scholarly journals ENHANCING EUROPEAN SECURITY: MODERN CHALLENGES POSED BY NUCLEAR WEAPONS

2021 ◽  
pp. 89-106
Author(s):  
T. Patussi ◽  
M. Kurando
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
European Security ◽  
Free Zone ◽  
Legal Structure ◽  
Nuclear Arms Race ◽  
The Times ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Nuclear Arms

The proposal of Europeanising French deterrence was revived by French President Emmanuel Macron, who declared in February 2020 that French nuclear forces reinforce European security simply by existing and suggested a strategic dialogue with all EU partners regarding the role of French nuclear weapons in European security. Macron further reasoned that this issue is increasingly urgent nowadays as the EU must jointly realise that, because of the lack of a legal structure, they may easily find themselves vulnerable to the resumption of a traditional, even nuclear, arms race on their land. The prospects of global control of weapons and disarmament efforts are very blurry in the times of rising political tensions, revived nuclear arms races, and weakening trust in multilateralism. Nevertheless, this all leads to the necessity to support active actions towards nuclear risk reductions, whichhave recently appeared in some of the multilateral forums. The elimination of nuclear risk is nothing but an intermediate measure to reduce nuclear proliferation dangers until they are liquidated. It is essential to review the risks of accidents involving nuclear weapons and their influence on European security, along with focusing on the role of European nuclear weapon states (NWS), their place in global security and possible scenarios for their future: the authors considered the possible prospects of the EU as another entity with nuclear weapons, as well as the likelihood of the EU as another regional nuclear-free zone and discussed whether the real change is possible.

The Role of Education in Preventing Nuclear War

1984 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 282-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Markusen ◽  
John Harris
Keyword(s):  
Citizen Participation ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Nazi Germany ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The Holocaust ◽  
Nuclear Arms Race ◽  
Nuclear Arms

Arguing that education should play a crucial role in reducing the threat of nuclear war, Eric Markusen and John B. Harris turn first to history. They examine the role of education in the Holocaust of Nazi Germany and draw a thought-provoking parallel to the role of education in the nuclear arms race. They then discuss aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons policymaking and factors of psychological resistance that have limited citizen participation in decisionmaking. Finally, they explore the potential of education to help prevent nuclear war and describe ways that educators are rising to that challenge.

New ''Cold War''

2020 ◽  
pp. 27-34
Author(s):  
Vladimir Batiuk
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Ideological Struggle ◽  
Nuclear Arms Race ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Nuclear Arms

In this article, the ''Cold War'' is understood as a situation where the relationship between the leading States is determined by ideological confrontation and, at the same time, the presence of nuclear weapons precludes the development of this confrontation into a large-scale armed conflict. Such a situation has developed in the years 1945–1989, during the first Cold War. We see that something similar is repeated in our time-with all the new nuances in the ideological struggle and in the nuclear arms race.

Regional nuclear arms control in Latin America

1975 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 415-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Redick
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Mexico City ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Energy ◽  
Control Mechanism ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
Free Zone ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control ◽  
Nuclear Arms

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was signed in 1967 and is now in force for eighteen Latin American nations (the important exceptions being Argentina and Brazil). Under the terms of the treaty the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) was established in 1969. With headquarters in Mexico City, OPANAL is a sophisticated control mechanism composed of three principal organs: a General Conference, Council and Secretariat. This article examines the effort to establish regional nuclear weapons free zone in Latin America and analyzes the ability of the Tlatelolco Treaty to provide the legal and political framework for containment of the growing military potential of Latin American nuclear energy programs. Particular attention is given to the positions of key Latin American nations within the region, nuclear weapons states, and those nations retaining territorial interest within the nuclear weapons free zone. In addition several policy options are advanced which could facilitate the more complete implementation of regional nuclear arms control in Latin America.

