scholarly journals Analysis of Evolution Mechanism and Optimal Reward-Penalty Mechanism for Collection Strategies in Reverse Supply Chains: The Case of Waste Mobile Phones in China

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4744 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yangke Ding ◽  
Lei Ma ◽  
Ye Zhang ◽  
Dingzhong Feng
Keyword(s):  
Mobile Phones ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Perfect Competition ◽  
Evolution Mechanism ◽  
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Reverse Supply Chains ◽  
Cooperative Competition ◽  
Optimal Reward ◽  
Collection Strategies

The aim of this paper is to discuss the coopetition (cooperative competition) relationship between a manufacturer and a collector in the collection of waste mobile phones (WMPs) and examine the evolution mechanism and the internal reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) for their collection strategies. A coopetition evolutionary game model based on evolutionary game theory was developed to obtain their common and evolutional collection strategies. The pure-strategy Nash equilibriums of this model were obtained which showed their collection strategy choices of perfect competition or cooperation. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium was obtained which revealed evolution trends and laws. In addition, the optimal RPM was obtained in the sensitivity analysis of related parameters. The example of WMPs in China was taken to examine the simulation of the RPM. Results show that (i) although the manufacturer and the collector may change their strategies of cooperation and competition over time, cooperation is their best choice to increase payoffs; (ii) the optimal RPM is beneficial to propel their cooperation tendency and then to increase their payoffs.

scholarly journals Towards an Integrated Healthcare System: Evolutionary Game Analysis on Competition and Cooperation between Urban and Rural Medical Institutions in China

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinglong Xu ◽  
Jiajie Liu ◽  
Sabina Ampon-Wireko ◽  
Henry Asante Antwi ◽  
Lulin Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Competition And Cooperation ◽  
Medical Institutions ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Health Institutions ◽  
Cooperative Competition ◽  
And Control

Abstract Background The game of interest is the root cause of the non-cooperative competition between urban and rural medical and health institutions. The study investigates competition and cooperation among urban and rural medical institutions using the evolutionary game analysis. Methods With the evolutionary game model, analysis of the stable evolutionary strategies between the urban and rural medical and health facilities is carried out. A numerical simulation is performed to demonstrate the influence of various values. Results The result shows that the cooperation mechanism between urban and rural medical Institutions is relevant to the efficiency of rural medical institutions, government supervision, reward, and punishment mechanism. Conclusions Suggestions for utilizing the government's macro regulation and control capabilities, resolving conflicts of interest between urban and rural medical and health institutions is recommended. In addition, the study again advocates mobilizing the internal power of medical institutions' cooperation to promote collaboration between urban and rural medical and health institutions.

scholarly journals Experience Weighted Learning in Multiagent Systems

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yi Zou ◽  
Jijuan Zhong ◽  
Zhihao Jiang ◽  
Hong Zhang ◽  
Xuyu Pu
Keyword(s):  
Reinforcement Learning ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Multiagent Systems ◽  
Parameter Optimization ◽  
Multiagent System ◽  
Learning Algorithm ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Fictitious Play ◽  
The Impact

Agents face challenges to achieve adaptability and stability when interacting with dynamic counterparts in a complex multiagent system (MAS). To strike a balance between these two goals, this paper proposes a learning algorithm for heterogeneous agents with bounded rationality. It integrates reinforcement learning as well as fictitious play to evaluate the historical information and adopt mechanisms in evolutionary game to adapt to uncertainty, which is referred to as experience weighted learning (EWL) in this paper. We have conducted multiagent simulations to test the performance of EWL in various games. The results demonstrate that the average payoff of EWL exceeds that of the baseline in all 4 games. In addition, we find that most of the EWL agents converge to pure strategy and become stable finally. Furthermore, we test the impact of 2 import parameters, respectively. The results show that the performance of EWL is quite stable and there is a potential to improve its performance by parameter optimization.

