Guided Tour

Chapter 1 provides a guided tour of the book. It begins with an explanation of the divide between formal and informal work on epistemic rationality and that between work on belief and credence. Six Basic Assumptions are sketched to get the ball rolling. They are the view that normative fact is grounded in natural fact, that propositional attitudes are binary relations, that propositional attitudes are functional in nature, that such attitudes are subject to epistemic appraisal, that transitions between them are too, and that models of such rationality are acceptable only if they match the target phenomena (in a sense of ‘match’ to be glossed).

Scepticism

Simply put, scepticism is the view that we fail to know anything. More generally, the term ‘scepticism’ refers to a family of views, each of which denies that some term of positive epistemic appraisal applies to our beliefs. Thus, sceptical doctrines might hold that none of our beliefs is certain, that none of our beliefs is justified, that none of our beliefs is reasonable, that none of our beliefs is more reasonable than its denial, and so on. Sceptical doctrines can also vary with respect to the kind of belief they target. Scepticism can be restricted to beliefs produced in certain ways: for example, scepticism concerning beliefs based on memory, on inductive reasoning or even on any reasoning whatsoever. And sceptical views can be restricted to beliefs about certain subjects: for example, scepticism concerning beliefs about the external world, beliefs about other minds, beliefs about value and so on. Solipsism – the view that all that exists is the self and its states – can be seen as a form of scepticism based on the claim that there are no convincing arguments for the existence of anything beyond the self. The philosophical problem of scepticism derives from what appear to be very strong arguments for sceptical conclusions. Since most philosophers are unwilling to accept those conclusions, there is a problem concerning how to respond to the arguments. For example, one kind of sceptical argument attempts to show that we have no knowledge of the world around us. The argument hinges on the claim that we are not in a position to rule out the possibility that we are brains-in-a-vat being artificially stimulated to have just the sensory experience we are actually having. We have no basis for ruling out this possibility since if it were actual, our experience would not change in any way. The sceptic then claims that if we cannot rule out the possibility that we are brains-in-a-vat, then we cannot know anything about the world around us. Responses to this argument often fall into one of two categories. Some philosophers argue that we can rule out the possibility that we are brains-in-a-vat. Others argue that we do not need to be able to rule out this possibility in order to have knowledge of the world around us.

Gettier and the Epistemic Appraisal of Philosophical Intuition

Gettier’s 1963 paper was enormously influential. Virtually all epistemologists agreed with Gettier that the JTB analaysis was mistaken. But this conclusion evidently depended on the reliability of the shared intuitions of Gettier’s and his philosophical contemporaries about the epistemological examples described in his chapter. How reliable are such intuitions? Today many philosophers challenge the reliability of classification intuitions. How are such challenges to be addressed, and what can we learn about the comparative reliability of putative experts (e.g. philosophers) and laypersons? Here it is proposed that philosophers can study this with the help of psychological techniques—including not only interview techniques of the kind utilized by experimental philosophers but other experimental techniques as well. Ways to investigate intuition’s reliability are illustrated.

Em defesa do Direito Probatório fundado em regras- e da Epistemologia também

<p><strong>RESUMO:</strong></p><p>Desde que Jeremy Bentham escreveu a sua severa crítca ao Direito Probatório, filósofos e juristas têm critcado as regras probatórias excludentes argumentando que as regras formais que excluem classes inteiras de provas em razão da sua alegada infabilidade violam máximas epistemológicas fundamentais que exigem que toda prova pertinente seja levada em consideração. Embora algumas partes da prova possam ser excluídas por falta de fabilidade – argumentam eles – seria um erro fazer tais juízos em relação a categorias inteiras, em oposição a fazê-los somente em relação à provas específcas apresentadas para propósitos específicos. Este artgo põe em causa essas alegações, argumentando que exclusões fundadas em regras servem a propósitos similares àqueles desempenhados pelas regras nas teorias morais consequencialistas de regras, e que, de maneira ainda mais importante, elas são totalmente consistentes com a natureza excludente das regras jurídicas em geral. Na verdade, uma vez visto o papel que as regras excludentes podem desempenhar na Epistemologia Jurídica, se torna possível ver que elas poderiam ter um papel a desempenhar na avaliação epistêmica em geral.</p><p><strong>ABSTRACT:</strong> </p><p>Ever since Jeremy Bentham wrote his scathing critque of the law of evidence, both philosophers and legal scholars have criticized the exclusionary rules of evidence, arguing that formal rules excluding entre classes of evidence for alleged unreliability violate basic epistemological maxims mandating that all relevant evidence be considered. Although particular pieces of evidence might be excluded as unreliable, they argue, it is a mistake to make such judgments for entire categories, as opposed to making only in the context of partcular pieces of evidence ofered for specifc purposes. This paper challenges these claims, arguing that rule-based exclusions serve similar purposes to those served by rules in rule-consequentalist moral theories, and that, even more importantly, they are entrely consistent with the exclusionary nature of legal rules in general. Indeed, once we see the role that exclusionary rules might serve in legal epistemology, we can see that they might have a role to play in epistemic appraisal more generally.</p>

