scholarly journals Transforming the Party Identity of German Radical Right: In Search of Female Support

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 706-718
Author(s):  
Ekaterina S. Burmistrova

The crises of the beginning of the 21st century changed the political landscape of modern Germany, which was manifested in increasing right-wing radicalism. As the party identity of the far-right transforms, they shift from being marginal nationalist anti-migrant forces, contradicting the democratic culture of Germany, to movements which defend identity and rights, including womens rights. Thus, the far-right in Germany claim to become a part of the civic culture that includes the right to criticize and disagree with the governments policies. The article examines how far-right parties interact with the female electorate on the example of the Alternative for Germany party. The study highlights the main activities of the Alternative for Germany in attracting womens votes, based on the analysis of the partys political program, interviews with party members and media materials. These activities include the orientation towards the socio-economic issues, concerning women, the consideration of the migrant problem through the prism of the Muslim threat towards women, the protection of the interests of conservative women, the attraction of women as party leaders. The author pays a special attention to female right-wing activists, as independent actors in the political life of Germany. Based on the cases of Beate Zschpe, Francisca Berit and #120db movement, the following interests of female activists were determined: opposing to gender mainstreaming, which threatens the traditional family structure, and opposing to Islam as a source of violence against women. Alternative for Germany aims at strengthening its positions among all women, whose rights are an integral part of European identity, therefore, the actualization of womens involvement in the movement becomes not only instrumental, but also of value nature. More radically oriented female activists get involved in the European Identitarian movement.

Author(s):  
Melanie Mierzejewski-Voznyak

During much of Ukraine’s post-Soviet history, the radical right has remained on the political periphery, wielding little influence over national politics. However, from 2009 to 2014, Ukraine saw a radical right-wing party, Svoboda, enter parliament, and from 2014 to 2016 there was an increased social role played by the right-wing radical groups Pravyi Sektor and Azov. Thus, the political impact of the far right in Ukraine extends beyond electoral performance and to the activities of extra-parliamentary groups that are beginning to penetrate political life and state institutions. The radical right in Ukraine is intertwined, but not identical, with ethnic Ukrainian nationalism. The direction and development of the Ukrainian far right have thus been a result of both the historical legacy and cultural context of a nation that was ruled over by others for centuries and is home to competing ethnic nationalisms and geopolitical orientations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 47-55
Author(s):  
Olga Patrikeeva

A Majority system of elections to the State Duma of the Russian Empire pushed the political parties participating in election campaigns to the conclusion of electoral blocs and agreements. The purpose of this article is to find out whether the generated block of Octobrists and reactionaries in the elections in the II State Duma? Compromised if the leadership of the “Soyuz 17 oktyabrya” the pre-election agreement with such odious political force? The methodological basis of this work was the principles of historicism, scientific credibility and objectivity, as well as traditional methods of historical research: problem-chronological, comparative. Based on the analysis of preserved in the archives of the party’s correspondence and also periodicals of the time the author comes to the conclusion that the election agreement of the “Soyuz 17 oktyabrya” with the right-wing political parties did not take place. The reason is the difference in the views of the moderate and far-right politicians to solve the “Jewish question” in Russia in the early twentieth century.


Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 250
Author(s):  
Mark Weitzman

Since the notorious Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville in 2017, the alt-right has surged into prominence as the most visible expression of right-wing extremism. While most analysts have focused on the political aspect of the movement, my article will explore the spiritual and religious roots and connections of the movement. In particular, I will focus on how Mircea Eliade, one of the most prominent figures in the academic study of the history of religion in the late 20th century, is viewed by many current extreme right thinkers. Drawing on the writings of some of the leading theoreticians and inspirations of the alt-right such as Julius Evola, Alain de Benoist, Aleksandr Dugin and Richard Spencer, as well as the prominent extreme right publishing houses, Arktos and Counter-Currents, I will show how Eliade’s extremely controversial and problematic past is seen as an intellectual and even spiritual source for these leading figures.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (188) ◽  
pp. 347-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silke Van Dyk

Trump‘s electoral victory, Brexit, the emergence of the AfD or the strength of right-wing politics in France and Austria indicate a new era of the political in which neoliberal hegemony is being increasingly challenged from the right. The current shift to the far right goes hand in hand with a new quantity and quality of lies and falsehoods. Consequently, many commentators have diagnosed the emergence of a ‘post truth society’. Beginning with an overview of this debate, this article assesses the ‘post truth’ diagnosis and challenges not only the new dimension of lies but also the truth claims of critics. The article argues that we will not be able to understand the characteristics and perils of the post truth society if we do not address the anti-pluralist and elitist neoliberal technocracy of the recent past. The critique of the liberal critique of Trump & Co. raises the question of what an emancipatory social criticism of far-right falsehoods might look like that does not reaffirm liberal dominance on one side and the resurgence of powerful positivist truth claims on the other.


