The rat race and working time regulation

To what extent, if at all, should a just society adopt public policies that regulate and limit the amount of time people work? Attempts to answer this question face a dilemma: Either, we can adopt a laissez-faire view, according to which governments must refrain from imposing working time policies on the labour market. But this view generates a situation in which many citizens experience deep regret about the balance between work and leisure in their lives. Or, we can endorse an interventionist view that advocates government imposition of working time policies. However, such a view appears to be objectionably perfectionist insofar as it imposes on citizens a particular conception of the ideal balance between work and leisure. This article proposes a way out of this dilemma. It shows that the interventionist view can be defended on the anti-perfectionist grounds that this helps address a collective action problem in the labour market – the working time rat race. Employers often use working time as a proxy for their employees’ productivity and commitment. Those who work particularly long hours are often awarded benefits such as raises or promotions or are spared from dismissals. This makes it individually rational for each worker to work extra hours in an attempt to outcompete colleagues. However, if many workers pursue this strategy, it loses its effectiveness. Workers with preferences for more leisure have a claim to state intervention to remove the rat race when this doesn’t impose disproportionate harm on third parties.

The Matzak judgment of the CJEU: The concept of worker and the blurring frontiers of work and rest time

The CJEU’S Matzak judgment raises diverse and important questions concerning (not only) working time regulation in the European Union. The present special issue sheds light on some of these questions, more specifically with regard to the Working Time Directive‘s personal scope as well as the notions of working time and rest time under EU law. The Directive’s scope is linked to the concept of worker and the criteria to construct it and, in the context of the Matzak case, leads to interesting questions about the position of volunteers in EU law and the problem of concurrent contracts. In this respect, exploring a purposive approach attending to the health and safety aims of the Directive may be fruitful. The boundaries between working time and rest time are far from clear, especially in situations of stand-by and on call time. Here the proposal of an intermediate category related to the idea of quality of rest time is discussed.

Part-time work in Danish private services: a (mis)match between wage flexibility and living hours

This chapter explores how the institutional framework for working time and wage regulation affects the prevalence of marginal part-time employment (less than 15 working hours per week) and its implications for men and women's hourly earnings within retail, industrial cleaning, hotels and restaurants. Analytically, we draw on the concept of living hours and find that the combined effects of wage and working time regulation influence the take-up of contracts of few hours and the workforce composition. We argue that the institutional framework of collective agreements, in some instances, facilitates a win-win situation for employers and employees alike and narrows the gender pay gap. In other instances, the very same agreements seemingly promote dualisation, especially for young people and migrants in terms of wage penalties and contracts of few hours, indicating the dual nature of the institutional framework.

Proactive employers and teachers’ working time regulation: Public sector industrial conflicts in Denmark and Norway

Public sector industrial relations in Denmark are normally perceived as relatively consensual, and as a ‘model employer’ country with a strong collective bargaining tradition it is one of the countries where unilateral regulation could be least expected. However, in 2013, a lockout without any prior strike or strike-warning in the bargaining area for primary and lower secondary education only, came to an end through legislative intervention. The article includes three main arguments. First, the government and the public employers took these drastic steps because various factors created a rare ‘window of opportunity’ for them. Second, the reason a Norwegian industrial conflict in 2014 with a very similar point of departure ended very differently was first and foremost that the Norwegian process was not embedded in politics and policy reform to the same extent as the Danish process. Third, the Danish case shows that Denmark might not have escaped the trend towards unilateralism seen across Europe.