the section devoted to the Utopians' pleasure philosophy is structured around five formulations of a “rule” to calculate “true and honest [honesta]” pleasure in ways that playfully imitate and echo the “rule” Cicero formulates several times in De officiis to discern one's duty when there seems to be a conflict between honestas et utilitas. When followed, the Utopian pleasure calculus shows the necessary role of societas, officii, iustitia, caritas, and the other aspects of human nature, most importantly friendship, that Cicero stresses in his rule and that he argued Epicurus ignored. Much of the irony and humor of this section depends on seeing the predominance of Ciceronian vocabulary in Raphael's unusual defense [patrocinium] of pleasure, rather than a Ciceronian defense of duty rooted in honestas. Throughout, however, this essay also shows how More goes beyond Cicero by including Augustinian and biblical allusions to suggest ways that our final end is not as Epicurus or the Stoics or Cicero claim; the language and allusions of this section point to a level of good cheer and care for neighbors and for God in ways quite different from any classical thinker.

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