Peace, Nonviolence, and Disarmament

2019 ◽  
pp. 47-73
Author(s):  
Sharon Erickson Nepstad
Keyword(s):  
Vietnam War ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Just War ◽  
Arms Race ◽  
Catholic Worker ◽  
Early Christian ◽  
Just War Doctrine ◽  
Nuclear Arms Race ◽  
Plowshares Movement ◽  
Nuclear Arms

This chapter explores the pacifism of the early Christian church and how the conversion of Constantine in the fourth century led to the development of the just war doctrine. At the conclusion of World War II, the advent of the nuclear arms race rendered some aspects of the just war doctrine obsolete. Pope John XXIII addressed these concerns in his encyclical Pacem in Terris, released in 1963. Numerous Catholic peace groups thought that the Vatican did not take a strong enough stance on war, militarism, and nuclear weapons. The Catholic Worker movement called for a return to pacifism and introduced the techniques of nonviolent noncooperation with civil defense drills in the 1950s. The chapter covers other Catholic peace movements and organizations, including Pax Christi, the Catholic Left that opposed the Vietnam War through draft card burnings and draft board raids, and the Plowshares movement, whose members damaged nuclear weapons to obstruct the nuclear arms race. Eventually, the US Catholic Bishops released the pastoral letter The Challenge of Peace, which condemned nuclear weapons and called for disarmament.

scholarly journals European strategic autonomy: Energy at the heart of European security?

European View ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-244
Author(s):  
Eloïse Ryon
Keyword(s):  
Economic Consequences ◽  
European Security ◽  
Political Concept ◽  
Energy Union ◽  
Practical Development ◽  
Nord Stream ◽  
Strategic Autonomy ◽  
Radical Transformation ◽  
The Eu

Since Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a radical transformation of the meaning, use and role of the concept of strategic autonomy within the European project. Whereas its application was originally restricted to defence matters, it is now explicitly mentioned in other sectors, including pharmaceuticals. The COVID-19 pandemic and its political, social and economic consequences have considerably boosted the trend to broaden the concept’s sphere of application. Strategic autonomy has found new life as a key political concept that will help shape the future of the EU. But does the concept really apply to all sectors? To what extent is European strategic autonomy behind the development of the Energy Union? The article attempts to provide an answer to these questions through an analysis of the theoretical and practical development of the concept, focusing particularly on the debate around Nord Stream 2.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

1988 ◽  
Vol 44 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 253-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ramesh Thakur
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
South Pacific ◽  
Control Measures ◽  
West Germany ◽  
The South ◽  
Nuclear Facilities ◽  
Free Zone ◽  
Nuclear Arms Race

The pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation has been a major international concern of our times. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is of great historical significance for having created the world's first nuclear-free zone (NFZ). Article 5 of the Treaty prohibits any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste in the Antarctica. The Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 established the first internationally recognised Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in a populated region of the world, namely Latin America. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 was an attempt to bring in a global regime to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). States in the latter category can adhere to the NPT while accepting a stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories, as long as they do not exercise jurisdiction and control over the weapons. West Germany is an obvious example of such a country. A NWFZ, however, prohibits such stationing of nuclear weapons. The three essential characteristics of a NWFZ are non-possession, non-deployment and non-use of nuclear weapons. NWFZs can help to strengthen and promote non-proliferation by providing a means of extending and reinforcing the NPT. In fact Article 7 of the latter accepts that, “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” The article merely acknowledged that one such treaty had been negotiated more or less simultaneously with the NPT. The second NFWZ in an inhabited region was not to be established for another eighteen years. At the Sixteenth South Pacific Forum meeting held in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, Forum countries adopted the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty on 6 August 1985 (Hiroshima Day). The Preamble to the treaty expresses the commitment to world peace, a grave concern at the continuing nuclear arms race, the conviction that every country bears an obligation to strive for the elimination of nuclear weapons, a belief in the efficacy of regional arms control measures, and a reaffirmation of the NPT for halting nucleor proliferation. The core NFZ obligations are contained in Articles 3–7. Each party agrees not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control—or seek to do so—over any nuclear device; not to assist or encourage others to make or acquire nuclear weapons; to prevent the stationing or testing of nuclear weapons on its territory; not to dump radioactive wastes at sea anywhere in the zone, and to prevent such dumping by others in its territorial sea. Discussions at the United Nations had, by the mid-1970s, identified nine major principles as the guiding elements of a NWFZ: (1) the initiative should come from the countries of the region; (2) the specific provisions of the NWFZ treaty should be negotiated between the regional member states in the form of a multilateral treaty establishing the zone in perpetuity; (5) while adherence to the treaty should be voluntary, the NWFZ must nevertheless embrace all militarily significant states in the region: (4) existing treaty relationships within the zone should not be disturbed; (5) there should be an effective verification system: (6) peaceful nuclear development should be allowed; (7) the zone should hare clearly defined and recognised boundaries; (8) in defining the territory of the zone, members must respect international law, including freedom of the seas and straits used for international navigation and of international airspace; and (9) the NWFZ should have the support of the nuclear-weapon states. Thus the NWFZ concept in established United Nations vocabulary does not prohibit the temporary presence of nuclear vessels during transit or on port calls, and it does not necessarily preclude the acquisition of sensitive nuclear facilities and materials tantamount to having a nuclear-weapon capability or producing untested nuclear bomb components. Nevertheless, it will be useful to follow the UN criteria in order to examine the nature and implications of the South Pacific zone.

