Training self-other distinction facilitates perspective taking in young children

Adults and children sometimes commit ‘egocentric errors’, failing to ignore their own perspective, when interpreting others’ communication. Training imitation-inhibition reduces these errors in adults, facilitating perspective-taking. This study tested whether imitation-inhibition training may also facilitate perspective-taking in 3-6-year-olds, an age where the egocentric perspective may be particularly influential. Children participated in a 10-minute imitation-inhibition, imitation, or non-social-inhibition training (white, n=25 per condition, 33 female), and subsequently the communicative-perspective-taking Director task. Training had a significant effect (F(2, 71)= 3.268, p= .044, η2= .084): on critical trials the imitation-inhibition group selected the correct object more often than the imitation and non-social-inhibition training groups. The imitation-inhibition training thus specifically enhanced the perspective-taking process, indicating that perspective-taking from childhood onwards involves managing self-other representations.

Imitation and interindividual differences: Belief in free will is not related to automatic imitation

It is well known that individuals have the tendency to automatically imitate each other and that such imitative behavior is fostered by perceiving intentions in others’ actions. That is, past research has shown that perceiving an action as internally driven enhances the shared representation of observed and executed actions increasing automatic imitation. An interpersonal factor that increases the perception that a behavior is internally driven is belief in free will. Consequently, we hypothesized that the more individuals believe in free will, the more they automatically imitate others. To test this prediction, we conducted two high-powered (total N = 642) and preregistered studies in which we assessed automatic imitation with the imitation-inhibition task. Contrary to our predictions, belief in free will did not correlate with automatic imitation. This finding contributes to current findings challenging the assumption that automatic imitation is modulated by interindividual differences. Further theoretical implications are discussed.

Concurrently observed actions are represented as independent actions and not as a compound action

Recent research suggests that we can simultaneously represent the actions of multiple agents in our motor system. However, it is currently unclear exactly how we represent their actions. Here, we tested two competing hypotheses. According to the independence hypothesis, we represent concurrently observed actions as independent, competing actions. According to the compound hypothesis, we instead integrate those actions, whenever possible, into compound actions. In Experiment 1 (N = 32), we first show that the standard imitation-inhibition task with a single hand can be extended to measure automatic imitation of compound actions. In Experiment 2 (N = 55), we then tested how we represent concurrently observed actions by further extending this task to include two hands performing identical or different actions. The results revealed that two hands performing two different actions (e.g., one hand lifts index finger, one hand lifts middle finger) produced an effect similar to that of both hands performing just one of those actions (e.g., both hands lift index finger) but different from that of both hands performing both actions together (e.g., lift both index and middle finger). As such, our results show that concurrently observed actions are coded separately in the motor system.

Group membership does not modulate automatic imitation

Individuals have the automatic tendency to imitate each other. A key prediction of different theories explaining automatic imitation is that individuals imitate in-group members more strongly than out-group members. However, the empirical basis for this prediction is rather inconclusive. Only a few experiments have investigated the influence of group membership using classic automatic imitation paradigms and these experiments led to mixed results. To put the group membership prediction to a critical test, we carried out six high-powered experiments (total N = 1538) in which we assessed imitation with the imitation-inhibition task and manipulated group membership in different ways. Evidence across all experiments indicates that group membership does not modulate automatic imitation. Moreover, we do not find support for the idea that feelings of affiliation or perceived similarity moderate the effect of group membership on automatic imitation. These results have important implications for theories explaining automatic imitation and contribute to the current discussion of whether automatic imitation can be socially modulated.

Automatic imitation of in- and out-group members

Individuals have the automatic tendency to imitate each other. A key prediction of motivational theories explaining automatic imitation is that individuals imitate in-group members more strongly than out-group members. However, the empirical basis for this prediction is rather inconclusive. Only few experiments have investigated the influence of group membership using classic automatic imitation paradigms and these experiments led to mixed results. To put the group membership prediction to a critical test, we carried out six high-powered experiments (total N = 1,538) in which we assessed imitation with the imitation-inhibition task and manipulated group membership in different ways. Evidence across all experiments indicates that group- membership does not modulate automatic imitation. These results have important implications for motivational theories explaining automatic imitation and contribute to the current discussion of whether automatic imitation can be socially modulated.

