MUF Calculation of Indonesian 10-MWt RDE Experimental HTGR Using Combined Uncertainty Approach

A safeguards assessment for the 10-MWt RDE Experimental HTGR needs to be established in order to fulfill the requirements needed to construct it. Methods and instruments used for the RDE’s nuclear material accounting and safeguards system are reviewed in this paper. Material unaccounted for (MUF) is calculated using the uncertainty of each method and instrument. The effectiveness of the safeguards system is examined by comparing the resulting MUF with the number of SQ ( = significant quantity, i.e. the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing of a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded). The total uncertainty from each KMP showed a number less than 10%. The number of MUF in each KMP according to total uncertainty showed a number below 1 kg of U-235 in one inventory period (~12 months). According to the number of MUF counted, it is impossible to reach 1 SQ if the diversion done is only by taking the advantage of MUF in the measurement. The result of total uncertainty and MUF calculation showed that the safeguards system and the material measurement designed for RDE is amendable. The sets of instruments and measurements designed will give a comprehensive data of each nuclear material in the RDE. The low number of MUF in comparison with the SQ showed that the RDE has a high proliferation resistance.

Project Gatekeeper: An Entrance Control System Embedded Radiation Detection Capability for Security Applications

Threat assessments continue to conclude that terrorist groups and individuals as well as those wanting to cause harm to society have the ambition and increasing means to acquire unconventional weapons such as improvised nuclear explosive devices and radiological disposal devices. Such assessments are given credence by public statements of intent by such groups/persons, by reports of attempts to acquire radioactive material and by law enforcement actions which have interdicted, apprehended or prevented attempts to acquire such material. As a mechanism through which to identify radioactive materials being transported on an individual’s person, this work sought to develop a detection system that is of lower-cost, reduced form-factor and more covert than existing infrastructure, while maintaining adequate sensitivity and being retrofittable into an industry standard and widely utilised Gunnebo Speed Gate system. The system developed comprised an array of six off-set Geiger–Muller detectors positioned around the gate, alongside a single scintillator detector for spectroscopy, triggered by the systems inbuilt existing IR proximity sensor. This configuration served to not only reduce the cost for such a system but also allowed for source localisation and identification to be performed. Utilising the current setup, it was possible to detect a 1 µSv/h source carried into the Speed Gate in all test scenarios, alongside locating and spectrally analysing the material in a significant number.

U.S. Policy to Curb West European Nuclear Exports, 1974–1978

After India's detonation of a nuclear explosive in 1974 publicly demonstrated the proliferation risks from nuclear assistance, the U.S. government increased its efforts to control nuclear exports worldwide. In doing so, U.S. policymakers faced challenges from two major West European allies, France and West Germany, both of which pursued their commercial interests through nuclear exports to countries such as Pakistan, Brazil, Iran, and India, among others. Despite multilateral efforts including the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and bilateral negotiations with the supplier governments, the administrations of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter attained only partial success. The commercial interests of nuclear firms, the influence of pro-export coalitions inside supplier countries, and the emerging importance of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries as alternative suppliers influenced the outcome. The United States was more successful in restraining the French through a series of quid pro quo arrangements than it ever was with the West Germans. Using recently declassified archival documents, this article sheds new light on U.S. nonproliferation policy in the aftermath of the 1973 oil price shock.