Transforming the Party Identity of German Radical Right: In Search of Female Support

The crises of the beginning of the 21st century changed the political landscape of modern Germany, which was manifested in increasing right-wing radicalism. As the party identity of the far-right transforms, they shift from being marginal nationalist anti-migrant forces, contradicting the democratic culture of Germany, to movements which defend identity and rights, including womens rights. Thus, the far-right in Germany claim to become a part of the civic culture that includes the right to criticize and disagree with the governments policies. The article examines how far-right parties interact with the female electorate on the example of the Alternative for Germany party. The study highlights the main activities of the Alternative for Germany in attracting womens votes, based on the analysis of the partys political program, interviews with party members and media materials. These activities include the orientation towards the socio-economic issues, concerning women, the consideration of the migrant problem through the prism of the Muslim threat towards women, the protection of the interests of conservative women, the attraction of women as party leaders. The author pays a special attention to female right-wing activists, as independent actors in the political life of Germany. Based on the cases of Beate Zschpe, Francisca Berit and #120db movement, the following interests of female activists were determined: opposing to gender mainstreaming, which threatens the traditional family structure, and opposing to Islam as a source of violence against women. Alternative for Germany aims at strengthening its positions among all women, whose rights are an integral part of European identity, therefore, the actualization of womens involvement in the movement becomes not only instrumental, but also of value nature. More radically oriented female activists get involved in the European Identitarian movement.

Negative partisanship is not more prevalent than positive partisanship

The dominant narrative among scholars and political pundits characterizes American partisanship as overwhelmingly negative --- portraying citizens as more repelled by the opposing party than attached to their own party. To assess the valence of partisan identity, we use novel measures, several new and existing nationally representative surveys, and behavioral outcomes obtained from two experiments. Our findings consistently depart from the negative partisanship narrative. For the majority of Americans, partisanship is either equally positive and negative or more positive than negative. Only partisan leaners stand out as negative partisans. We pair these observational findings with experimental data that differentiate between positive group behavior and negative group behavior in the partisan context. We find that the behavioral manifestations of party identity similarly include both positive and negative biases in balance, reinforcing our conclusion that descriptions of partisanship as primarily negative are exaggerated.

Follow the scientists? How beliefs about the practice of science shaped COVID-19 views

“Follow the science” became the mantra for responding to COVID-19 pandemic. However, for the public this also meant “follow the scientists”, and this led to uneasiness as some viewed scientists as not credible. We investigate how beliefs about the way scientists develop their findings affect pandemic-related views. Our analysis shows that beliefs about scientists' objectivity predict views regrading coronavirus-related risks, behavioral changes, and policy priorities. While political party identity also predicts views about COVID-19-related concerns, these vary by political leaders whose approaches embraced versus dismissed science-based strategies, highlighting the importance of perceptions of scientists in shaping pandemic-related attitudes and beliefs.

What matters for keeping or losing support in televised debates

What leads citizens to change their candidate preferences during televised debates? The present paper addresses this question with real-time response and panel survey data from respondents recruited in the run-up to the 2017 German national election. Probing the importance of party identity and performance perceptions formed during the debate, the analysis more closely examines several core determinants than has previously been done with real-time response data. The findings suggest, first, that only a strong or very strong party identity is an effective barrier to candidate preference change. Second, beyond party identity, ratings of candidates’ issue-specific statements on policy issues show a very strong effect, albeit regardless of personal issue importance. Third, this influence of candidate ratings does not seem to be mediated through changes in valence perceptions. Rather, viewers seem to form a general impression of the candidates which cannot be reduced to performance perceptions regarding policy issues.

The Effects of Politician’s Moral Violations on Voters' Moral Emotions

Existing empirical research on voters’ responses to individual politicians’ moral transgressions pays limited attention to moral emotions, although moral emotions are an integral part of voters’ moral judgment. This study looks at U.S. voters’ discrete moral emotional responses to politician’s moral violations and examines how these discrete moral emotional responses are dependent on voters’ own moral principles and the extent to which they identify with a political party. We report on a 5 × 3 between-subjects experiment where 2026 U.S. respondents reacted to politicians’ violations of one of five moral foundations defined by Moral Foundations Theory. We randomly vary which moral foundation is violated and the partisanship of the politician. While voters’ own moral principles somewhat condition moral emotional responses, we find that voters’ moral emotional responses mostly depend on partisan identification. When voters share party identity with a politician committing a moral violation, they respond with less anger, contempt, disgust and shame than when they do not share party identity. The effect is greater among strong partisans. However, we find limited evidence that specific moral emotions are activated by violations of particular moral foundations, thereby challenging Moral Foundations Theory.