Socio-cognitive training impacts emotional and perceptual self-salience but not self-other distinction

•Effect of a socio-cognitive training on self-other distinction and self-salience was tested•Ss trained to imitate, inhibit imitation, or inhibit control stimuli in 2 experiments•Unlike the original study, training did not influence self-other distinction•Imitation-inhibition training increased self-salience in empathy and shape matching

Childhood Abuse and Adult Sociocognitive Skills: Distinguishing Between Self and Other Following Early Trauma

Experience of childhood abuse (CA) impairs complex social functioning in children; however, much less is known about its effects on basic sociocognitive processes and even fewer studies have investigated these in adult survivors. Using two behavioral tasks, this study investigated spontaneous theory of mind (ToM) and imitative behavior in 41 women with CA and 26 unaffected comparison (UC) women. In the spontaneous ToM task, UCs showed a larger ToM index than CAs, indicating more facilitation by knowledge of another’s false belief. In the imitation–inhibition task, CAs experienced less interference than UCs when observing another’s incongruent movements. After controlling for depression, differences in ToM became marginally significant, yet remained highly significant for inhibiting imitative behavior. The findings suggest CA survivors have altered perspective-taking and are less influenced by others’ perspectives, potentially due to changes in self-other distinction. Clinical implications regarding therapeutic practice with survivors of CA are discussed.

Money priming and self-other focus

The self-sufficiency hypothesis suggests that priming individuals with money makes them focus more strongly on themselves than on others. However, recently, research supporting this claim has been heavily criticized and some attempts to replicate have failed. A reason for the inconsistent findings in the field may lay in the common use of explicit measures, because they tend to rely on one or just a few items and are thus prone to demand effects and low reliability. In the present research, we administered, in two experiments, the imitation-inhibition task—a robust, unobtrusive and reliable paradigm that is sensitive to self-other focus on a trial-by-trial basis. A pilot study found an increased focus on the self as compared to others when primed with money. Building on this finding, a preregistered high-powered experiment replicated this effect, suggesting that money primes may indeed increase a focus on the self. An additionally carried out meta-analysis indicates that automatic imitation is modulated by self-other focus and that money primes lead to a smaller focus on the self than conventional methods. Overall the found effects are rather small and several limitations, such as order effects, call for a cautious interpretation of the findings.

The Effect of Money Priming on Self-Focus in the Imitation-Inhibition Task

The self-sufficiency hypothesis suggests that priming individuals with money makes them focus more strongly on themselves than on others. However, recently, research supporting this claim has been heavily criticized and some attempts to replicate have failed. A reason for the inconsistent findings in the field may lay in the common use of explicit measures, because they tend to rely on one or just a few items and are thus prone to demand effects and low reliability. In the present research, we administered, in two experiments, the imitation-inhibition task – a robust, unobtrusive, and reliable paradigm that is sensitive to self-other focus on a trial-by-trial basis. A pilot study found an increased focus on the self as compared to others when primed with money. Building on this finding, a preregistered high-powered experiment replicated this effect, suggesting that money primes may indeed increase a focus on the self. An additionally carried out meta-analysis indicates that automatic imitation is modulated by self-other focus and that money primes lead to a smaller focus on the self than conventional methods. Overall, the found effects are rather small and several limitations, such as order effects, call for a cautious interpretation of the findings.

Childhood abuse and adult socio-cognitive skills: Distinguishing between self and other following early trauma

Experience of childhood abuse impairs complex social functioning in children; however, much less is known about its effects on basic socio-cognitive processes and even fewer studies have investigated these in adult survivors. Using two behavioral tasks, this study investigated spontaneous theory of mind (ToM) and imitative behavior in 41 women with childhood abuse (CA) and 26 unaffected comparison women (UC). In the spontaneous ToM task, UCs showed a larger ToM index than CAs, indicating more facilitation by knowledge of another’s false belief. In the imitation-inhibition task, CAs experienced less interference than UCs when observing another’s incongruent movements. After controlling for depression, differences in ToM became marginally significant, yet remained highly significant for inhibiting imitative behavior. The findings suggest childhood abuse survivors have altered perspective-taking, and are less influenced by others’ perspectives, potentially due to changes in self-other distinction. Clinical implications regarding therapeutic practice with survivors of childhood abuse are discussed.