Generalized Replicator Dynamics as a Model of Specialization and Diversity in Societies

1998 ◽  
Vol 01 (04) ◽  
pp. 325-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vivek S. Borkar ◽  
Sanjay Jain ◽  
Govindan Rangarajan
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Final States ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Pure Strategies

We consider a generalization of replicator dynamics as a non-cooperative evolutionary game-theoretic model of a community of N agents. All agents update their individual mixed strategy profiles to increase their total payoff from the rest of the community. The properties of attractors in this dynamics are studied. Evidence is presented that under certain conditions the typical attractors of the system are corners of state space where each agent has specialized to a pure strategy, and/or the community exhibits diversity, i.e., all strategies are represented in the final states. The model suggests that new pure strategies whose payoff matrix elements satisfy suitable inequalities with respect to the existing ones can destabilize existing attractors if N is sufficiently large, and be regarded as innovations that enhance the diversity of the community.

scholarly journals Cooperative Evolution Mechanism of Unmanned Swarm within the Framework of Public Goods Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Minggang Yu ◽  
Ming He ◽  
Ziyu Ma ◽  
Mingguang Zou ◽  
Lei Wan ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Centralized Control ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Theoretical Derivation ◽  
Evolution Mechanism ◽  
Cooperative Evolution ◽  
Average Abundance ◽  
Actual Control

One of the key advantages of unmanned swarm operation is its autonomous cooperation. When the communication is interrupted or the centralized control manner is lost, the cooperative operation can still be carried out orderly. This work proposed a cooperative evolution mechanism within the framework of multiplayer public goods game to solve the problem of autonomous collaboration of unmanned swarm in case of failure of centralized control. It starts with the requirement analysis of autonomous cooperation in unmanned swarm, and then, the evolutionary game model of multiplayer public goods based on aspiration-driven dynamics is established. On this basis, the average abundance function is constructed by theoretical derivation, and furthermore, the influence of cost, multiplication factor, and aspiration level on the average abundance is simulated. Finally, the evolutionary mechanism of parameter adjustment in swarm cooperation is revealed via case study, and deliberate proposals are suggested to provide a meaningful exploration in the actual control of unmanned swarm cooperation.

scholarly journals Analysis of a Multiparticipant Game under a Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism: An Evolutionary Theory Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Jiangchao Li ◽  
Shilei Yang
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Strategy Space ◽  
Market Sentiment ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability

In a market with intense competition, cost pressures tempt enterprises to seek profits in ways that infringe on the interests of consumers. This is especially true when market sentiment is weak. In such situations, governments play a vital role in protecting consumers’ interests and helping struggling enterprises. We construct a tripartite game model that includes the government, enterprises, and consumers under a subsidy and punishment mechanism. We use this model to investigate the strategic choices made by the participants in an evolutionary game theory (EGT) framework. We present four stable equilibrium points as pure strategy solutions with the aid of a replicator dynamic system. Three main findings are presented in this paper. First, not all equilibrium points can be evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) when considering the potential motivations of the participants to change strategies. Second, there is an equilibrium point that satisfies the stability condition but changes periodically in its strategy space; strategy changes between participants are not synchronized. Third, the government prefers to subsidize enterprises when enterprise speculation is serious or when enterprise investment in improving production technology is high.

scholarly journals Analysis on the Evolution Path of Promoting the College Students' Entrepreneurship

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 102
Author(s):  
Tian Yanan
Keyword(s):  
College Students ◽  
Phase Diagram ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolution Mechanism ◽  
Evolution Path ◽  
The Stability

Promote the deep cooperation between government and university is conducive to promoting the development of college students’ entrepreneurship. In order to study how to promote the evolution of college students 'entrepreneurship, this paper uses the theory of evolutionary game to construct the evolutionary game model of political and university collaboration and promote the stability and balance of college students' entrepreneurship. The study draws the relevant phase diagram of the system, and analyzes the influence of the relevant parameters on the evolution mechanism in the process of coordination between government and government.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document