scholarly journals Pure first-person experience and the unfolding argument: Neo-Cartesian reasoning as a foundation for IIT and other causal structure theories ends up in dissociative epiphenomenalism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael H. Herzog ◽  
Aaron Schurger ◽  
Adrien Doerig
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Causal Power ◽  
Causal Structure ◽  
First Person ◽  
Main Question ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
First Person Experience

We recently put forward an argument, the Unfolding Argument (UA), that integrated information theory (IIT) and other causal structure theories are either already falsified or unfalsifiable, which provoked significant criticism. It seems that we and the critics agree that the main question in this debate is whether pure first-person experience, independent of third-person measurements, is a sufficient foundation for theories of consciousness. Here, we show, first, that the use of pure first-person experience relies on non-scientific, neo-Cartesian reasoning. Second, even if this reasoning is accepted, it leads to consciousness being entirely epiphenomenal, with absolutely no causal power. Third, consciousness would be fully detached from the content of reports about subjective experience. A human may report to perceive X but their content of consciousness is Y. Hence, IIT and other causal structure theories end up in a form of dissociative epiphenomenalism, invalidating pure first-person experience as a viable foundation.

scholarly journals MIND-BODY INTEGRATION IN DANCE MOVEMENT THERAPY

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongju Li ◽  
◽  
Xindi Cao ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Movement Therapy ◽  
First Person ◽  
Dance Movement Therapy ◽  
Dance Movement ◽  
The Third ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The Third Person ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
First Person Experience

"Mind-body integration is a key element for a successful dance movement therapy (DMT). As the connection between mind and body is reconnected, the clients can not only express but also improve their mental state through body movement. The integration of mind and body can be viewed from to aspects, namely the first-person experience and the third-person phenomenon, both of which play a crucial role in the therapeutic process of DMT. The first-person experience transcends the mind’s neurobiological phenomenon, which is relatively more important for the clients, while the third-person observation is based on the body’s reflection of mind, often adopted by the therapists. The relationship between mind and body can be validated by the mirror neuron theory, which is one of the theoretical proofs and inspirations of DMT. Unlike the notion of mind-body differentiation in western classical philosophy, ancient Chinese thoughts had not separated them. The Chinese character “shen” is considered as the whole of flesh and soul. The abundant Chinese thoughts concerning mind-body theory can be considered as a suitable route of the exploration of mind-body integration."

scholarly journals Brain mechanisms underlying the subjective experience of remembering

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Simons ◽  
Maureen Ritchey ◽  
Charles Fernyhough
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Functional Neuroimaging ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
Significant Part ◽  
First Person ◽  
Perceptual Features ◽  
Psychiatric Conditions ◽  
Healthy Participants ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
First Person Experience

The ability to remember events in vivid, multisensory detail is a significant part of human experience, allowing us to relive previous encounters and providing us with the store of memories that shape our identity. Recent research has sought to understand the subjective experience of remembering: what it feels like to have a memory. Such remembering involves reactivating sensory-perceptual features of an event, and the thoughts and feelings we had when the event occurred, integrating them into a conscious first-person experience. It allows us to reflect on the content of our memories, and to understand and make judgments about them, such as distinguishing events that actually occurred from those we might have imagined or been told about. In this review, we consider recent evidence from functional neuroimaging in healthy participants and studies of neurological and psychiatric conditions, which is shedding new light on how we subjectively experience remembering.

The Logic of Ambiguity

Janus Head ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-29
Author(s):  
Elizabeth McManaman Tyler ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Lived Experience ◽  
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ◽  
Traumatic Stress ◽  
Stress Disorder ◽  
First Person ◽  
Post Traumatic Stress ◽  
Post Traumatic ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
First Person Experience

While recent work on trauma provides insight into the first-person experience of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Aristotelian propositional logic, which underlies Western paradigms of thought, contains implicit ontological assumptions about identity and time which obscure the lived experience of PTSD. Conversely, Indian Buddhist catuskoti logic calls into question dualistic and discursive forms of thought. This paper argues that catuskoti logic, informed by Buddhist ontology, is a more fitting logical framework when seeking to describe and understand the first-person experience of PTSD, as it allows for ambiguity, non-duality, and polysemy.

scholarly journals La vida y la revelación: los caminos insondables de Michel Henry

2021 ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Carlos Belvedere
Keyword(s):  
First Person ◽  
Late Work ◽  
Michel Henry ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
First Person Experience