2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 34-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Anne Simpson

Europe has witnessed the rise of a multigenerational, populist shift to the right, characterized by the unapologetic deployment of extremist symbols, ideologies, and politics, but also by repudiations of right-wing labels associated with racism, xenophobia, and nativist entitlements. The political lexicon of far-right rhetoric derives its considerable persuasive force from mobilizing and normalizing extremist views. This article examines the intricately and translocally woven connections among representative movements, organizations, and media personalities who popularize and disseminate far-right views through social media and their own internet websites. With diatribes about the threat against Russia, the uncontainable and intolerable influx of refugees and asylum seekers, whom they blame for terrorist attacks, deteriorating family values, the loss of national German identity, and the antidemocratic politics of Chancellor Angela Merkel, the cadre of self-credentializing experts and politicians, some in alignment with Pegida, mobilize historical moments and meanings to make connections with a broad spectrum of supporters.


2006 ◽  
pp. 54-75
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Friedrich

Facing the decisive struggle between Nazism and Soviet communism for dominance in Europe, in 1942/43 Polish communists sojourning in the USSR espoused anti-German concepts of the political right. Their aim was an ethnic Polish ‘national communism’. Meanwhile, the Polish Workers’ Party in the occupied country advocated a maximum intensification of civilian resistance and partisan struggle. In this context, commentaries on the Nazi judeocide were an important element in their endeavors to influence the prevailing mood in the country: The underground communist press often pointed to the fate of the murdered Jews as a warning in order to make it clear to the Polish population where a deficient lack of resistance could lead. However, an agreed, unconditional Polish and Jewish armed resistance did not come about. At the same time, the communist press constantly expanded its demagogic confrontation with Polish “reactionaries” and accused them of shared responsibility for the Nazi murder of the Jews, while the Polish government (in London) was attacked for its failure. This antagonism was intensified in the fierce dispute between the Polish and Soviet governments after the rift which followed revelations about the Katyn massacre. Now the communist propaganda image of the enemy came to the fore in respect to the government and its representatives in occupied Poland. It viewed the government-in-exile as being allied with the “reactionaries,” indifferent to the murder of the Jews, and thus acting ultimately on behalf of Nazi German policy. The communists denounced the real and supposed antisemitism of their adversaries more and more bluntly. In view of their political isolation, they coupled them together, in an undifferentiated manner, extending from the right-wing radical ONR to the social democrats and the other parties represented in the underground parliament loyal to the London based Polish government. Thereby communist propaganda tried to discredit their opponents and to justify the need for a new start in a post-war Poland whose fate should be shaped by the revolutionary left. They were thus paving the way for the ultimate communist takeover


Author(s):  
Claudia Leeb

Through a critical appropriation of Hannah Arendt, and a more sympathetic engagement with Theodor W. Adorno and psychoanalysis, this book develops a new theoretical approach to understanding Austrians’ repression of their collaboration with National Socialist Germany. Drawing on original, extensive archival research, from court documents on Nazi perpetrators to public controversies on theater plays and museums, the book exposes the defensive mechanisms Austrians have used to repress individual and collective political guilt, which led to their failure to work through their past. It exposes the damaging psychological and political consequences such failure has had and continues to have for Austrian democracy today—such as the continuing electoral growth of the right-wing populist Freedom Party in Austria, which highlights the timeliness of the book. However, the theoretical concepts and practical suggestions the book introduces to counteract the repression of individual and collective political guilt are relevant beyond the Austrian context. It shows us that only when individuals and nations live up to guilt are they in a position to take responsibility for past crimes, show solidarity with the victims of crimes, and prevent the emergence of new crimes. Combining theoretical insights with historical analysis, The Politics of Repressed Guilt is an important addition to critical scholarship that explores the pathological implications of guilt repression for democratic political life.


2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-362
Author(s):  
Myungji Yang

Through the case of the New Right movement in South Korea in the early 2000s, this article explores how history has become a battleground on which the Right tried to regain its political legitimacy in the postauthoritarian context. Analyzing disputes over historiography in recent decades, this article argues that conservative intellectuals—academics, journalists, and writers—play a pivotal role in constructing conservative historical narratives and building an identity for right-wing movements. By contesting what they viewed as “distorted” leftist views and promoting national pride, New Right intellectuals positioned themselves as the guardians of “liberal democracy” in the Republic of Korea. Existing studies of the Far Right pay little attention to intellectual circles and their engagement in civil society. By examining how right-wing intellectuals appropriated the past and shaped triumphalist national imagery, this study aims to better understand the dynamics of ideational contestation and knowledge production in Far Right activism.


1962 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 430-439
Author(s):  
José M. Sánchez

Few subjects in recent history have lent themselves to such heated polemical writing and debate as that concerning the Spanish Church and its relationship to the abortive Spanish revolution of 1931–1939. Throughout this tragic era and especially during the Civil War, it was commonplace to find the Church labelled as reactionary, completely and unalterably opposed to progress, and out of touch with the political realities of the twentieth century.1 In the minds of many whose views were colored by the highly partisan reports of events in Spain during the nineteen thirties, the Church has been pictured as an integral member of the Unholy Triumvirate— Bishops, Landlords, and enerals—which has always conspired to impede Spanish progress. Recent historical scholarship has begun to dispel some of the notions about the right-wing groups,2 but there has been little research on the role of the clergy. Even more important, there has been little understanding of the Church's response to the radical revolutionary movements in Spain.


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