Nuclear Arms Control in US Foreign Policy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Hunt
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Arms Control ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nuclear Forces ◽  
Protest Movements ◽  
New States ◽  
Nuclear Arms Control ◽  
Nuclear Arms

The development of military arms harnessing nuclear energy for mass destruction has inspired continual efforts to control them. Since 1945, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and South Africa acquired control over these powerful weapons, though Pretoria dismantled its small cache in 1989 and Russia inherited the Soviet arsenal in 1996. Throughout this period, Washington sought to limit its nuclear forces in tandem with those of Moscow, prevent new states from fielding them, discourage their military use, and even permit their eventual abolition. Scholars disagree about what explains the United States’ distinct approach to nuclear arms control. The history of U.S. nuclear policy treats intellectual theories and cultural attitudes alongside technical advances and strategic implications. The central debate is one of structure versus agency: whether the weapons’ sheer power, or historical actors’ attitudes toward that power, drove nuclear arms control. Among those who emphasize political responsibility, there are two further disagreements: (1) the relative influence of domestic protest, culture, and politics; and (2) whether U.S. nuclear arms control aimed first at securing the peace by regulating global nuclear forces or at bolstering American influence in the world. The intensity of nuclear arms control efforts tended to rise or fall with the likelihood of nuclear war. Harry Truman’s faith in the country’s monopoly on nuclear weapons caused him to sabotage early initiatives, while Dwight Eisenhower’s belief in nuclear deterrence led in a similar direction. Fears of a U.S.-Soviet thermonuclear exchange mounted in the late 1950s, stoked by atmospheric nuclear testing and widespread radioactive fallout, which stirred protest movements and diplomatic initiatives. The spread of nuclear weapons to new states motivated U.S. presidents (John Kennedy in the vanguard) to mount a concerted campaign against “proliferation,” climaxing with the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Richard Nixon was exceptional. His reasons for signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Moscow in 1972 were strategic: to buttress the country’s geopolitical position as U.S. armed forces withdrew from Southeast Asia. The rise of protest movements and Soviet economic difficulties after Ronald Reagan entered the Oval Office brought about two more landmark U.S.-Soviet accords—the 1987 Intermediate Ballistic Missile Treaty (INF) and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)—the first occasions on which the superpowers eliminated nuclear weapons through treaty. The country’s attention swung to proliferation after the Soviet collapse in December 1991, as failed states, regional disputes, and non-state actors grew more prominent. Although controversies over Iraq, North Korea, and Iran’s nuclear programs have since erupted, Washington and Moscow continued to reduce their arsenals and refine their nuclear doctrines even as President Barack Obama proclaimed his support for a nuclear-free world.

Bundeswehr Reform: Three Stages

2015 ◽  
pp. 86-94
Author(s):  
A. Sindeev
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
European Security ◽  
Military Cooperation ◽  
The Public ◽  
Dual Strategy ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
Three Stages ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Eu

The article examines the state of the Bundeswehr reform in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy. The emphasis is laid on the process of major decisions preparation, problems to be solved in the course of the reform, the state of the Bundeswehr, the role of a subjective facilitation, and on the approaches of three German Ministers of Defence. According to the article, the Bundeswehr is being transformed into an offensive army. It will be active outside Germany, and is gradually changing its essence as a parliamentary army. The reform was prepared gradually and imperceptibly to the public. In 2010, the Weise-Commission presented the reform proposals. The new Defence Minister De Maizière left these proposals unchanged. His merit was a good management of the reform. The scandal with the Euro Hawk forced him to resign. As the next Minister Von der Leyen was new to the Ministry of Defence, the reform of the Bundeswehr stopped. Germany will have to realize a dual strategy: а) to strengthen the military cooperation in the EU and NАТО; b) to maintain the own strength before the emergence of the EU security and defence structures and mechanisms.

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