Eliminations and Reductions I

2021 ◽  
pp. 54-94
Author(s):  
Alex Worsnip
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
Positive Case ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Substantive Rationality ◽  
The Preface Paradox ◽  
Higher Order Evidence ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines and argues against attempts to eliminate the category of structural rationality or reduce it to substantive rationality. Together with the following chapter—which argues against eliminations and reductions of the converse kind—it thereby provides a positive case for dualism about rationality, according to which both kinds of rationality are genuine and neither is reducible to the other. On the way, it also argues that there are cases where being substantively rational does not suffice for being structurally rational, and examines the preface paradox and cases of misleading higher-order evidence.

Eliminations and Reductions II

2021 ◽  
pp. 95-124
Author(s):  
Alex Worsnip
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Positive Case ◽  
Substantive Rationality ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines and argues against attempts to eliminate the category of substantive rationality or reduce it to structural rationality. Together with the previous chapter—which argues against eliminations and reductions of the converse kind—it thereby provides a positive case for dualism about rationality according to which both kinds of rationality are genuine and neither is reducible to the other. On the way, it also argues against ideal attitudes accounts of reasons; neo-Kantian views according to which it’s structurally irrational to be immoral; and radical forms of coherentism and Bayesianism in epistemology.

Full Belief and Loose Speech

2019 ◽  
Vol 128 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Moss
Keyword(s):  
Rational Beliefs ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Full Belief ◽  
The Preface Paradox ◽  
Probabilistic Theories ◽  
The Way

This paper defends an account of full belief, including an account of its relationship to credence. Along the way, I address several familiar and difficult questions about belief. Does fully believing a proposition require having maximal confidence in it? Are rational beliefs closed under entailment, or does the preface paradox show that rational agents can believe inconsistent propositions? Does whether you believe a proposition depend partly on your practical interests? My account of belief resolves the tension between conflicting answers to these questions that have been defended in the literature. In addition, my account complements fruitful probabilistic theories of assertion and knowledge.

ON THE EPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF EVIDENCE YOU SHOULD HAVE HAD

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 449-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Strict Liability ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
Total Evidence ◽  
Knowing How ◽  
The One ◽  
Additional Support ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

ABSTRACTElsewhere I and others have argued that evidence one should have had can bear on the justification of one's belief, in the form of defeating one's justification. In this paper, I am interested in knowing how evidence one should have had (on the one hand) and one's higher-order evidence (on the other) interact in determinations of the justification of belief. In doing so I aim to address two types of scenario that previous discussions have left open. In one type of scenario, there is a clash between a subject's higher-order evidence and the evidence she should have had: S's higher-order evidence is misleading as to the existence or likely epistemic bearing of further evidence she should have. In the other, while there is further evidence S should have had, this evidence would only have offered additional support for S's belief that p. The picture I offer derives from two “epistemic ceiling” principles linking evidence to justification: one's justification for the belief that p can be no higher than it is on one's total evidence, nor can it be higher than what it would have been had one had all of the evidence one should have had. Together, these two principles entail what I call the doctrine of Epistemic Strict Liability: insofar as one fails to have evidence one should have had, one is epistemically answerable to that evidence whatever reasons one happened to have regarding the likely epistemic bearing of that evidence. I suggest that such a position can account for the battery of intuitions elicited in the full range of cases I will be considering.

The Puzzles of Easy Knowledge and of Higher-Order Evidence

2019 ◽  
pp. 173-188
Author(s):  
Ram Neta
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
Structural Constraints ◽  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
Higher Order Evidence

The goal of this chapter is to provide a unified solution to two widely discussed epistemological puzzles: the puzzle of easy knowledge and the puzzle of higher-order evidence. The chapter begins by setting out each of these two puzzles. It then briefly surveys some of the proposed solutions to each puzzle, none of which generalizes to the other. Finally, the chapter argues that the two puzzles arise because of a widespread confusion concerning the relation of substantive and structural constraints of rationality: or, in the epistemic domain, the relation of evidence and coherence. Clearing up this confusion allows us to clear up both puzzles at once.

scholarly journals Nudging Well

2021 ◽  
pp. 132-148
Author(s):  
Neil Levy
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Higher Order Evidence ◽  
The Way

Cleaning up the epistemic environment, in the way advocated in the last chapter, is or entails nudging beliefs, and nudging is very controversial. A central reason why nudging is controversial is that nudges are believed to bypass rational cognition. This chapter describes this concern, and argues it’s misplaced. Typically (at least) nudges provide higher-order evidence in favor of the options nudged. Nudges recommend options, and agents respond to nudges as recommendations. Our responses to nudges are (usually, at least) rational responses to evidence. Once we see how nudges work through the provision of higher-order evidence, we are in a position to recognize that the cues to expertise and to reliability we examined in previous chapters work in precisely the same way: they provide genuine evidence and we respond to them in virtue of that fact.