Me propongo delinear las nociones de vida y revelación tal como son descritas en la obra temprana y en la obra tardía de Michel Henry. Además, cotejaré estas descripciones con la piedra de toque de la fenomenología, a saber, la experiencia en primera persona. A partir de ella levantaré una objeción material: que la vida no se revele en mí como una fenomenalidad pura distinguida del fenómeno propia-mente dicho pone en jaque el carácter absoluto de la manifestación pues hay al menos un caso en que no se cumple. Luego mostraré que, en sus últimos años, Henry da cuenta de este tipo de experiencia a partir de las figuras del mal. Argumentaré, por último, que aunque tiene el mérito de dar cuenta de una heterogeneidad posible de la experiencia, la respuesta ofrecida allí resulta insuficiente para retirar la objeción planteada inicialmente.My aim is to delineate the notions of life and revelation as they are described in the early work and in the late work of Michel Henry. In addition, I will compare these descriptions with the touchstone of phenomenology, namely, the first-person experience. Based on it I will raise a material objection: that life does not reveal itself in me as a pure phenomenality distinguished from the phenomenon itself calls into question the absolute character of manifestation because there is at least one case in which it is not fulfilled. Then I will show that, in his latest years, Henry accounts for this type of experience as a figure of evil. Finally, I will argue that, although it has the merit of accounting for a possible heterogeneity of the experience, the answer offered there is insufficient to withdraw the objection raised initially.

Qualia, Robots and Complementarity of Subject and Object

1998 ◽  
pp. 54-62
Author(s):  
Piotr Boltuc
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
First Person ◽  
German Philosophy ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Black And White ◽  
Complementary Approach ◽  
Subject And Object ◽  
First Time ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
First Person Experience

Jackson claims that a person who sees colors for the first time by this very fact acquires a certain knowledge which she or he could not have learned in a black and white world. This argument can be generalized to other secondary qualities. I argue that this claim is indefensible without implicit recourse to the first-person experience; also Nagel’s "what it is like" argument is polemically weak. Hence, we have no argument able to dismiss physicalism by consideration of first-person qualia (contra Jackson); however, it does not force us to endorse qualia-reductionism. In the second part of my paper I defend non-reductionism in a different way. Following Nagel and Harman, I try to avoid criticisms usually presented against Nagel, seeing subjectivity and objectivity as two complementary structures of the subjective and objective element of our language. I refer to classical German philosophy, phenomenology and Marxist dialectics which have developed a complementary approach crucial in the reductionist/anti-reductionist controversy in the philosophy of mind.

scholarly journals Integrated Information Theory and Isomorphic Feed-Forward Philosophical Zombies

Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (11) ◽  
pp. 1073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jake R. Hanson ◽  
Sara I. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Original System ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Mathematical Framework ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Labeling Scheme ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

Any theory amenable to scientific inquiry must have testable consequences. This minimal criterion is uniquely challenging for the study of consciousness, as we do not know if it is possible to confirm via observation from the outside whether or not a physical system knows what it feels like to have an inside—a challenge referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness. To arrive at a theory of consciousness, the hard problem has motivated development of phenomenological approaches that adopt assumptions of what properties consciousness has based on first-hand experience and, from these, derive the physical processes that give rise to these properties. A leading theory adopting this approach is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which assumes our subjective experience is a “unified whole”, subsequently yielding a requirement for physical feedback as a necessary condition for consciousness. Here, we develop a mathematical framework to assess the validity of this assumption by testing it in the context of isomorphic physical systems with and without feedback. The isomorphism allows us to isolate changes in Φ without affecting the size or functionality of the original system. Indeed, the only mathematical difference between a “conscious” system with Φ > 0 and an isomorphic “philosophical zombie” with Φ = 0 is a permutation of the binary labels used to internally represent functional states. This implies Φ is sensitive to functionally arbitrary aspects of a particular labeling scheme, with no clear justification in terms of phenomenological differences. In light of this, we argue any quantitative theory of consciousness, including IIT, should be invariant under isomorphisms if it is to avoid the existence of isomorphic philosophical zombies and the epistemological problems they pose.

On the Limits of the Method of Phenomenal Contrast

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTINA FÜRST
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
First Person ◽  
Cognitive Phenomenology ◽  
The Face ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
First Person Experience

ABSTRACT:The method of phenomenal contrast aims to shed light on the phenomenal character of perceptual and cognitive experiences. Within the debate aboutcognitive phenomenology, phenomenal contrast arguments can be divided into two kinds. First, arguments based on actual cases that aim to provide the reader with a first-person experience of phenomenal contrast. Second, arguments that involve hypothetical cases and focus on the conceivability of contrast scenarios. Notably, in the light of these contrast cases, proponents and skeptics of cognitive phenomenology remain steadfast in their views. I provide an explanation of the method's dialectical ineffectiveness by focusing on first-person performances of phenomenal contrast tasks. In particular, I argue that introspective judgments about phenomenology are regimented by the view initially held. Understanding the underlying mechanisms responsible for the dialectical standoff in the face of phenomenal contrast cases casts light on introspection-based arguments for phenomenology in general.

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