The emotional valence of candidate ratings in televised debates

It is well-established that party identity biases the processing of political information and the evaluation of political actors. This is presumed to avoid cognitive dissonance and achieve positive affect. What happens, however, when individuals diverge from this pattern and do make identity-inconsistent evaluations of political actors – how does this translate into positive and negative emotions toward the candidates? The paper addresses this question using large-N data from the main televised debate of the 2017 German national election by combining survey responses with viewer perceptions measured during the debate. The findings suggest that candidate ratings made during the debate have different valence depending on a person’s party identity. Strikingly, a stronger party identity does not mean a reduced impact of identity-inconsistent evaluations on emotional responses toward a candidate. Rather, only evaluations in accordance with one’s party identity, and hence with lower information value, show a reduced effect on emotional responses.

The Study of Independent Voters

More Americans identify as Independent than as Republican or Democrat. Who are Independents and how do they impact American politics? This question does not have a clear-cut answer. On the one hand, American Independents are pursued by media and politicians for their (perceived) nonpartisan behavior and their ability to swing elections. On the other hand, Independents are ignored for their low political engagement and dismissed as “closet partisans.” As a result, many analyses of American voters either remove Independents entirely or combine leaners—those Independents who admit feeling closer toward one party or the other—with weak partisans. This puts Independents and the researchers who study them in a strange position as we attempt to understand the role of Independent voters in American politics. The debate about whether Independent leaners are truly independent or whether they are “closet partisans” dominates the literature, but a thorough review of the evidence reveals many interesting findings and generates many interesting research questions surrounding the motivations for an Independent identity and its consequences. We address the who, how, why, and where of Independent voters: Who Are Independents? discusses Measurement of Party Identity and Independence, Partisan Dealignment, and Demographics of Independent Voters; How Do Independents Behave? discusses Voting, Political Interest and Engagement, and Implicit Attitudes and Intergroup Bias; Why Identify As Independent? discusses intrapersonal and interpersonal motivations for identifying as Independent; and Where Do We Go From Here? suggests common practices for researchers to enhance the study of Independent voters.

STABILITY AND CHANGES IN PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN TAIWAN: AN EXAMINATION OF LIFE CYCLE, COHORT, AND PERIOD EFFECTS

This article builds on the theoretical debate over age, period, and cohort effects (APC) and explores how these factors might affect Taiwan's partisan stability. We conducted a two-level multinomial logit random effects model using survey data from 1991 to 2020 to disentangle the APC effects. Our findings challenge Converse's core assumption that partisanship strengthens with age. As a new democracy, Taiwan's party affiliations remain fluid, and we do find evidence of period effects, particularly associated with cross-Strait crises that favor the DPP. However, generational replacement is the most significant factor driving party identity changes in Taiwan. With generational replacement, the Kuomintang is burdened by the image of a century-old party. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had previously fared better among young cohorts but has recently lost its support from millennials. The youngest generation increasingly refuses to associate with the traditional political parties. It seems reasonable to expect that the new generational forces will restructure the Blue–Green cleavage and expand the ideological diversity of Taiwan's party system.

Revisiting the Concept of Moderation in the Age of Populism: the akp case of Turkey

This article presents the case of Turkey within the framework of this special issue entitled “On Islamist Parties and the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis”. I argue that rather than a distinction between the concepts of ”tactical” and “ideological” moderation that the literature talks about, a distinction between the concepts of an “inclusionary-populist” and “moderate Islamist” party could provide a more useful insight over the role of Islamist and post-Islamist parties in democratization and de-democratization processes. Through a re-analysis of the secondary literature and a content analysis of 196 newspaper columns written by three pro-democracy intellectuals, I label the akp’s transition period from moderate-Islamism toward authoritarianism as its inclusionary populist phase. I show that in contexts marked by deep ideological divisions and unconsolidated democratic institutions, a shift in party identity from moderate-Islamism toward inclusionary populism can be taken as the early signal of an unfolding process of autocratization.