scholarly journals Context-sensitivity and the Preface Paradox for credence

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominik Kauss
Keyword(s):  
Context Sensitivity ◽  
Rational Belief ◽  
The Other ◽  
Preface Paradox ◽  
Contextualist Approach ◽  
The Preface Paradox

AbstractIt’s intuitively plausible to suppose that there are many things that we can be rationally certain of, at least in many contexts. The present paper argues that, given this principle of Abundancy, there is a Preface Paradox for (rational) credence. Section 1 gives a statement of the paradox, discusses its relation to its familiar counterpart for (rational) belief, and points out the congeniality between Abundancy and broadly contextualist trends in epistemology. This leads to the question whether considerations of context-sensitivity might lend themselves to solving the Preface for credence. Sections 2 and 3 scrutinize two approaches in this spirit—one mimicking Hawthorne’s (2002) Semantic Contextualist approach to an epistemic version of the Preface, the other one analogous to Clarke’s (2015) Sensitivist approach to the doxastic version—arguing that neither approach succeeds as it stands.

Development and regional planning within the decentralized administrative frame: case study (the Jordanian Experiment)

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 60-72
Author(s):  
Mansour Safran
Keyword(s):  
Regional Planning ◽  
The Other ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Administrative Procedures ◽  
The Way

This aims to review and analyze the Jordanian experiment in the developmental regional planning field within the decentralized managerial methods, which is considered one of the primary basic provisions for applying and success of this kind of planning. The study shoed that Jordan has passed important steps in the way for implanting the decentralized administration, but these steps are still not enough to established the effective and active regional planning. The study reveled that there are many problems facing the decentralized regional planning in Jordan, despite of the clear goals that this planning is trying to achieve. These problems have resulted from the existing relationship between the decentralized administration process’ dimensions from one side, and between its levels which ranged from weak to medium decentralization from the other side, In spite of the official trends aiming at applying more of the decentralized administrative policies, still high portion of these procedures are theoretical, did not yet find a way to reality. Because any progress or success at the level of applying the decentralized administrative policies doubtless means greater effectiveness and influence on the development regional planning in life of the residents in the kingdom’s different regions. So, it is important to go a head in applying more steps and decentralized administrative procedures, gradually and continuously to guarantee the control over any negative effects that might result from Appling this kind of systems.   © 2018 JASET, International Scholars and Researchers Association

Speech Acts by the Governor Candidates of North Sumatera in Political Debates

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vidya Dwi Amalia Zati ◽  
Sumarsih Sumarsih ◽  
Lince Sihombing
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
The Other ◽  
Political Debate ◽  
Direct Speech ◽  
Dominant Type ◽  
Political Debates ◽  
The Way ◽  
Descriptive Qualitative

The objectives of the research were to describe the types of speech acts used in televised political debates of governor candidates of North Sumatera, to derive the dominant type of speech acts used in televised political debates of governor candidates of North Sumatera and to elaborate the way of five governor candidates of North Sumatera use speech acts in televised political debates. This research was conducted by applying descriptive qualitative research. The findings show that there were only four types of speech acts used in televised political debates, Debat Pemilukada Sumatera Utara and Uji Publik Cagub dan Cawagub Sumatera Utara, they were assertives, directives, commissives and expressives. The dominant type of speech acts used in both televised political debates was assertives, with 82 utterances or 51.6% in Debat Pemilukada Sumatera Utara and 36 utterances or 41.37% in Uji Publik Cagub dan Cawagub Sumatera Utara. The way of governor candidates of North Sumatera used speech acts in televised political debates is in direct speech acts, they spoke straight to the point and clearly in order to make the other candidates and audiences understand their utterances.   Keywords: Governor Candidate; Political Debate; Speech Acts

Ibn-Ul-Arabi's Cultural Environment that Influenced Him

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 165
Author(s):  
Assist. Prof. Dr. Kazım Yıldırım
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Cultural Environment ◽  
Ibn Rushd ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
The Way

The cultural environment of Ibn al-Arabi is in Andalusia, Spain today. There, on the one hand, Sufism, on the other hand, thinks like Ibn Bacce (Death.1138), Ibn Tufeyl (Death186), Ibn Rushd (Death.1198) and the knowledge and philosophy inherited by scholars, . Ibn al-Arabi (1165-1240), that was the effect of all this; But more mystic (mystic) circles came out of the way. This work, written by Ibn al-Arabi's works (especially Futuhati Mekkiye), also contains a very small number of other relevant sources.

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