LEARNING STYLE PREFERENCES OF UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE STUDENTS

Knowledge of the appropriate learning styles in which students approach the study supports the effectiveness of the teaching process. There is international research that explores the factors that influence student learning styles or students' preferences. The results of some research based on the similar methodologies are inconsistent. The aim of this research under the conditions of Czech tertiary education was to verify what factors students´ learning style preferences in the subject Marketing depend on. The method of questioning based on quantitative research was used. 132 students of University of Economics, Prague and of College of Polytechnics Jihlava were involved in the research. The questions were formulated in a way to be able to define the learning style and whether students were aware of their sensory preferences. The model was based on the VARK model and the learning style according to motivation and intent. A chi-square test of independence was used for verification. The preferences of a deep problem-based learning style prevail. Learning styles preferences depend on factors related to the practical preparation of the students and the difficulty of the subject. Keywords: learning style, VARK model, deep problem-based learning style, Czech tertiary education, subject Marketing.

Proclus and Trouble in Paradise

This chapter addresses the contributions of Proclus to the completion of the Platonic project. Proclus, living some two hundred years after Plotinus, extended the systematization of Platonism. Moreover, it is Proclus, in part through Pseudo-Dionysius, and in part through the Liber de Causis, who served as the gateway to Platonism for the next millennium. Proclus was at once full of admiration for Plotinus as an exegete of Plato and also frequently critical of him. As seen in both Plato and Plotinus, the fundamental systematic law of Platonism is expressed as “remaining,” “procession,” and “reversion.” In his Elements of Theology, Proclus connects the procession with the distinction between cause and condition in Phaedo and cause and accessory to the cause in Timaeus. The chapter then details the analytic prowess Proclus shows in discovering a deep problem in the systematic construction of Platonism. This is a problem that Proclus's student, Damascius, exploits in a remarkable way.

How to get Certain Knowledge from Fallible Justification

Abstract“Real knowledge,” as I use the term, is the most highly prized form of true belief sought by an epistemic agent. This paper argues that defeasible infinitism provides a good way to characterize real knowledge and it shows how real knowledge can arise from fallible justification. Then, I argue that there are two ways of interpreting Ernest Sosa's account of real knowledge as belief that is aptly formed and capable of being fully defended. On the one hand, if beliefs are aptly formed only if they have a specific causal etiology, namely that they are efficiently caused fully or partially by virtuous characteristics of the epistemic agent, then Sosa's account falls prey to what I call the problem of the Hazard of Empirical Disconfirmation (HED). The HED problem applies to all forms of causal accounts of real knowledge and is simply that as we gain more empirical knowledge about the causal origins of our true beliefs that are the most highly prized we will discover that they do not always (or even hardly ever) satisfy the required efficient causal constraints. Bluntly put, having sufficiently good reasons for our beliefs might not require that the beliefs have the requisite efficient causal etiology. On the other hand, there is a way of interpreting Sosa's views that does not include an efficient causal prerequisite. That interpretation makes Sosa's account of real knowledge almost identical to defeasible infinitism but expressed in an alternate vocabulary. Such a view is not subject to the HED problem and it can solve the deep problem in epistemology, namely how to get epistemically certain (as opposed to psychologically certain) knowledge from fallible justification.

Addressing a Deep Problem With Magnetoencephalography

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Epistemic Logics

Standard possible-worlds epistemic logic gives rise to the problem of logical omniscience. There are attempts to deal with the problem without using impossible worlds. A number of these approaches are discussed in this chapter and all are found wanting. The impossible worlds approach is immediately more successful, but faces a deep problem: how should impossible worlds be constrained, so as to give adequate models of knowledge and belief? One option is to take impossible worlds to be closed under some weaker-than-classical logic. But this approach does not genuinely solve the problem of logical omniscience. A different approach is the dynamic one, whereby epistemic states are not closed at any one time, but nevertheless evolve towards closure in a dynamic way.

What ‘Just Culture’ doesn’t understand about just punishment

Recent years have seen the rise of ‘Just Culture’ as an ideal in the patient safety movement, with numerous hospitals and professional organisations adopting a Just Culture response to incidents ranging from non-culpable human error to intentional misconduct. This paper argues that there is a deep problem with the Just Culture model, resulting from its impoverished understanding of the value of punitive, fundamentally backward-looking, practices of holding people accountable. I show that the kind of ‘accountability’ and ‘punishment’ contemporary Just Culture advocates endorse disrespects both patients and providers. I claim, first, that punishment is good because it respects participants in the healthcare system by restoring an equilibrium of social and moral status that wrongdoing disturbs, and, second, that it only does so when it communicates a backward-looking message of resentful blame.

Problems for Perfectionism

Perfectionism, the view that well-being is a matter of developing characteristically human capacities, has relatively few defenders in the literature, but plenty of critics. This article defends perfectionism against some recent formulations of classic objections, namely, the objection that perfectionism ignores the relevance of pleasure or preference for well-being, and a sophisticated version of the ‘wrong properties’ objection, according to which the intuitive plausibility of the perfectionist ideal is threatened by an absence of theoretical pressure to accept putative wrong properties cases. The article argues that these objections are unsuccessful, but introduce a new worry, the deep problem: perfectionism fails to offer a satisfying foundational justification for why developing the human essence is valuable. The article responds to the deep problem, ultimately arguing that it is a puzzle put to all theories of well-being to provide a justification for their normative significance.

How Valuable Could a Material Object Be?

ABSTRACT:Arguments for substance dualism—the theory that we are at least partly nonmaterial beings—abound. Many such arguments begin with our capacity to engage in conscious thought and end with dualism. Such are familiar. But there is another route to dualism. It begins with our moral value and ends with dualism. In this article, we develop and assess the prospects for this new style of argument. We show that, though one version of the argument does not succeed, there may yet be a deep problem for standard physical accounts of our nature.

Harrington's Empire of Law

Nearly every reader of James Harrington has taken his theory that property is the foundation of government to be his central and most enduring contribution to political thought. Operating within this standard reading, most of the extensive literature on Harrington has focused on derivative issues, such as the accuracy and depth of his economic reading of English history, or the extent to which his mechanistic account of political institutions displaced more traditional republican accounts of civic virtue. But the standard reading is incomplete. For example, it is puzzling on this reading why Harrington should single out Thomas Hobbes as his chief opponent. To demonstrate the incompleteness of the standard reading, this article will examine a relatively neglected aspect of Oceana: namely, the sharp contrast drawn throughout the work between those communities organized as an ‘empire of laws' and those organized as an ‘empire of men’. As it turns out, Harrington strikes upon a deep problem, not noticed by previous authors in the classical republican tradition, but nevertheless lying at the very conceptual core of republican theory. Examining this problem in detail is both interesting in its own right, in so far as it sheds light on some central issues in republican theory, and in the renewed historical appreciation it brings to our reading of Harrington as well.