More on the Interaction of ‘Would’ with Context

This chapter discusses the contrast between Sobel sequences of counterfactuals and reverse Sobel sequences, where adding a conjunct to the antecedent generates an apparent counterexample to the (valid) principle of strengthening the antecedent, but subtracting it again does not. The difference corresponds to the pragmatic difference that adding items to the contextually relevant domain (here, of worlds) is easier than taking them away again. The pressure to add worlds is explained by the use of the suppositional heuristic, which makes some worlds verifying the antecedent (if there are any) relevant. For indicative conditionals, similar apparent counterexamples arise, for the difference in suppositions remains even in the absence of a context-sensitive element in the semantics: the basic explanation of the apparent counterexamples is cognitive rather than semantic. However, a recent attempt by Moss to explain the difference on epistemic grounds in a way consistent with a Lewis-style semantics is shown not to cover all the data.

Maximal Non-trivial Sets of Instances of Your Least Favorite Logical Principle

The paper generalizes Van McGee's well-known result that there are many maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski's schema to a number of non-classical theories of truth. It is shown that if a non-classical theory rejects some classically valid principle in order to avoid the truth-theoretic paradoxes, then there will be many maximal non-trivial sets of instances of that principle that the non-classical theorist could in principle endorse. On the basis of this it is argued that the idea of classical recapture, which plays such an important role for non-classical logicians, can only be pushed so far.

The World Bank’s Sustainable Development Approach and the Need for a Unified Field of Law and Development Studies in Argentina

This paper argues that the World Bank’s adoption of the principle of sustainable development is an example of the persistence of the law and development approach. Indeed, the World Bank’s interpretation of the principle translates into its projects; through soft law and loan conditionality, it applies to the borrower and regulates behaviors at the country level. This potentially results in the legal transplantation of a cross-culturally valid principle. The paper will present a case study of the sustainable development principle’s application by the World Bank in Argentina: the “Riachuelo-Matanza Basin Sustainable Development Project”. Given the difficulties of implementing the project, the paper makes the case that, to bridge the gaps described by Trubek and Galanter, Argentina needs scholars specialized in law and development as a unified field in order to fine-tune the development approach of international development actors to national realities and thus create a real impact.

HARM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND PROHIBITION

What restrictions are there on the scope of the criminal law? One familiar suggestion is that it is wrong to criminalize conduct that is not harmful. Another suggestion is that it is wrong to criminalize conduct if criminalizing that conduct does not prevent harm. The first suggestion focuses on the conduct criminalized. The second focuses on the effects of the decision to criminalize. A third suggestion is that it is wrong to criminalize conduct if that conduct does not wrongfully interfere with the sovereignty of others. None of these suggestions points to a valid principle of criminalization, though each points to part of the truth. Versions of the harm principle can deal with some familiar objections but cannot explain why it is permissible to criminalize interference with some nonharmful conduct, for example, interference with self-sacrificial acts. The sovereignty principle can explain the cases that the harm principle struggles with. But it makes the permissibility of preventing harm through the criminal law depend on interference with sovereignty. This is not attractive either with respect to the protection of those who have the capacity for sovereignty but especially with respect to the protection of those who do not. I conclude that any valid principle of criminalization will be complex, drawing on two independent ideas: of harm and of interference with sovereignty.

Aristotle and Diodorus Cronus: Principle of bivalence and principle of plenitude

Aristotle in De Interpretatione 9 considers the use of predicates in combination with subjects which are forming propositions, each of which is necessarily either true or false. This necessity was later named as Principle of bivalence (of truth values). Although he grants the truth or falsity of propositions about past and present events, propositions about the future seem problematic. If a proposition about tomorrow is true (or false) today, then the future event it describes will happen (or not happen) necessary. It leads to (logical) determinism. Aristotle attempts to avoid it. His solution was to maintain that the disjunction is necessarily true today even though neither of its disjuncts is. Thus, it is necessary that either tomorrow's event will occur or it will not, but it is neither necessary that it will occur nor necessary that it will not occur. Because of fact that according to Aristotle Principle of bivalence is not valid for a propositions about future, for him is not valid Principle of plenitude also. On the other side, according to his Master argument and his definitions of modalities for Diodorus Cronus possible is something what is or will be. In opposition to Aristotle, for him does not exists any non-actualized possibility. In some sense Diodorus implicit respects Principle of bivalence. It is compatible with the Principle of plenitude which is also respected from Diodorus Cronus. Aristotle attempts to save difference between modal categories (necessity and possibility), and trys to reject logical determinism. According to his definition of possibility in Diodorus Cronus conception this difference collapses in to determinism.

Philosophy in Search of an Ethics of Universal Dialogue

Throughout human history, both lying and the coercion of someone's belief and will have been rejected through prohibitions that are a precondition for mutual understanding between people as well as for any agreement. Immanuel Kant contributed to the ethical formulation of these prohibitions, proving these universal claims through his method of transcendental formalism. Kant's theory of the categorical imperative is fruitfully developed by the ethics of discourse as the theory of the ultimate moral ground of earnest argumentation and consensus. I examine the post-metaphysical transformation of the categorical imperative, as expressed in the works of Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. Discourse ethics confronts the hermeneutical contextualist critique of universalism. This ethics develops a transcendental-pragmatic foundation for a universally valid principle of coresponsibility. It contributes to the search for a rationally grounded normative base for universal dialogue.

Reply to Masterson

Masterson criticizes my argument concerning the incoherence of the principle of equality of opportunity on three grounds: (a) that I assume that ‘if a principle cannot be effected absolutely it must be discarded as a principle’ (p. 2), whereas he claims that so long as one can move in the direction of realizing the principle, then it can be a tenable working principle; (b) that I seem to believe that if a principle can be overruled by another principle in particular cases, it ceases to be a valid principle (p. 3); and (c) that I assume that a principle must apply to all cases, whereas he claims that a principle could be formulated so as not to apply to all cases (p. 5).