Leveraging the Rhetorical Energies of Machines: COVID-19, Misinformation, and Persuasive Labor

The rampant misinformation amid the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates an obvious need for persuasion. This article draws on the fields of digital rhetoric and rhetoric of science, technology, and medicine to explore the persuasive threats and opportunities machine communicators pose to public health. As a specific case, Alexa and the machine’s performative similarities to the Oracle at Delphi are tracked alongside the voice-based assistant’s further resonances with the discourses of expert systems to develop an account of the machine’s rhetorical energies. From here, machine communicators are discussed as optimal deliverers of inoculations against misinformation in light of the fact that their performances are attended by rhetorical energies that can enliven persuasions against misinformation.

Notes on 'Diagnosing Madness'

What kind of story could be conveyed about psychiatric patients and the practices of their confinement in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century? How could such an account be grounded? What theoretical tools and frameworks would allow for an apprehension of this situation, and within or across which disciplinary frameworks? Firmly situated in the field of rhetoric of science, Diagnosing Madness. The discursive construction of the psychiatric patient, 1850-1920 attempts such an account, “placing rhetorical analysis of the written word at the center of the web of cultural practices that made asylums possible in the nineteenth century”

Rhetoric of Science

This contribution examines the status of the rhetoric of science in two contexts. The first one is the effect that the changing interpretation of logic (the changing 'image of logic') has had on the status of the rhetoric of science. The second is the role that imagery has in scientific discourse. It is argued that the very possibility of a rhetorical interpretation of science depends on how the logic of science is understood. Informal logic, which acts here as a variant of argumentation theory or a logic of argumentation, is proposed as such a logic. This leads to a revision of the nature of justification in science in general, the substitution of apodictic logic for a logic of argumentation as a principal tool, and the consideration of strict formal ways of material implication-based justification as mere individual cases of a logic of argumentation. The role of imagery in scientific discourse is analysed. It is demonstrated that the situation of rhetoric and perception of imagery is paradoxical: although using rhetorical mechanisms in scientific communication is unavoidable, rhetoric has been criticised for many centuries. It is shown that the negative attitude to using rhetorical elements in scientific texts has long historical roots going back to ancient philosophical thought, namely, Socrates's criticism of eloquence and sophistic rhetoric. Analysis of the functions of imagery in scientific discourse suggests that imagery is an inalienable mechanism of both professional communication and the creation of theoretical models of knowledge.