Trends in the Economic Development of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979)

The relevance of the study is conditioned by the need to examine individual historical stages of Cambodia's economic development to establish the basis for further improvement of the economic system. The purpose of the research was to analyse analytically the development of the economy of Democratic Kampuchea and the role of friendly countries in it. The study on the stated subject was conducted using general scientific theoretical research methods, in particular, methods of analysis, synthesis, and comparison. The article examines the economy of Democratic Kampuchea in the middle of the second half of the 70s. It is determined that after gaining full independence from the French colonialists, followed by the struggle for independence against the Americans, and then the Khmer Rouge era, there was a need to restore and improve the country's economy. The study described the general state of the key industries of Democratic Kampuchea, in particular, light, food, agricultural engineering, heavy, electronic, construction, forestry, chemical, rubber, and military; the principles of conducting trade relations with the countries of the socialist and capitalist camps, and the development features of agriculture under the rule of the Khmer Rouge. The results of the analysis showed that during this period the republic managed to restore agriculture and ensure its subsequent growth, and the updated industry was already fully functioning with the help of the friend countries. The practical value of the study is determined by the integral characteristic of the economic system of Democratic Kampuchea, which contributes to the functional solution of the economic problems of modern Cambodia

Agrarian Marxism, Animal Geographies, and non-human labor in Democratic Kampuchea

Between 1975 and 1979, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) embarked on a genocidal program of sweeping economic, social, and political change. In an effort to modernize Democratic Kampuchea, as Cambodia was renamed, CPK officials forced the entire populace to clear forests; build dams, canals, and reservoirs; and grow rice in an effort to accumulate rapidly the necessary capital for industrialization. In doing so, upwards of two million people died from disease, hunger and malnutrition, torture, and execution. The broad coordinates of the genocide are well-established. To date, however, no scholarship has examined critically the role of non-human animals in the agricultural transformations initiated during the Cambodian genocide. Drawing on two bodies of scholarship, Agrarian Marxism and Animal Geographies, in this paper we examine the role of draught animals in the regime’s plans to build an economy around agricultural expansion and rice production for export. Specifically, we trace the new productive relationships into which Cambodia’s water buffalo and oxen became enmeshed, and the structures of violence within which these animals played an essential part. We find not only that the work of draught animals materially contributed to the CPK’s plans for state-building, but in the process, the new state–animal relationship became an exemplar of the idealized relationship between the CPK and its human laborers. We conclude that the human–animal relationship provides key insights into the mass violence that transpired in Democratic Kampuchea under the Khmer Rouge and to this end encourage future engagement with interspecies relationships in the Cambodian context and in genocide studies more broadly.

Vietnam's Military and Political Challenges in Cambodia and the Early Rise of Cambodia's Strongman, Hun Sen, 1977–79

Much has been written about Cambodia's strongman, Prime Minister Hun Sen, who has been in power since 1985. Yet, the history of Hun Sen's early rise to a position of power in the Vietnam-initiated Cambodian revolution after June 1977 remains murky. Relying on Vietnamese and Cambodian archival documents, memoirs and interviews with former veterans of Unit 125 as well as Hun Sen's speeches and personal recollection of his historic journey to Vietnam on 20 June 1977, we make a two-fold argument. First, Hanoi's decision to establish an anti-Pol Pot Cambodian revolution in southern Vietnam to take over Cambodia—after toppling Democratic Kampuchea—was part of Hanoi's strategic plan to handle a double challenge: (1) to avoid being branded as an invader and (2) to establish a capable and friendly regime in Cambodia after the war. This provided an opportunity for a young Khmer Rouge defector, Hun Sen, to change his fortune by quickly earning the Vietnamese military leadership's trust and confidence based on his competence to organize and command the first army unit of the new Cambodian revolution, i.e. Unit 125. Second, as lucky as he was to flee across the heavily militarized border into Vietnam unharmed, Hun Sen's early rise to power is attributed to his survivalist instinct combined with shrewd strategic thinking.

Brothers at War

In January 1979, Vietnamese troops triumphantly entered Phnom Penh, the capital of Democratic Kampuchea ruled by the Khmer Rouge. The images they produced to justify their military offensive dwelled on the horror of the atrocities committed by the overthrown Pol Pot regime in the former torture center code-named S-21. In the framework of a split within the communist Bloc between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, this article discusses three strategies put forward by the Vietnamese propaganda machinery in which the visual imagery of the former prison played a crucial role: an intense documentary production, the atrocity-themed museum constructed on the site of S-21, and the trial for genocide held in absentia against Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. These visual strategies aimed to deprive the Khmer Rouge of their communist status by associating them with Nazis and their crimes.

Position of some Southeast Asia Countries to the Afghan Armed Conflict of 1979-1989

The article analyzed the official position of some states of Southeast Asia to the «Afghan war» 1979–1989. In the first part the author examines the position of Thailand and Democratic Kampuchea, in the second part – the position of Vietnam, Laos and the People's Republic of Kampuchea. The main conclusion is the example of the position of the Southeast Asia countries to the Afghan conflict, the contradictions of the Cold War were especially pronounced, since the countries of the region were clearly divided in relation to this issue depending on bilateral relations with the USSR and the political orientation of each state.

Pod rękę z Pol Potem. Komunistyczna Partia Robotników wobec Czerwonych Khmerów 1975–1981

The aim of this article is to examine relations between the Norwegian Workers’ Communist Party and Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea between 1975 and 1981. The Norwegian Maoist movement held a deeply positive view of the Khmer Rouge regime, which resulted in its sending a delegation to Phnom Penh in September 1978. In the article I will analyze how they interpreted the regime, focusing on delegates’ memoirs and debates after the fall of the Khmer Rouge government.