Incentive structures shape scientists' research practices. One incentive in particular, rewarding priority of publication, is hypothesized to harm scientific reliability by promoting rushed, low-quality research. Here, we develop a laboratory experiment to test whether competition affects information sampling and guessing accuracy in a game that mirrors aspects of scientific investigation. In our experiment, individuals gather data in order to guess true states of the world and face a tradeoff between guessing quickly and increasing accuracy by acquiring more information. To test whether competition affects accuracy, we compare a treatment in which individuals are rewarded for each correct guess to a treatment where individuals face the possibility of being ‘scooped’ by a competitor. In a second set of conditions, we make information acquisition contingent on solving arithmetic problems to test whether competition increases individual effort (i.e. arithmetic-problem solving speed). We find that competition causes individuals to make guesses using less information, thereby reducing their accuracy (
H1a
and
H1b
confirmed). We find no evidence that competition increases individual effort (
H2
, inconclusive evidence). Our experiment provides proof of concept that rewarding priority of publication can incentivize individuals to acquire less information, producing lower-quality research as a consequence.