Anti-Realisms Local and Global
The Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy rejects the metaphysical realist thesis that there is such a thing as how things are anyway, independently of the concepts we happen to use. While other Buddhist schools claim that such things as persons, trees, and tables are mere useful fictions, they maintain that these fictions are usefully grounded in facts about the ultimate nature of reality. Not so Mādhyamikas, who are pan-fictionalists. They support this stance by seeking to demonstrate that various hypotheses concerning things with intrinsic nature (things that are thus purported to be ultimately real) lead to absurdities. The conclusion one is invited to draw is that all things are empty, that is, devoid of intrinsic nature. Some sample reductios are examined, and various realist objections are considered. Several different interpretations of Madhyamaka anti-realism are discussed, with a semantic non-dualist reading, to the effect that the very idea of ultimate truth is incoherent, being judged the most plausible.