Subjective probability is modulated by emotions

Information about risks and probabilities is ubiquitous in our environment, forming the basis for decisions in an uncertain world. Emotions are known to modulate subjective probability assessments when probabilistic information is emotionally valenced. Yet little is known about the role of emotions in subjective probability assessment of affectively neutral events. We investigated this in one correlational study (Study 1, N = 162) and one experimental study (Study 2, N = 119). As predicted, we found that emotional dominance modulated the degree of conservatism in respondents’ neutral probability estimates. Remarkably, this pattern also transferred to realistic risk assessments. Furthermore, respondents’ tendency to use the representativeness heuristic as a proxy for probability was increased in high dominance individuals. Our findings highlight the importance of considering emotions, particularly the little-understood emotion dimension dominance, in research on probabilistic cognition.

Use of Heuristics during the clinical decision process from family physicians in real conditions.

Rationale, aims and objectives: The available evidence on the existence and consequences of the use of heuristics in the clinical decision process is very scarce. The purpose of this study is to measure the use of the Representativeness, Availability and Overconfidence heuristics in real conditions with Primary Care physicians in cases of dyspnea and to study the possible correlation with diagnostic error. Methods: A prospective cohort study was carried out in 4 Primary Care centers in which 371 new cases or dyspnea were registered. The use of the three heuristics in the diagnostic process is measured through an operational definition of the same. Subsequently, the statistical correlation with the identified clinical errors is analyzed. Results: In 9.97% of the registered cases a diagnostic error was identified. In 49.59% of the cases, the physicians used the representativeness heuristic in the diagnostic decision process. The availability heuristic was used by 82.38% of the doctors and finally, in more than 50% of the cases the doctors showed excess confidence. None of the heuristics showed a statistically significant correlation with diagnostic error. Conclusion: The three heuristics have been used as mental shortcuts by Primary Care physicians in the clinical decision process in cases of dyspnea, but their influence on the diagnostic error is not significant. New studies based on the proposed methodology will allow confirming both its importance and its association with diagnostic error.

Use of Heuristics during the clinical decision process in from family physicians in real conditions.

Rationale, aims and objectives: The available evidence on the existence and consequences of the use of heuristics in the clinical decision process is very scarce. The purpose of this study is to measure the use of the Representativeness, Availability and Overconfidence heuristics in real conditions with Primary Care physicians in cases of dyspnea and to study the possible correlation with diagnostic error. Methods: A prospective cohort study was carried out in 4 Primary Care centers in which 371 new cases or dyspnea were registered. The use of the three heuristics in the diagnostic process is measured through an operational definition of the same. Subsequently, the statistical correlation with the identified clinical errors is analyzed. Results: In 9.97% of the registered cases a diagnostic error was identified. In 49.59% of the cases, the physicians used the representativeness heuristic in the diagnostic decision process. The availability heuristic was used by 82.38% of the doctors and finally, in more than 50% of the cases the doctors showed excess confidence. None of the heuristics showed a statistically significant correlation with diagnostic error. Conclusion: The three heuristics have been used as mental shortcuts by Primary Care physicians in the clinical decision process in cases of dyspnea, but their influence on the diagnostic error is not significant. New studies based on the proposed methodology will allow confirming both its importance and its association with diagnostic error.

The representativeness heuristic at work in decision-making: building blocks and individual-level cognitive and behavioral factors

PurposeThis paper aims to develop a conceptual framework on how the representativeness heuristic operates in the decision-making process. Specifically, the authors unbundle representativeness into its building blocks: search rule, stopping rule and decision rule. Furthermore, the focus is placed on how individual-level cognitive and behavioral factors, namely experience, intuition and overconfidence, affect the functioning of this heuristic.Design/methodology/approachFrom a theoretical standpoint, the authors build on dual-process theories and on the adaptive toolbox view from the “fast and frugal heuristics” perspective to develop an integrative conceptual framework that uncovers the mechanisms underlying the representativeness heuristic.FindingsThe authors’ conceptualization suggests that the search rule used in representativeness is based on analogical mapping from previous experience, the stopping rule is the representational stability of the analogs and the decision rule is the choice of the alternative upon which there is a convergence of representations and that exceeds the decision maker's aspiration level. In this framework, intuition may help the decision maker to cross-map potentially competing analogies, while overconfidence affects the search time and costs and alters both the stopping and the decision rule.Originality/valueThe authors develop a conceptual framework on representativeness, as one of the most common, though still poorly investigated, heuristics. The model offers a nuanced perspective that explores the cognitive and behavioral mechanisms that shape the use of representativeness in decision-making. The authors also discuss the theoretical implications of their model and outline future research avenues that may further contribute to enriching their understanding of decision-making processes.

Use of Heuristics during the clinical decision process in Primary Care physicians in real conditions.

Rationale, aims and objectives: The available evidence on the existence and consequences of the use of heuristics in the clinical decision process is very scarce. The purpose of this study is to measure the use of the Representativeness, Availability and Overconfidence heuristics in real conditions with Primary Care physicians in cases of dyspnea and to study the possible correlation with diagnostic error. Methods: A prospective cohort study was carried out in 4 Primary Care centers in which 371 new cases or dyspnea were registered. The use of the three heuristics in the diagnostic process is measured through an operational definition of the same. Subsequently, the statistical correlation with the identified clinical errors is analyzed. Results: In 9.97% of the registered cases a diagnostic error was identified. In 49.59% of the cases, the physicians used the representativeness heuristic in the diagnostic decision process. The availability heuristic was used by 82.38% of the doctors and finally, in more than 50% of the cases the doctors showed excess confidence. None of the heuristics showed a statistically significant correlation with diagnostic error. Conclusion: The three heuristics have been used as mental shortcuts by Primary Care physicians in the clinical decision process in cases of dyspnea, but their influence on the diagnostic error is not significant. New studies based on the proposed methodology will allow confirming both its importance and its association with diagnostic error.

Predictably Irrational Hiring

The hiring process plays a key role in organisational performance, but it involves contentious judgements and decisions. Behavioural economics can help us improve hiring effectiveness and enable the development of strong cultures and successful organisations. Using three historical cases from a Big-Five accounting firm, we present counter-intuitive hiring strategies that are relevant to organisations today. The cases involve six practices related to hiring and nine scientific concepts. The practices are: reverse interview, reverse recruitment, assessment centre (AC) design, structured interviewing, salary history ban, and withdrawal and rationalisation of designations. The scientific concepts are: representativeness heuristic, anticipatory socialisation, affect heuristic, distinction bias, social facilitation (observer effect), dual-process thinking, identity economics, anchoring effect (reference dependence) and social preference (inequity aversion). Finally, we examine the relevance of these practices and concepts as they relate to four human resources (HR) functions: (a) recruitment; (b) selection; (c) compensation and rewards; and (d) culture building.

Cognitive biases in suicide risk assessment

Cognitive biases result from automatic/unconscious cognitive processes that allow us to come to quick conclusions when facing uncertain or insufficient information. Although these strategies are often useful in providing quick and efficient answers, they can also lead to systematic errors in judgement and decision-making. This text explores the potential adverse effects of cognitive biases on decisions and judgements specific to clinician’s assessment of suicidality. An in-depth description of specifically relevant heuristics and biases, such as the representativeness heuristic and confirmation bias, are described. Different strategies to minimize their negative effects on the suicide risk assessment of the patient are also discussed.