Towards an Integrated Healthcare System: Evolutionary Game Analysis on Competition and Cooperation between Urban and Rural Medical Institutions in China

Background The game of interest is the root cause of the non-cooperative competition between urban and rural medical and health institutions. The study investigates competition and cooperation among urban and rural medical institutions using the evolutionary game analysis. Methods With the evolutionary game model, analysis of the stable evolutionary strategies between the urban and rural medical and health facilities is carried out. A numerical simulation is performed to demonstrate the influence of various values. Results The result shows that the cooperation mechanism between urban and rural medical Institutions is relevant to the efficiency of rural medical institutions, government supervision, reward, and punishment mechanism. Conclusions Suggestions for utilizing the government's macro regulation and control capabilities, resolving conflicts of interest between urban and rural medical and health institutions is recommended. In addition, the study again advocates mobilizing the internal power of medical institutions' cooperation to promote collaboration between urban and rural medical and health institutions.

How does the position of firms in the supply chain affect their performance? An empirical study

The relationship between a firm and its supply chain has been well studied, however, the association between the position of firms in complex supply chain networks and their performance has not been adequately investigated. This is primarily due to insufficient availability of empirical data on large-scale networks. To addresses this gap in the literature, we investigate the relationship between embeddedness patterns of individual firms in a supply network and their performance using empirical data from the automotive industry. In this study, we devise three measures that characterize the embeddedness of individual firms in a supply network. These are namely: centrality, tier position, and triads. Our findings caution us that centrality impacts individual performance through a diminishing returns relationship. The second measure, tier position, allows us to investigate the concept of tiers in supply networks because we find that as networks emerge, the boundaries between tiers become unclear. Performance of suppliers degrade as they move away from the focal firm (i.e., Toyota). The final measure, triads, investigates the effect of buying and selling to firms that supply the same customer, portraying the level of competition and cooperation in a supplier’s network. We find that increased coopetition (i.e., cooperative competition) is a performance enhancer, however, excessive complexity resulting from being involved in both upstream and downstream coopetition results in diminishing performance. These original insights help understand the drivers of firm performance from a network perspective and provide a basis for further research.

Business Ethics in Difficult Times: Takeaways from the Current Corona and Economic Crises

The COVID-19 pandemic poses serious global challenges. Not only are they influencing political and social decisions, they are also affecting economic ones, both within individual companies and with all market participants. We are currently threatened by an unprecedented recession, which calls for active invention in the economy and companies themselves. This paper examines normative aspects of business and corporate ethics and shows how they can be used to better counteract the current crisis and associated challenges. I show that cooperative competition and open information-sharing with competitors can be mutually beneficial. I likewise suggest the importance of qualitative innovations that are recognized by society and all whom they directly or indirectly affect. If both aspects are combined – cooperation and the recognition of innovation – extensive innovation clusters can be initiated that can actively counter the current economic crisis. Keywords: Cooperative competition, qualitative innovation, coronavirus, recession, business ethics, philosophy of economics, innovation cluster, basic goods

Research on the Multi-Objective Cooperative Competition Mechanism of Jinsha River Downstream Cascade Reservoirs during the Flood Season Based on Optimized NSGA-III

This paper analyzes the complex relationship among flood control, power generation and ecological maintenance for the four cascade reservoirs located on the lower reaches of the Jinsha River, China. A weighted flood control index is incorporated and a constraining method consisting of the combination of a constrained corridor and a penalty function is proposed. A comprehensive utilization model is established in this paper based on the objectives of flood prevention, power generation, and ecological maintenance of the downstream cascade reservoir group of the Jinsha River during flood season. In addition, based on the coalescent selection of reference points and vector angles, an optimized non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm (VA-NSGA-III) is proposed. The algorithm is applied to the constructed model to define the cooperative competition mechanisms among these three targets, resulting in a set of non-inferior scheduling schemes with more uniformity and better convergence acquired with VA-NSGA-III. The scheduling program shows that there is a non-linear competitive relationship between the power generation and ecological effects of the cascade reservoirs during flood season, and the competitiveness weakens as the power generation increases. Furthermore, when the flood control is at low risk, there exists a complex coupling relationship between competition and coordination of the flood control, power generation, and ecological maintenance. While the risk appears high, there is a competitive relationship between flood control and power generation, with flood control being in synergy with ecological maintenance.

The intellectual structure of coopetition: past, present and future

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the intellectual structure of coopetition through utilizing a citation and co-citation analysis of scholarly articles focusing on coopetition.Design/methodology/approachThe authors conducted bibliometric analyses of citation and co-citation analysis. The units of analysis were original research articles and research notes retrieved from journals indexed by well-known databases. Keywords used in the search were “co-opet, co-opet, coopetition, coopetition, simultaneous cooperation and competition, simultaneously cooperate and compete, coexistence of cooperation and competition, coexistence of cooperation and competition, cooperate and compete simultaneously, coopetitive relationships, coopetitive relationships, coopetitive networks, horizontal alliances, cooperate with competitors, cooperation with competitors, cooperative relationships with competitors, cooperative competition and competitive cooperation.” Regarding the time period for publication of the sample articles, the authors did not place any restrictions.FindingsThe research findings provide evidence that coopetition demonstrates multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary characteristics. Subfields of the coopetition field were identified based on the components of coopetition, which are relation, process and strategy. The component dealing with relationship management and innovation as strategy become prominent. Although coopetition literature has emerged as a relation view of strategy, it is still fragmented and diverse. Additionally, the robust subfields generated from the analysis were super-positioned with low degrees.Originality/valueThis is one of the few studies offering a critical review of coopetition research via quantitative research approach.

Analysis of Evolution Mechanism and Optimal Reward-Penalty Mechanism for Collection Strategies in Reverse Supply Chains: The Case of Waste Mobile Phones in China

The aim of this paper is to discuss the coopetition (cooperative competition) relationship between a manufacturer and a collector in the collection of waste mobile phones (WMPs) and examine the evolution mechanism and the internal reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) for their collection strategies. A coopetition evolutionary game model based on evolutionary game theory was developed to obtain their common and evolutional collection strategies. The pure-strategy Nash equilibriums of this model were obtained which showed their collection strategy choices of perfect competition or cooperation. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium was obtained which revealed evolution trends and laws. In addition, the optimal RPM was obtained in the sensitivity analysis of related parameters. The example of WMPs in China was taken to examine the simulation of the RPM. Results show that (i) although the manufacturer and the collector may change their strategies of cooperation and competition over time, cooperation is their best choice to increase payoffs; (ii) the optimal RPM is beneficial to propel their cooperation tendency and then to increase their payoffs.