A case study of epistemic order in mathematics classroom dialogue

We define epistemic order as the way in which the exchange and development of knowledge takes place in the classroom, breaking this down into a system of three components: epistemic initiative relating to who sets the agenda in classroom dialogue, and how; epistemic appraisal relating to who judges contributions to classroom dialogue, and how; and epistemic framing relating to the terms in which development and exchange of knowledge are represented, particularly in reflexive talk. These components are operationalised in terms of various types of structural and semantic analysis of dialogue. It is shown that a lesson segment displays a multi-layered epistemic order differing from that of conventional classroom recitation. Un estudio de caso del orden epistémico en el discurso de la clase de matemáticas Definimos orden epistémico como el modo en que se produce el intercambio y desarrollo de conocimiento en el aula, de acuerdo con un sistema de tres componentes: iniciativa epistémica respecto a quién y cómo establece la agenda del diálogo de clase; evaluación epistémica respecto a quién y cómo valora las contribuciones a este diálogo; y marco epistémico respecto a los términos en los cuales el desarrollo e intercambio de conocimiento se representa, particularmente en el habla reflexiva. Operativizamos estos componentes mediante varios tipos de análisis estructurales y semánticos del diálogo. Con los datos de un segmento de clase, se muestra un orden epistémico de múltiples niveles que difiere de formatos convencionales de relato en el aula.Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10481/42388WOS-ESCINº de citas en WOS (2017): 1 (Citas de 2º orden, 0)Nº de citas en SCOPUS (2017): 1 (Citas de 2º orden, 0)

A noção de justificação epistêmica como conceito de avaliação epistêmica [The notion of epistemic justification as concept of epistemic appraisal]

O propósito deste ensaio é apresentar algumas distinções epistemológicas fundamentais que devem ser observadas por qualquer teoria que se proponha analisar adequadamente os conceitos mais importantes da teoria do conhecimento. A noção de justificação epistêmica é apresentada como um conceito de avaliação epistêmica que deve respeitar gradações, de modo a permitir que um sujeito esteja mais, ou menos, justificado ao crer que determinada proposição é verdadeira. Destaca-se a importância da diferença entre ter justificação e estar justificado ao crer. Por fim, é analisada a diferença entre o que causa e o que justifica uma opinião.

In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence Law–and Epistemology Too

ABSTRACTEver since Jeremy Bentham wrote his scathing critique of the law of evidence, both philosophers and legal scholars have criticized the exclusionary rules of evidence, arguing that formal rules excluding entire classes of evidence for alleged unreliability violate basic epistemological maxims mandating that all relevant evidence be considered. Although particular pieces of evidence might be excluded as unreliable, they argue, it is a mistake to make such judgments for entire categories, as opposed to making them only in the context of particular pieces of evidence offered for specific purposes. This paper challenges these claims, arguing that rule-based exclusions serve similar purposes to those served by rules in rule-consequentialist moral theories, and that, even more importantly, they are entirely consistent with the exclusionary nature of legal rules in general. Indeed, once we see the role that exclusionary rules might serve in legal epistemology, we can see that they might have a role to play in epistemic appraisal more generally.

When Logic Meets Politics: Testimony, Distrust, and Rhetorical Disadvantage

The contested testimony in the Hill-Thomas ease is an illuminating test case for universalistic theories about the reliability of testimony. There is no reasonable alternative to universalistic standards of epistemic appraisal. And yet the charge by feminists and others that such criteria can be applied selectively and used to discredit and silence people is shown to be accurate. The road to a solution is to offer guidelines for the interpretation and application of these norms.