scholarly journals IGRA UVERAVANJA U VELIKIM GRUPAMA

2020 ◽  
Vol 67 (1/2020) ◽  
pp. 103-128
Author(s):  
Dusan Pavlovic
Keyword(s):  
Assurance Game

U tekstu istražujem primenu teorije igara na političke fenomene u velikim grupama (više od dva igrača). Fokusiram se na problem kolektivnog delanja u okviru igre uveravanja (assurance game). Nakon izlaganja opšteg oblika sa dva igrača, pokazujem kako igra izgleda kada u njoj učestvuje više igrača, sa naglaskom na tvrdnju kako igra može da pomogne u razumevanju situacija u kojima učešće jedne osobe u nekoj kolektivnoj radnji zavisi od očekivanja da će u njoj učestvovati druge osobe. Identifikujem četiri ključna elementa za rešenje ove igre – pivot, tip učesnika, životni optimizam i vrsta kolektivnih normi. Politički primeri na kojima pokazujem značaj ovih koncepata su glasanje u skupštini, učešće na građanskim protestima, izborno glasanje za male stranke i pristupanje pokretu otpora. Uočavamo da je za svaku igru dominantniji neki drugi faktor koji doprinosi uspehu kolektivnog delanja i rešenju igre.

The Hare Question in Assurance Games: Practical Problems and Insights From Robotic Surgery

2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-30
Author(s):  
Roger Lee Mendoza
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Robotic Surgery ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Canonical Model ◽  
Health Care Economics ◽  
Robotic Technology ◽  
Cooperative Action ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
Practical Implications

We examine in this article a frequently overlooked, if not ignored, premise underlying the canonical assurance game model: Hunters could potentially bag more than a single hare (or two) in place of the prized stag. Whether a risk-dominant equilibrium is necessarily inefficient or inferior to one that is assumed to be payoff-dominant is the question we seek to address. In doing so, we suggest plausible variations of the model with different game-theoretic realizations. Single-play illustrations drawn from robotic surgery underscore their practical implications for health care economics and management. The robotic technology revolution amplifies the rational and interactive choices available to players under conditions of risk and uncertainty. Like the canonical model, our illustrations involve insulated, self-interested actions arising from the presence or absence of trust and coordination among players. They differ from the canonical model by allowing for multiple, potentially cooperative equilibrium payoffs. Any cooperative action can be considered optimal if players coordinated on it, taking fully into account the quantifiable and multiplicable value of their second best strategies. Nonetheless, we suggest that any dominant solution/s should accommodate best evidence in health care to provide patients with the most suitable treatments and services. There lies the challenge in reconciling theory and practice in health economics. JEL Classifications: C70, C71, I11, I12

Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Problems

2008 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Dalibor Roháč
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Weakest Link ◽  
Game Of Chicken ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
The Difference

Abstract In this paper, we discuss several issues related to public goods provision. Unlike many Austrians, we do not think that the concept of public goods - or of collective action - is an inherently flawed idea, even though we reject the alleged welfare implications of public goods theory, as proposed by orthodox public finance literature. We then argue that the structure of a generic public goods problem is more a game of chicken or an assurance game than a prisoner's dilemma and that this has important implications with regard to the plausibility of cooperative outcomes. Namely, when the public goods problem has the weakest-link structure and can be represented as an assurance game, then the cooperative outcome will be self-enforcing. In many cases, the public goods problems can be transformed into weakest-link games or different mechanisms can be found to ensure cooperation. We also discuss the difference between a public goods problem and collusion. We assert that, unlike public goods problems, collusive agreements have the structure of a prisoner's dilemma. Overall, our paper suggests that there are reasons to be optimistic about stability and efficiency of stateless societal orders.

Steht auf, wenn ihr Deutsche seid!

2007 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Holger Strulik
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Social Behavior ◽  
Collective Behavior ◽  
Threshold Model ◽  
World War ◽  
World Cup ◽  
The World ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
Informational Cascade ◽  
Over Time

SummaryDuring the World Cup 2006 Germany experienced a surge of revealed patriotism unseen so far after World War II. How can this unexpected and spontaneous change of social behavior be explained given that preferences (for patriotism) are stable over time? This essay introduces and discusses three possible explanations: (i) patriotism as assurance game, (ii) patriotism as informational cascade, and (iii) patriotism as equilibrium in the threshold model of collective behavior.

scholarly journals More than meets the eye – and less: Comments on The Internationalists

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-341
Author(s):  
ANDREAS FOLLESDAL
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
International Law ◽  
New World ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
World Order ◽  
New World Order ◽  
Great Contribution ◽  
Old World ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Assurance Game

Abstract:These comments address three themes concerning Oona A Hathaway’s and Scott J Shapiro’s The Internationalists (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017), a great contribution to scholarship about international relations, international law and international legal theory. I first explore further some game theoretical themes, how the Peace Pact arguably contributed to avoid war by creating institutions – such as international courts – that helped stabilise an assurance game among states by providing trustworthy information and commitments, in turn influencing practices and beliefs concerning mutual non-aggression. Second, I suggest that the authors should not claim more than that the Peace Pact was one cause of the massive shift in reduced warfare. Further arguments are needed to show that this treaty was the trigger that ‘began a cascade’. Third, I suggest that the lessons for the future are limited, as we explore how to preserve and improve on the New World Order of the Pact, rather than backsliding into the Old World Order.

Why Hobbes' State of Nature is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game

Utilitas ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MOEHLER
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The State ◽  
The Third ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
Third Law

In this article, I argue that if one closely follows Hobbes' line of reasoning in Leviathan, in particular his distinction between the second and the third law of nature, and the logic of his contractarian theory, then Hobbes' state of nature is best translated into the language of game theory by an assurance game, and not by a one-shot or iterated prisoner's dilemma game, nor by an assurance dilemma game. Further, I support Hobbes' conclusion that the sovereign must always punish the Foole, and even exclude her from the cooperative framework or take her life, if she defects once society is established, which is best expressed in the language of game theory by a grim strategy. That is, compared to existing game-theoretic interpretations of Hobbes, I argue that the sovereign plays a grim strategy with the citizens once society is established, and not the individuals with one another in the state of nature.

Patent Law and the Assurance Game: Refitting Intellectual Property in the Box of Regulation

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shubha Ghosh
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Contract Theory ◽  
Social Contract Theory ◽  
Patent Law ◽  
Innovative Products ◽  
Assurance Game ◽  
Unique Relationship

Patent law is often understood through the fiction of social contract. The author argues that this fiction does not offer an adequate economic or political theory of patent law, that is, one that will explain the unique relationship between government and property that patents entail. As an alternative to social contract theory, a regulatory theory of patent law is developed based on the assurance game taken from game theory. The assurance game is used to show how patent law serves to regulate the invention process and the market for innovative products.

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