Women’s Emancipation from Slavery in Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries

Women were the majority of enslaved people in Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries. Slavery was transformed and expanded in the context of so-called “legitimate commerce” that followed the abolition of oceanic slave trading. Abolition proclamations followed, in British colonies in the 1830s, and elsewhere from the 1870s through much of the 20th century, but abolition did not equate to freedom. Gender was at the heart of emancipation everywhere. Colonial merchants and officials colluded with local male elites to ensure the least disruption possible to the status quo. For these male allies, emancipation was a contradiction in terms for women, because masculine authority and control over women was assumed. In many regions, it was difficult for Europeans to distinguish between marriage, pawnship, and slavery. Women engaged strategically with colonial institutions like the courts over such distinctions to assert some form of control over their own lives, labor, and bodies. Where slavery and marriage were categorically distinct, again women might engage with Western gender stereotypes of marriage to extricate themselves from the authority of former slaveholders, or they might withdraw their labor by fleeing from the farms. Whereas for Europeans women were ideally defined as subservient wives within nuclear families, for many women themselves motherhood and access to their children were key to struggles toward emancipation. Women’s decisions about their emancipation were influenced by many factors, including whether or not they were mothers, if they were born into slavery or enslaved as children or adults, their experiences of coercion and cruelty including sexual violence, their status within the slaveholding, and their relationships of dependency and support. Topography and location mattered; urban contexts offered different kinds of post-slavery opportunity for many, and access to land and other economic opportunities and limitations were critical. The abolition of slavery by European colonial officials did not emancipate women, but it did provide the context in which some women might negotiate or claim their own rights to freedom as they defined it—which in some cases meant walking away from systems of involuntary servitude. Some women engaged colonial officers and institutions directly to demand a change in status, whereas others decided to stay in relationships that, in many cases, were subtly redefined.

Employer Rights Against Worker Involuntary Servitude

This paper argues that employers can sometimes validly challenge laws as violating the Thirteenth Amendment’s Involuntary Servitude Clause. Judges currently read that clause to bar some kinds of physical or legal coercion against workers who would otherwise quit their current employer. This paper identifies how existing Involuntary Servitude Clause doctrine can be extended to bar legal coercion against prospective employers who would otherwise hire those workers after they quit. If so extended, the Involuntary Servitude Clause sets a minimum level of labor mobility in the United States. To illustrate, the paper discusses how employers can use the Involuntary Servitude Clause to challenge (1) labor mobility restrictions on H-2 foreign guest workers, and (2) non-competition clauses in labor contracts.

Protection

Chapter 2 describes the protective principle and in dubio pro operario in Latin America, namely, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. It also describes worker protection in International Labor Organization (ILO) instruments and other international human rights texts. It then searches for the protective principle and in dubio pro operario in the United States. It argues that the protective principle can be found in the Thirteenth Amendment, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Thirteenth Amendment bans involuntary servitude and mandates Congress to protect free labor. The chapter even finds something akin to in dubio pro operario in the general way that U.S. jurisprudence calls for “liberal” interpretations of statutes that derogate the common law. It further finds the protective principle in U.S. purposive methods of statutory interpretation, applied by some judges. However, those broad, purposive, worker-protective interpretations of the law have given way to more reluctant and narrow readings of the labor laws—and without good reasons. Finally, we address how employment at will narrows worker protection in the United States. While U.S. labor law has grown less labor protective, judges could reverse existing jurisprudence through the existing legal texts. Some statutory reform is, however, desirable, especially if anchored in the Thirteenth Amendment and if it derogates employment at will.

The Strange Career of the Convict Clause: US Prison Imperialism in the Panamá Canal Zone

This article follows the “convict clause” in the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution – the exception for slavery and involuntary servitude to continue as punishment for crime – to the Panamá Canal Zone. It argues that US officials used the prison system not only to extract labor, but to structure racial hierarchy and justify expansionist claims to jurisdiction and sovereignty. It reveals how despite the purported “usefulness” of the Black bodies conscripted in this brutal labor regime, the prison system's operational modality was racial and gendered violence which exceeded the registers of political economy, penology, and state-building in which that usefulness was framed. The Canal Zone convict road building scheme then became a cornerstone from which Good Roads Movement boosters, who claimed the convict was a slave of the state, could push for the Pan-American Highway across the hemisphere. Afro-Panamanian and Caribbean workers, who were the majority of those forced into Canal Zone chain gangs, protested the racism and imperialism of the prison system by blending anti-colonial and anti-racist strategies and deploying a positive notion of blackness as solidarity and race pride. Their efforts and insight offer an understanding of the US carceral state's imperial dimensions as well as enduring lessons for movements struggling to broaden the meaning and experience of freedom in the face of slavery's recurrent afterlives.

Black Codes and Bondage, Settling the North, Legislative Follies

Chapter 3 covers the years in which the Illinois state capital moved from Kaskaskia to Vandalia to Springfield, focusing on legislative and judicial debates surrounding the Black Code, which limited the rights of free blacks, and the euphemistic practices of indentured/involuntary servitude and apprenticeship contracts. As antislavery populations surged in northern Illinois, political and legal opinions about blacks shifted. The 1832 Black Hawk War, a land dispute involving the Sauk and Fox, led to the 1833 treaty that removed Native Americans from the state. The Illinois General Assembly, including in 1836–37 representatives Stephen Douglas and Abraham Lincoln, chartered state banks that failed; set up internal improvement schemes that indebted the state; and ultimately supported completion of the Illinois and Michigan Canal (1848).